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9==========
0. PREFACE
==========
It is one of the assertions of the book that software 
art praxis can offer new critical forms of arts practice 
by embodying contradictions in the interplay between 
code and action. Contradiction is also embodied in the 
form the text itself takes, as both a conventional piece 
of academic writing (referred to herein as thesis) and 
a script written in Perl. Together, it presents an 
argument _about_ software art that is simultaneously an 
example _of_ software art. Crucially, both the thesis 
and the program can be interpreted and acted upon.
 
The book, derived from my Doctoral thesis completed in 
2006, includes references to a number of other essays 
written during the time of study, as well as some 
key collaborative projects: notably the exhibition _
Generator_, the publication _Notes Towards the Complete 
Works of Shakespeare_, and the project _The UK Museum of 
Ordure_ (details of all can be found in the ‘references’ 
section at the end of the book). Although referred to in 
the text, the projects do not illustrate the thesis but 
embody its argument. Similarly, the text is not a linked 
narrative to these projects but an example of software 
art practice in itself. In form and content, the thesis 
aims to express a dialectics of software art; expressing 
a move from in-itself to for-itself. 
Finally, I would like to thank Roy Ascott and Andreas 
Broeckmann who supervised the thesis. Thanks also go to 
all those who have helped in its preparation and the 
production of related projects: Stuart Brisley, Rowan 
Green, George Grinsted, Joasia Krysa, Lau Thiam Kok, 
Mike Lawson-Smith, Alex McLean, Hugo de Rijke, Victoria 
de Rijke, Tom Trevor, and especially Adrian Ward. The 
publication of the book has been generously facilitated 
through the Digital Aesthetics Research Center, Aarhus 
University, following initial support from the Faculties 
of Art and Technology at the University of Plymouth for 
the research stage. As the text was first written in 
2006, some details are a lttle outmoded in places, but I 
do hope its subsequent publication is not too late to be 
useful in some way to its readers.    
GC
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#!/usr/bin/Perl
print <<antiTHESIS;
================================
*the dialectics of software art*
================================
Geoff Cox 
=================
1. *introduction*
=================
‘Beyond the words being read, others lie in wait to 
subvert and perhaps surpass them. Nothing any longer can 
be taken for granted; every word has become a banana 
peel. The fine surface unity that a piece of writing 
proposes is belied and beleaguered; behind it, in 
the realm of potentiality, a dialectic has emerged.’ 
(Mathews, in Motte 1998: 126) 
An underlying assumption of this thesis is that software 
is not simply a functional tool but expresses wider 
cultural and technological processes that extend the 
critical potential of arts practice. In this way, the 
approach taken follows a critical tradition that aims 
to challenge the usual relations of production when 
making art using computers, where the efforts of the 
programmer are often hidden, and remain subordinate to 
that of the end-product or artist. Like the programmer, 
the source code that lies behind a software artwork also 
remains relatively hidden and consequently difficult to 
consider as an integral part of the work. The approach 
advocated in this thesis, in contrast, emphasises the 
process rather than the end-product - literally the 
‘work’, not the object of art. Clearly this is not 
without precedence, but in the case of ‘software art’ 
the activity of work can be applied to both programming 
and the program (and even the result of these processes 
that in itself might be a further generative process), 
as well as the other material required for the program 
to run (which together is referred to as software). 
Indeed, software art might draw attention to any one 
or combination of these activities, but in general 
is considered to be not the artwork resulting from 
software, but software as artwork. 
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The thesis begins with a general overview of software 
art and culture (chapter 2), including some of the 
historical influences such as arts practice that have 
developed in the conceptual tradition and that draw upon 
systems theory. The chapter pays particular attention to 
the currency for the term software art, in contrast to 
the term ‘generative art’ associated with algorithmic 
and computer-based practices that tended towards an 
emphasis on more formalist concerns. Contemporary 
definitions of software art express both lines of 
continuity and discontinuity from these previous modes 
of creative production, but in general tend towards an 
emphasis on social context. Hence a critical practice in 
software art demonstrates the potential to be developed 
relative to the interactions of technical, cultural and 
political processes. Software art appears to be well-
suited to comment upon the ways in which these processes 
increasingly utilise software but also ‘act’ like 
software. A critical practice in software art (something 
this thesis argues for) arises from these reflexive 
conditions, in which the form the work takes and its 
subject matter are entwined. 
Software is always about itself in the sense that its 
source code both expresses what it will do, and does 
it, at the same time. That software appears to express 
this dual state of being and becoming, is analogous to 
a dialectical understanding of historical processes 
(chapter 3). These processes are thereby understood 
as dynamic and emergent phenomena that are analogous 
to the inner workings of software, and to systems in 
general that express ongoing processes of development 
and feedback. Historical materialism, rather than 
expressing a historical continuum, conceptualises the 
relation of the past to the present as a dialectical 
relation of ‘what-has-been’ to the ‘now’. To furnish 
this discussion, the dialectical method is described 
in more detail, and a position is adopted that stresses 
the importance of negation and the retention of 
contradiction, rather than any reconciliation at the point 
of synthesis. Like software, the approach suggests that 
nothing is finished or resolved but is in a continual state 
of becoming, appropriate to its emergent properties. 
 
Building upon this dialectical understanding, the 
historical development of informational technologies 
can also be seen to express lines of discontinuity 
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and continuity from previous modes (chapter 4) - 
discontinuity of technical form but continuity of 
capitalist logic. The contemporary network structure, 
for instance, although arranged in dynamic and 
distributed forms, can be seen to express control and 
feedback like any other system. A critical tradition 
that pays attention to systems, informed by both 
dialectical materialism and cybernetics, can be useful 
in revealing some of the new antagonisms that emerge. A 
problem arises in that the control expressed in complex 
systems remains relatively hidden, as it is expressed 
in ever more complex and ‘immaterial’ formations that 
obscure historical and material conditions, as well as 
the social consequences. Rather than an understanding 
of complexity and immateriality legislating against 
a dialectical approach (as is the case with much 
post-Marxist thinking), this thesis draws together 
a simultaneous understanding of complex systems and 
dialectical materialism, to take account of these new 
formations and provide critical insights into the power 
relations at work. This represents an optimistic turn 
for a critical art practice through software art, by 
drawing attention to the ways in which disorder can lead 
to a new sense of order (which leads to further disorder 
and so on).
In this way, dialectics is applied to an understanding 
of the conditions in which both the programmer and 
program can be seen to work, and produce artwork as 
software (chapter 5). Such attention to formations of 
labour derives from an understanding of its potential 
to express deeper social antagonisms, developed as a 
result of the increased collective and communicative 
nature of labour, and the recognition that social 
relations are embedded in humans and machines. The 
‘machinic’ production of software presents a suitable 
case study in this respect, and the contradictions that 
arise from the open source movement and production 
of free software are particularly revealing as 
both a condition of, and reaction to, contemporary 
network social forms. Like the drudgery of work in 
general, the production of software is taken to be 
a negative condition under capitalism. Therefore a 
number of oppositional tactics are proposed, such 
as the refusal to work (non-executable code) or by 
working in a negative mode or unruly manner (dirty or 
messy code) outside the orthodoxy of passive working 
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(analogous to proprietary models of clean and pure 
code). The argument is that software art holds the 
potential to make apparent contradictions within the 
relations of production, as well as be programmed to 
act in a disruptive manner itself, by calling upon its 
dialectical properties. 
This way of working rejects determinism associated 
with software, for something far more speculative 
(and ‘artistic’ even). The final part of this thesis 
(chapter 6) examines the deployment of software in an 
artistic context, by concentrating on the work involved 
in writing code and the work that the code performs 
when executed. In the spirit of critical practices 
that seek to transform the technical apparatus, it 
further emphasises how dialectical thinking remains 
productive to understand how transformation is inherent 
to software. As a consequence, it is suggested that a 
critical practice in software art seeks to reveal these 
contradictions, with particular attention to source code 
as an expression of potential action. This performative 
dimension of code is important, as it emphasises the 
way that coding practices can break out of the ‘means-
end’ chain of traditional software production and arts 
practice. In this way, a focus on coding practices, 
code, and the execution of code represents the 
privileging of potential - the potential that remains 
within and is ready to come into being. Therein lies the 
possibility of a critical practice in software art - and 
this is referred to as ‘software praxis’.  
As well as taking the form of a conventional research 
study, the thesis is simultaneously presented as 
software. The suggestion is that the critical potential 
of software art is demonstrated by the integration of 
theory and practice, in parallel to the way in which a 
practice-based submission for PhD is informed by theory. 
An understanding of software as art is extended to the 
presentation of a thesis as software, as something that 
can be read and that can be executed. Thus, this text 
aims to exemplify coding or programming as something 
that is to be executed or that embodies action, making 
a parallel between the production of the work itself 
(as both artwork and thesis) and the potential for its 
transformation. The text is both about software art and 
an example of software art. 
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On a technical level, this thesis has been produced 
using TextEdit 1.3 (v202) on a Macintosh PowerBook 
G4, running Mac OS X software (version 10.4.2) and 
saved as Plain Text (.txt).[1] It is simultaneously a 
Perl script or program. The program that interprets 
or compiles Perl code is typically called ‘/usr/bin/
Perl’ - hence the enhanced title of this thesis. Perl 
programs are generally stored as text source files such 
as this one, then translated or compiled into machine 
language by other programs (interpreters or compilers) 
at run-time.[2] The Perl script can be executed by 
typing ‘perl’ and the name of the file into a Unix 
command line shell (for more precise instructions on 
this, see note [3]). If run, the script will change 
text characters in the thesis and reposition them. Once 
the text has reached a critical state of disorder, the 
thesis will be published on the project web site and 
this version will be released under the Libre Commons 
License so as not to legislate against - and indeed to 
invite - its further development.[4] In the running of 
the program, this thesis expresses labour, action and 
new knowledge. In collapsing form and content, the aim 
is to position the thesis in terms of its reflexivity, 
and to exemplify the speculative potential of software 
art practice, rejecting fixed definitions or outcomes. 
Indeed the program performs, is thoroughly ‘write-able’, 
and reflects its intrinsic contradictory and potentially 
disruptive qualities, in the dynamic interplay between 
source code and action.
  
The thesis ends with a deliberate mistake. The last 
sentence contains no full stop, leaving the argument 
with an indeterminate ending. This is important on a 
functional level, as a full stop here would prevent the 
program from running. It also provides a dialectical 
composition that makes further reference to creative 
practices that employ constraints and then introduce an 
‘anticonstraint’ to break the symmetry of the system.
[5] The quote by Harry Mathews at the beginning of 
this introduction exemplifies this position, and how 
algorithms can be used to compose and decompose texts so 
as to demonstrate their latent dialectical potential. 
Such examples can be seen to inform the approach taken 
with this thesis, both in the absence of a full stop 
and more importantly by using the ‘anticonstraint’ 
software (antithesis) to break the system of constraints 
established by the finished work (thesis).
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=================
2. *software art* 
=================
‘Earlier much futile thought had been devoted to the 
question of whether photography is an art. The primary 
question - whether the very invention of photography 
had not transformed the nature of art - was not raised. 
Soon the film theoreticians asked the same ill-considered 
question with regard to film.’ (Benjamin 1999d [1936]: 220)
Software is not simply a functional tool but expresses 
wider cultural and technological processes and as 
such, holds the possibility of extending the critical 
potential of arts practice. In saying this, a contiguity 
is struck with previous technologies that threatened 
some of the founding principles of what constitutes art, 
how widely available it should be, and what purpose it 
serves. But whether software art is art is the wrong 
question to ask. Rather, contemporary practices and the 
emerging discourse in software art reveal not only how 
the nature of art may be subject to transformation but 
also that transformation is inherent to software culture 
itself. Accordingly, this chapter presents a general 
overview of software art and culture. In doing so, it 
stresses the ways in which technical, cultural and 
political processes increasingly utilise software but 
also can be seen to ‘act’ like software. 
First of all, the term software needs some further 
description. Software refers to a computer program and 
the resources related to it that act upon the hardware 
of the physical machine components and machine. In 
more detail, this means software includes not only the 
instructions written in a particular language (such 
as Perl) as the program, but also the other materials 
required for it to run, that are usually combined for 
distribution. As a more general description, software is 
useful in this respect as it refers to the wider context 
within which the program runs. But it is also important 
to stress that it is the program itself as the source 
code that the computer executes. These instructions 
are loaded into memory, interpreted and then executed 
(or ‘run’) following the instructions as programmed 
until termination or an error is detected. Hardware is 
worked upon, and software performs the work. This link 
to performance also clarifies something about the use 
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of the term ‘software art’, in describing not merely 
software used to produce art (a means to an end), but 
the software itself as the artwork (and this issue is 
something that the final chapter will return to in more 
detail). In other words, the programmers put the pre-
existing hardware to work, in a similar way to artists 
producing concepts and manipulating materials in more 
traditional forms. There is little new in placing 
emphasis on process rather than end-product, but the 
assertion of this thesis is that software art exemplifies 
process-orientated practice in a way that lends itself 
to critical work appropriate to contemporary conditions.
Section 2.1 of this chapter defines the contemporary 
practice of software art, in comparison to the 
historical influence of ‘generative art’ and ‘computer 
arts’ practices of the 1960s and 70s. Clearly there 
have been many previous examples of artists and writers 
generating creative work in an algorithmic manner, using 
instructions and contraints, whether using computers 
or not. These principles have been especially explored 
in the parallel between program code and literature, 
suggesting an analogy with the linguistic distinction 
between syntax and semantics. Rules underpin all 
software practices, even those that seek to undermine 
these rules. Despite this, a general view seems to 
have emerged that older definitions associated with 
‘generative art’ stress the formal rule-based and 
syntactical properties of software, and thus do not 
place sufficient emphasis on semantic concerns and social 
context. Although in general this thesis subscribes 
to this position and so adopts the term software art, 
it also retains formal concerns that are essential to 
understand the more cultural aspects and the generative 
or transformative aspects of software. It is argued that 
taken together, the terms generative art and software 
art emphasise contradictions inherent to both and 
between the two. 
 
Section 2.2 elaborates upon the cultural aspect of 
software, emphasising some of the relatively hidden 
material concerns of software production; evoking a 
tradition of literary criticism and cultural studies. 
A closer engagement with culture reveals it to be 
an emergent, even generative, phenomenon that any 
criticism should address to utilise and develop 
appropriate methods that in themselves can adapt to 
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changed circumstances. What might broadly be referred 
to as software criticism attempts to do this, in 
recognition of practices that acknowledge dynamic 
processes, structures and events that take place when 
software runs. Both operational understanding and 
more speculative inquiry are required to open up the 
possibilities for a critical practice in software art 
and culture - both following and breaking rules as the 
previous section suggested  - that is critical of itself 
and that understands the historical conditions of its 
production. Examples are introduced here to establish 
software art as a coherent field of practice.  
These practices build upon previous practices, and 
section 2.3 situates software art in the context of 
a broader art history and culture. There are many 
parallels to non-computer-based practices and this 
demonstrates the value of a historical perspective 
(but is not meant as a comprehensive history of 
software art). For example, in the 1970s and in 
parallel to the increasing visibility of computer 
technologies in culture, the term software was 
employed as a cultural metaphor to indicate a shift 
away from an emphasis on the (hardware) object of art. 
In this way, software art can be seen to operate in a 
conceptual tradition by placing emphasis on code as 
well as its execution, just as conceptual art’s 
articulation of the ‘dematerialisation’ of the art 
object previously threw emphasis on the ideas and 
process of the artwork. Another clear historical 
influence on software art practice are Dadaist tactics, 
presenting a negation of the dynamic, transformational 
potentialities of technology and culture. However, 
these once radical practices now appear commonplace. 
For instance, techniques such as montage are now 
typified by computer techniques, and oppositional 
tactics ever more appear to run the risk of easy 
recuperation. It is suggested that the challenge for 
a dialectics of software art is to maintain 
contradiction in the process of transformation, 
for this is where politics is evident and where 
re-invention takes place. 
-------------------------
2.1 - working definitions
-------------------------
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Practices that combine the fields of art and technology 
have a complex history and employ a contested range 
of terms. The term software art has become popular to 
describe the contemporary artistic preoccupation with 
software production. Certainly ‘media arts’ is far too 
broad a description and one that would focus attention 
too heavily on the ‘medium’ and ‘mediation’ of software 
rather than emphasise its dynamic properties, processes 
and metaphors. Software art is clearly not just media 
art, as it expresses more complex processes than simply 
something mediated between sender, apparatus and 
receiver.[1] To contest whether the term or category 
software art is applicable, or useful even, illustrates 
part of the process of how terms that combine art 
and technology enter the public realm, and become 
normalised by festivals, conferences, publications, 
PhD submissions, and so on. This recuperative process 
is echoed in Alexei Shulgin’s comments about the term 
‘net.art’, which became useless once it gained wider 
acceptance (1997). Whilst recognising this danger, the 
intention of this thesis is to stress that software 
art can remain useful as a practice and discourse, in 
revealing a range of contradictory tendencies in both 
art and software. The argument relies on the inherent 
character of software to express potentially disruptive 
qualities in the dynamic interplay between source code 
and action.
  
The recent attention given to software art is partly 
due to a range of cultural events that have provided 
critical consideration of the activity of programming 
and the materiality of code. Of particular importance 
are the _Readme_ festival and its associated _Runme_ 
software art repository in Moscow, Helsinki, Aarhus, 
Dortmund (2002-2005), and the _transmediale_ media arts 
festival in Berlin. Until recently, the transmediale 
festival included a category ‘artistic software’, and 
the jury statement of 2001 has become a key reference 
point for any definitions that have since emerged. For 
what was at that time a new festival category, jurors 
Florian Cramer and Ulrike Gabriel carefully drew 
attention to the structures of programming that lie 
behind the work (2001a). They argued this was part of a 
historical lacuna that tended to overlook the material 
and aesthetic aspects of software, predicated on the 
fact that programming code is inevitably a part of all 
art that is digitally produced, whether acknowledged 
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or not. Elsewhere too, Cramer has insisted that all 
digital art is software art in as much as it relies 
on, or is assisted by, other software to run, be it a 
browser, operating system, or network protocols (in 
Goriunova & Shulgin 2003). In this broad sense, if all 
digital art is software art, it could also be argued 
that all software is generative, in that it runs a set 
of processes and on execution a basic element is made to 
generate other forms and processes. The 2004 festival 
definition of software art written by Andreas Broeckmann 
and Cramer provided a useful description in this 
respect: 
‘Software > Generative Art: The Software category 
includes projects whose main artistic material 
is program code, or which deal with the cultural 
understanding of software. Thus, software is not 
understood as a functional tool serving the “real” 
artistic work, but as a generative means for the 
creation of “machinic” and social processes. Software 
art can be the result of an autonomous and formal 
creative practice, but it can also refer to the cultural 
and social meaning of software, or reflect on existing 
software through strategies like collage or critique.’
Interestingly both generative and software practices 
are included here, as this is an open call for festival 
submissions. Distinctions can be made between these 
terms, although Olga Goriunova pragmatically states 
that software art and criticism is justified in its very 
usage, by the fact that people find it a useful focus for 
discussion and to grant exposure to emergent practices. 
This is certainly the intention of the _Readme_ software 
art festival that she co-organised (with Shulgin); more 
particularly it aims to draw attention to works that 
lie outside mainstream festival culture and thus build 
an alternative community and discourse (in keeping 
with Shulgin’s earlier comments on the fate of net.
art). For instance, many examples of practice associated 
with the free software movement would not normally be 
considered within an artistic frame of reference. The 
festival therefore presents an alternative curatorial 
strategy, one in which people can submit works to an 
‘open’ repository that is not selected or juried in 
a conventional manner. The associated _Runme.org_ 
software art repository is built upon an open database. 
Submitted works are contextualised, and this is not 
without difficulties particularly around categorisation, 
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but in general the festival’s openness attracts a wider 
constituency than most, including demo-coders for 
instance, and those that subscribe to an open source 
ethos. As a result it suffers from a confusion of art 
and non-art codes but productively so. The working 
principles of free software are simply applied to its 
exhibition in the spirit of shared and collective 
development, in a manner that challenges the commodity 
status of art. The conventions of intellectual property, 
fees and prizes are substituted for the symbolic capital 
of the open source world. 
Software art can be seen to challenge many of the 
precepts of arts practice, in the spirit of Walter 
Benjamin’s claim about how new techniques transform 
the very nature of art. In Bill Nichols’s ‘The Work of 
Culture in the Age of Cybernetic Systems’, this line of 
argument has been adapted to respond to issues around 
artificial life. He says ‘a presumption is made about 
a fixed, or ontologically given nature to life or art, 
rather than recognising how that very presumption has 
been radically overturned’ (1988: 37). His statement is 
no simple call for an end-of-art or end-of-life, but a 
redefinition of the terms and possibilities on offer. In 
any new definitions that emerge, there is some danger of 
making fixed definitions in a way that contradicts the 
very principles of software as something generative and 
non-definitive: work in progress. What is required is the 
constant redefinition of the terms and possibilities on 
offer.
# software either/or generative art
There are a number of competing definitions for 
generative art that establish correspondences between 
systematic and procedural approaches to production, 
across a variety of old and new media. In seeking 
to clarify what constitutes generative art, Philip 
Galanter’s definition is much cited and positions 
generative art as broadly rule-based:
‘Generative Art refers to any art practice where 
the artist uses a system, such as a set of natural 
language rules, a computer program, a machine, or other 
procedural invention, which is set into motion with some 
degree of autonomy contributing to or resulting in a 
completed work of art.’ (2003) 
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In a general sense, there is broad agreement that 
generative art is a term applied to artwork that is 
automated by the use of instructions or rules by which 
the artwork is executed. The outcome of this process 
is thus unpredictable, and could be described as 
being integral to the apparatus or situation, rather 
than a direct consequence of the artist’s intentions. 
Importantly, the description recognises that other 
agencies are at work, including human agency as an 
integral part of the production process in setting 
the rules. It is this line of thinking that informed 
the curation of the exhibition _Generator_ (2002/3), 
combining the work of artist-programmers and artists 
from a conceptual tradition who employ rules and 
instructions in their practice. The work of Alex McLean 
and Adrian Ward were presented in parallel to Sol LeWitt 
and Yoko Ono amongst others (the website contains more 
details on the exhibition [2]). All work was considered 
‘live’ or performative in the sense that the artwork 
was generated from a process. To stress the point about 
agency, two examples are offered: Ono’s _Mend Peace for 
the World_ (2001), consisted of broken dishes from around 
the world and materials to mend them. The instructions, 
to be executed by those visiting the exhibition, were: 
‘Keep adding more crockery as it gets fixed. Keep wishing 
while you mend.’ In contrast, McLean’s _forkbomb.pl_ 
(2001), was a Perl script designed to take a computer 
to its operational limit. A computer under such 
high load causes unpredictable results that pattern 
differently depending on the operating system it runs 
upon. Both examples - one tending towards reparation 
or reconstruction, the other towards destruction 
- emphasise a rejection of what one might refer to 
as ‘software-determinism’. They demonstrate how the 
producer can concede control to some extent - and this 
is an important qualification - over the production of 
the work but that human intervention is paramount to 
(software) production. In other words, the artwork is 
necessarily programmed - with or without the aid of a 
computer. Whether the artist was involved in the writing 
of the software or not is beside the point. Someone was. 
In contrast to what has been said about these examples 
from _Generator_, much of the work in the field of 
generative art stresses issues of unpredictability and 
autonomy rather differently.[3] Defining generative art 
in 2003, John McCormack adds the influence of biology 
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and emergent behaviour, and in particular the terms 
‘genotype’ and ‘phenotype’. He argues that software 
can be seen in terms of ‘genotypes’ (DNA in cells) as 
machine code, and ‘phenotypes’ (the higher level form of 
behaviour) as what happens when it runs. The programmer 
would set the parameters that defined the fitness, and 
the software would evolve ‘autonomously’. Put simply, 
McCormack generalises that the authoring process is 
directed towards a genotype as the specification of a 
process, and when this process is executed it generates 
the phenotype as the ‘experience of the artwork’ (in 
Brown 2003: 5). It is worth noting the position of the 
artists in this description as responsible for the DNA 
of the artwork in the perpetuation of a ‘creationist’ myth 
(which chapter 4 will dispute, along with biological 
determinism in general). Clearly other external factors 
are at work in creative production in art and life. 
In his essay ‘What is Generative Art? Complexity Theory 
as a Context for Art Theory’ (2003), Galanter also 
refers to generative systems as displaying emergent 
behaviour, but interprets ‘autonomous systems’ at far 
too literal a level when he claims: ‘Generative art 
is ideologically neutral’ (2003). This simply cannot 
be the case if such a process is already seen to be 
programmed. Any claims of neutrality ironically only 
serve to prove the point of how ideology works, even in 
the descriptions that deny its very presence. Galanter’s 
definition of generative art is an eclectic one, 
contributing to wider discussions around ‘not just art’ 
and cultural practices which allows for the inclusion of 
algorithmic composition, as well as practices that do 
not necessarily involve computers at all. But to Inke 
Arns, this is part of the problem as the definition is 
far too inclusive, applied across many fields of practice 
that focus attention on the end-product of a process. 
She quotes Tilman Baumgartel’s article ‘Experimental 
Software’ (from 2001) to stress the distinction between 
earlier work using computers and software art, where the 
latter is: 
‘... not art that has been created with the help of a 
computer, but art that happens in the computer, software 
is not programmed by artists in order to produce autonomous 
artworks, but the software itself is the artwork. 
What is crucial here is not the result but the process 
triggered in the computer by the program code’ (in Arns 
2004: 184-5).
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Both Galanter and McCormack’s statements do appear 
to verify an emphasis on end-product as opposed to 
Baumgartel’s emphasis on process. Arns is additionally 
thinking of statements such as: ‘the aesthetic value 
of code lies in its execution, not simply its written 
form’, and takes this to foreground execution (see 
Cox et al 2001). Admittedly there is a danger of 
emphasising the formal and syntactic aspects in using 
the term generative art. This statement was intended 
to emphasise the interaction between source code and 
its executed form. The emphasis on execution is thus a 
description of process, wherein the end-product remained 
a by-product. An example cited was McLean’s _forkbomb.
pl_ (2001, described earlier in this section), to 
argue for the aesthetic appreciation of source code in 
parallel to a visualisation of the process when run. 
This is in fact how it was exhibited as part of the 
_Generator_ show, with the source code as an integral 
part of the work. Nevertheless, the criticism Arns is 
making is that the privileging of execution, even if in 
combination with source code, avoids some contemporary 
practice associated with software art. She is thinking 
of programs that are not necessarily executable, or 
executable only on a conceptual level. Following these 
remarks, the earlier statement that all software is 
generative should be further qualified by adding that 
this applies in the most abstract of ways (for instance, 
with a concept). Any definition of generative art 
requires improved description to shift emphasis from 
the object generated to the process of generation. To 
describe this generative or transformative aspect and 
in order not to dismiss it out of hand, more historical 
detail is required to stress its importance to an 
understanding of cultural activity using software, and 
of course to an understanding of software art. 
# generative grammar
To generate something accounts for most creative 
activity in a very general sense. A more specific use 
of the term in relation to arts practice can be traced 
to a lecture ‘Generative Art Forms’ (presented at the 
Queen’s University, Belfast Festival) in 1972, by the 
Romanian sculptor Neagu (who also founded a Generative 
Art Group).[4] A more common reference is Noam Chomsky’s 
_Syntactic Structures_ (1972), first published in 1957, 
often cited as the source of the concept ‘generative 
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grammar’ (sometimes referred to as ‘transformational 
grammar’). Chomsky assumes that somehow grammar is 
given in advance (‘hard-wired’) and therefore human 
consciousness contains innate grammatical competence 
that is pre-social (1972: 85).[5] This explains his 
interest in ‘syntactic structures’ by which sentences 
are constructed in particular languages to understand 
the properties that underlie successful grammars (1972: 
11). This is an abstract endeavour to discover broad 
principles that can be applied to languages in general 
and thereby provide a method that can be applied to 
specific languages. 
These concerns have also been the inspiration for much 
artistic experimentation using computers, as it lends 
itself to the procedural qualities of programming as 
an expression of transformative grammar.[6] An example 
is Bill Seaman’s _The World Generator_ (1996) that 
generates emergent meanings by enabling users to make 
choices from a spinning interface of different media-
elements and processes (including objects, images, 
texts, music and movies). His claim is that this 
‘techno-poetic mechanism’ generates a poetics that is 
extended by computer-based technologies, becoming what 
he calls ‘recombinatory poetics’. As a consequence, 
Seaman asks whether this constitutes a new form of 
writing or a ‘new form of evocative exchange which 
cannot be defined in terms of past linguistic discourse?’ 
(1999). Like Chomsky’s work, this approach might be 
seen to suffer from universalism. Both the machine and 
consciousness in these examples are taken to follow 
rules at the risk of diminishing other factors, such as 
social interaction that is essential to the expression 
of action in the world.[7]
More commonly cited in connection with recombinatory 
work is the ‘Ouvroir de Littérature Potentielle’ 
(OuLiPo), a group of writers and mathematicians founded 
in 1960 by Raymond Queneau and François Le Lionnais. 
Their concerns were syntactic rather than semantic, 
concerned with contraints ‘brought to bear on the formal 
aspects of literature: alphabetical, consonantal, 
vocalic, syllabic, phonetic, graphic, prosodic, rhymic, 
rhythmic, and numerical constraints, structures, or 
programs’ (Le Lionnais, in Motte 1998: 29). An example 
of automatic transformation of text is Jean Lescure’s 
‘S+7’ method in which a text is taken and each word (‘s’ 
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for substantive) is replaced by the seventh following it 
in a dictionary. Queneau points out that if a 2000 word 
dictionary is used, the ‘S+2000’ method would produce 
an exact copy of the original (Motte 1998: 61). In this 
sense, and according to Georges Perec: ‘the Book is a 
cryptogram whose code is the Alphabet’ (in Motte 1998: 
96). Rather than a chance operation (such as in the work 
of John Cage), Oulipean texts are generated through 
the use of constraints or rules, wherein any ideas 
associated with freedom of expression is undermined. 
A further Oulipean example that lends itself to 
computation is Queneau’s _Cent Mille Milliards de 
Poemes_ [one hundred thousand billion poems] (1961) in 
which ten sonnets can be arranged according to formal 
rules. To each of the ten first lines, the reader can add 
any of ten different second lines, and so on. The sonnet 
has fourteen lines, so the possibilities are of the 
order of 10 to the power of 14, or one hundred trillion 
sonnets. Le Lionnais makes a claim for the significance 
of this in terms of technical superiority: ‘the work 
you are holding in your hands represents, itself alone, 
a quantity of text far greater than everything man 
has written since the invention of writing’ (Motte 
1998: 3). Potential writing in this sense implies the 
impossibility of its potential reading - and both are 
exponentially bound. The full potential of this work 
lies unrealised for practical reasons, perpetually in a 
suspended state of its further reading. In an experiment 
to exploit the potential of the computer, Paul Braffort 
was commissioned to program some of the OuLiPo works, 
such as Queneau’s _Cent Mille Milliards de Poemes_. In 
describing this enterprise as ‘algorithmic literature’, 
Paul Fournel argues that the machine allows the author 
to dominate the existing relations of computer, work 
and reader in new ways (Motte 1998: 140-2). Originality 
is clearly not the point in this work; originality is 
mentioned in connection to mark a distinction from 
other practices such as the work of the ‘algorists’ 
(associated with Roman Verostko) who explore the ‘form-
generating’ possibilities of algorithms but at the same 
time their originality, in a way that parallels the 
conservative paradigm of originality in arts practice 
(2004).
Creative endeavour is seen to be programmable, and 
is considered in terms of its execution. But far 
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from a deferral of authorship, the computer offers 
new potentialities in this way. In ‘Prose and 
Anticombinatorics’, Italo Calvino demonstrates the 
potential of the computer in serving this purpose, 
proposing that: 
‘... the aid of the computer, far from replacing 
the creative act of the artist, permits the latter 
rather to liberate himself [sic] from the slavery of a 
combinatory search, allowing him also the best chance of 
concentrating on this “clinamen” which, alone, can make 
of the text a true work of art’ (in Motte 1998: 152).[8] 
Thus, the potential for permutations or ‘combinatorics’, 
what Le Lionnais calls a ‘combinatory literature’, is 
expanded greatly by the computer and its systematic 
compositional structure. This is further developed by 
Cramer’s web site _Permutations_ (1996-2000), which 
reproduces combinatory text systems, such as those of 
Queneau, in digital form. Many programmers would deny 
the ambiguity of expression in their work - it either 
works or does not in logical terms - but clearly there 
are poetic elements in code. The programmer Donald Knuth 
makes this apparent by pointing to programming as an 
‘aesthetic experience much like composing poetry or 
music’ (1981: v). In _The Art of Programming_, he draws 
analogies to formal experimentation in literature when 
he produces codes to guide the reader through a series 
of workshop exercises. In the section ‘Procedures for 
Reading This Set of Books’, the instructions for reading 
the book are arranged in an algorithmic form that 
directly addresses the reader: 
‘1. Begin reading this procedure, unless you have 
already begun to read it. Continue to follow the steps 
faithfully; [...] 5. Is the subject of the chapter 
interesting you? If so, go to step 7; if not, go to step 
6. 14. Are you tired? If not, go back to step 7; 15. Go 
to sleep. Then, wake up, and go back to step 7.’ (1981: 
xv-xvi)
Work, such as this, using executable formal 
instructions, makes explicit the idea of software as 
potential literature, whether running on a computer or 
not. The analogy to language is further expressed in 
terms of input-output of data (abbreviated to ‘I/0’), 
with the input often referred to as reading and output 
as writing - hence the common use of the description 
‘read me’ for explanatory texts). This is a similar 
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approach to Calvino’s ‘How I Wrote One of My Books’,[9] 
referring to his own novel _If on a Winter’s Night a 
Traveller_ (1981), in which he produces an algorithmic 
description of the book’s structure:
‘The reader who is there (L) is reading the book that is 
there (l); The book that is there relates the story of 
the reader who is in the book (L’); The reader who is 
in the book does not succeed in reading the book in the 
book (l’); The book that is there does not relate the 
story of the reader who is there; The reader who is in 
the book claims to be the reader that is there [...].’ (1995)
It reads like a source code to the earlier novel. It is 
worth emphasising that an engagement with this thesis 
operates overtly in terms of reading and writing: it is 
a ‘read me’ (the text) but also carries the invitation 
to ‘run me’ (the program). Indeed all conventions of 
writing and reading, of both text and code, have in 
common that they are part of a set of abstract (coded) 
systems of input and output. In so-called  natural 
languages , this is limited by the numbers of phonemes 
(letter-sounds), arranged in strings (which may be a 
sentence) or finite sequences with sentences - although 
the sentences are infinite. In other formalised systems 
such as programming, the logic adheres to rules and 
so can be considered a language like other artificial 
languages, with its own particular grammar that 
generates its grammatical sequences. What is significant 
about the work of the OuLiPo group is their tendency 
to follow an algorithm to the rule and then break it, 
introducing a flaw in the system to disrupt the symmetry: 
‘because when a system of constraints is established, 
there must also be anticonstraint within it. The system 
of constraints - and this is important - must be 
destroyed.’ (Motte 1998: 20)  
Programming languages can clearly be seen in terms of 
their grammar and syntax but also their poetic spatial 
arrangements, sometimes referred to as ‘code literature’ 
or ‘code poetry’ (typified in 2004 by an exhibition to 
assess the aesthetic implications of digital poetry: 
_p0es1s: Digitale Poesie_, held at the Kulturforum 
Potsdamer Platz, Berlin). The Perl programming language 
has often been used to ‘port’ other poems, such as 
Eric Andreychek’s _Jabberwocky_ as seen in the Perl 
Poetry contest of 2001. While the output of the poem 
is not significant, the three characters of the poem 
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are represented by three dysfunctional processes if 
the program is executed. It does not exactly crash the 
system it runs on, but does express the potential of 
algorithms to both compose and decompose texts.
# generative both/and software art
In the many comparisons between software art now and 
the older practices associated with generative art, 
McCormack explains one key difference was that in the 
1960s and 1970s artists simply had to write (or ask 
someone to write) their own software in order to 
generate the outcomes (in Brown 2003). The now wide 
availability of authoring software has changed the 
conditions for the production of software art by the 
artist-programmer. It is with some of these issues in 
mind that Richard Wright traces the ‘divergence between 
programmers and program users’, based around the issue 
of whether a computer is considered a medium or a tool 
(2004). In a hierarchy of programming languages, Wright 
points out that not all programming practices are 
equal. He is thinking of the predominance of scripting 
languages such as Flash Actionscript (but also Lingo, 
Perl, MAX, JavaScript, Java, C++, as well as other 
programming and scripting languages) that use libraries 
of functions and a certain shared, if not prescribed, 
vocabulary of styles.[10] For Wright, this changes 
the terms of the discussion from a general issue of 
artistic programming to one of what kind of programming 
is being used. He cites the historical shift in Harold 
Cohen’s practice from a painter to developing software 
to automate his artwork, through the use of what 
Cohen refers to as ‘autonomous machine (art making) 
intelligence’. Developed from 1973 onwards, the _AARON_ 
program represents to Wright the historical transition 
towards contemporary culture, where the use of computers 
has become pervasive. As a result, the terms of practice 
have fundamentally changed for the artist-programmer. 
His argument is that: 
‘In a world where artists use software to write 
software that will be seen by virtue of other 
software, questions about the “aesthetics of the code” 
become a symptom of not being able to see the wood 
for the trees. Programming is not only the material 
of artistic creation, it is the context of artistic 
creation. Programming has become software.’ (Wright 
2004)
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The distinction refers back to earlier practices that 
were characterised by artists working at the meta-
level of programming - and there is even a certain 
amount of nostalgia here that somehow the early ‘avant-
garde’ of computer arts has been forgotten or not fully 
appreciated. Alan Kay refers to artists working at the 
level of the ‘metamedium’. The idea that artists using 
computers should engage with programming at a deep 
level is a position that many computer art education 
programmes propagated in the 1970s and 1980s - for 
instance, at the Slade School of Art and Middlesex 
University in the UK, with which Paul Brown and Wright 
were associated.[11] However programming in Cohen’s work 
operates in a rather ambiguous relation to the overall 
artwork. Clearly in a general sense it is part of the 
artistic output but more in terms of a representation of 
his skills and technique, rather than as a constituent 
part of the artwork as such. The emphasis tends towards 
the completed work of art rather than the program or 
programming being a work in itself.
 
In contrast to Cohen’s work, a more contemporary 
reference that situates software art overtly in terms 
of programming is the exhibition _CODeDOC_, first for 
the Whitney Museum of American Art’s ‘artport’ web 
site (2002), and later at Ars Electronica (2003). 
The curator, Christiane Paul, set the invited artist-
programmers an instruction to ‘connect and move three 
points in space’ in a language of their choice (Java, 
C, Visual Basic, Lingo, Perl) and to exchange the code 
with the other artists for comments. For example, in 
Rainer Mandl and Annja Krautgasser’s _Pedigree_ (2003b), 
the Oedipal drama is revealed in the source code of the 
work. The three points connected in space represent 
the three protagonists of the myth - father, mother 
and child - who play their parts in the generative 
narrative. The viewers of all the works in _CODeDOC_ 
were invited to first read the written code and then 
see the executed work. This raised some controversy on 
mail lists at the time, for deliberately obfuscating 
or aestheticising code to non-programmers, rather than 
demystifying the creative process. Yet the significance 
is that code is taken to be part of the work and not 
simply meant to assist interpretation. The curatorial 
statement contains a number of useful comments on 
the intentions of the experiment and reiterates the 
potential of software itself as artwork:
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‘In software art, the “materiality” of the written 
instructions mostly remains hidden. In addition, these 
instructions and notations can be instantaneously 
activated; they contain and - further layers of 
processing aside - *are* the artwork itself. While one 
might claim that the same holds true for a work of 
conceptual art that consists of written instructions, 
this work would still have to be activated as a 
mental or physical event by the viewer and cannot 
instantaneously transform, transcend, and generate its 
own materiality.’ (Paul 2003b)
 
This parallels some of the earlier curatorial decisions 
for the _Generator_ show, in particular McLean’s 
_forkbomb.pl_ where the source code was exhibited as 
an integral part of the artwork (see section 9.1). 
Whereas formerly artists had to engage with programming 
in early computer arts practice, the lack of necessity 
now allows for other social issues to be engaged (just 
as previously the invention of photography freed 
painting from figurative representation). In linguistic 
terms, artist-programmers appear to have shifted 
their attention from an engagement with the syntax of 
programming to semantic concerns.[12] This is indeed 
how Cramer makes the distinction between generative art 
and software art, by associating the former with syntax 
and the latter with semantics (2003). But this is not 
simply a shift from one to the other. Syntax, although 
not concerned with meaning in itself, certainly has 
implications for semantics, and both are required to 
inform an overall theory of language. The programmer 
Larry Wall clarifies this in relation to the programming 
language Perl and the wider cultural concerns that 
arise: ‘A language is not a set of syntax rules. It is 
not just a set of semantics. It’s the entire culture 
surrounding the language itself.’ (in Flor 2002) Yet 
what Cramer is trying to emphasise is a shift in 
software art from ‘pure syntax’ to ‘something semantic, 
something that is aesthetically, culturally and 
politically charged’ (2003). It is not a choice of one 
or the other but a change of emphasis. 
Therefore, although this thesis adopts the term software 
art, it aims to retain the implicit generative aspect 
as an evocative technical and cultural process. The 
apparent dualism between generative art and software art 
is also something that Mitchell Whitelaw disputes in 
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questioning the binary relation of formalism (associated 
with generative art) and culturalism (associated with 
software art). Rather than seeing this as an impasse, as 
Troels Degn Johansson does in ‘Mise en Abyme in Software 
Art’ (2004), Whitelaw suggests a ‘complementarity’ of 
positions that leads to alternative modes of being 
and relation (2005: 138). He calls this ‘critical 
generativity’ to stress the emergent and transformative 
properties that reflect social complexity and software’s 
latent cultural agency (2005: 152). 
The dialectical approach of this thesis also argues for 
new critical forms, but rather than seeking Whitelaw’s 
complementarity or fusion, argues for a contradictory 
relation. That said, the competing definitions matter 
little in themselves but only in as much as they operate 
in terms of an overall contribution to a critical 
discourse around the practice of software art. Software 
includes, if only on a conceptual level, a generative 
process in which something is always ready to come into 
being, however latent. It is for convenience only that 
this is referred to as software art. It does so in 
recognition that these debates are appropriately in flux, 
and entirely open to contestation as part of the ongoing 
development of a critical discourse in software art and 
culture. 
--------------------------
2.2 - software materialism
--------------------------
It is clear that software is a thoroughly cultural and 
not simply technical phenomenon. But in discussing 
‘software culture’ and its critical potential, the 
term culture is far from uncontested territory. 
Culture is a notoriously ambiguous concept and even in 
terms of its scientific usage describes both a process 
(artificial development of microscopic organisms) and 
product (the organisms produced) (Williams 1998).
[13] An understanding of culture as both process and 
product is useful for software culture, as it stresses 
the issues introduced in the previous section and some 
of the criticisms of practices that privilege product 
over process. Any cultural product such as this thesis 
cannot be divorced from the materials and institutions 
that produce and disseminate it. Otherwise the final text 
is privileged over the cultural form that it takes, 
33
separating it from the reality of its social production 
and material conditions. This principle underpins 
subsequent chapters and the overall form this thesis 
takes.
This section aims to introduce software production as 
a cultural and material activity, and provide some 
examples of software art that are produced with these 
ideas in mind. This description is in keeping with 
what Raymond Williams called ‘cultural materialism’ 
(as an elaboration of ‘historical materialism’ that 
chapter 3 introduces in detail) to emphasise that 
cultural production is itself material, as much as 
any other human activity. Rather than simply see 
culture as influenced by its underlying system of 
production (as in orthodox Marxism), cultural work is 
taken to be political because social processes are 
always embedded in it - in the most ordinary aspects 
of everyday life and in cultural practices. This is 
important as it suggests that cultural activity has 
transformative possibilities, of not just understanding 
social processes, but of an active involvement in their 
potential transformation. This transformational aspect 
relates to Pierre Bourdieu’s concept of ‘cultural 
reproduction’, describing both the determinacy of social 
structures in which dominant values are reproduced but 
also the agency inherent in the practice of social 
action. To Chris Jenks, interpretations of reproduction 
have tended to over-concentrate on the determining 
aspect of the metaphor at the expenses of its 
regenerative properties (1993: 2). The dynamical aspects 
of culture and of cultural production are in danger of 
being overlooked.  
In engaging with software culture, this section engages 
with the dynamic technical processes associated with 
software, whilst at the same time recognising that 
culture and criticism are themselves dynamic. This is 
clearly an important criticism for the production of 
software art, or any form that strives to make explicit 
the operating system in which it runs. What is required 
is an understanding of cultural aspects, as well as the 
complex interactions and processes at work at a deeper 
level of operation that does not privilege execution or 
end-product. This calls for a ‘software criticism’ that 
takes account of practice rather than operating at an 
abstract theoretical level.   
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# software cultural criticism
A working principle has been established in the previous 
section: that any terms of reference are not definitive 
but only function as ideas in progress for further 
development. Criticism of the terms under discussion is 
an expected part of any critical work. The parenthesised 
subtitle of Matthew Fuller’s essay ‘Behind the Blip’ 
suggests as much, reading: ‘some routes into “software 
criticism,” more ways out’ (2003). Stressing software 
criticism that does not operate at a distance from 
practice but that takes account of practice, Fuller 
offers three categories towards a strategic definition. 
The first of these is ‘critical software’ designed 
to undermine normalised understandings, operating 
through two key modes: ‘by using evidence presented by 
normalised software to construct an arrangement of the 
objects, protocols, statements, dynamics, and sequences 
of interaction that allow its conditions of truth to 
become manifest’; and ‘in the various instances of 
software that runs just like a normal application, but 
has been fundamentally twisted to reveal the underlying 
construction of the user, the way the program treats 
data, and the transduction and coding processes of 
the interface’ or even by adapting or hacking into 
existing software (2003: 23). He sees this as extending 
ambiguities built into the software itself, and perhaps 
all software is contradictory in this way. 
An example of critical software, and one much discussed, 
is Signwave’s _Auto-Illustrator_ (2000), that defies 
user expectation as a parody of the vector graphics 
design software Abode _Illustrator_. It looks like and 
indeed works like conventional commercial software, 
but carries some extra auto-generative functionality 
that render designs outside of the direct control or 
creativity of the user. Cheekily included in early 
releases was a license agreement that indicated that 
any designs were necessarily co-authored by the company 
Signwave who supply the software (aka Adrian Ward). 
Here, the parody operated particularly effectively, as 
some users were outraged that a company would insist on 
such a clause in a direct assault on their creative and 
intellectual rights. It highlights the issue that full 
authorship is rarely acknowledged in making art using 
software, as is the labour of all those involved in the 
process. The software was released as a boxed version 
35
for the exhibition _Generator_ with a ‘User’s Manual’ 
that contained both technical detail and critical 
essays (2002). In this way, the commercial packaging 
added a further layer to its ironic critique of the 
commodification of art, and software as art.  
The second of Fuller’s categories is ‘social software’ 
built by and for those excluded from commercial 
software production, providing a subculture of software 
production with a different agenda. Related to this 
is software developed and changed through social 
networks of users and programmers, that emerges from 
a different set of social relations than the orthodoxy 
of software production. It is this separation from the 
mainstream that situates Fuller’s use of the term, 
outside the usual description of software that simply 
connects people or allows for collaboration (such as 
the ‘social software’ group at MIT’s Media Lab for 
instance). His example is Mongrel’s _Linker_ (1999), 
that might be updated to the more recent _Nine(9)_ 
(2003). Both allow communities of users to form online 
collaborative archives (or ‘knowledge maps’). In these 
examples, sociality goes beyond the software itself 
to the communities and individuals who use it, and 
who further develop it as a project. In a more general 
sense, the free and open-source software movement are 
examples where developers form ‘a socio-technical pact 
between users of certain forms of license, language, 
and environment’ (2003: 24). In this scenario, open 
source software development and relations of production 
present new configurations and contradictions of labour-
power and criticism. The labour invested in producing 
the software is made public, unlike proprietary software 
but the control of the means of production is still 
managed according to capitalist principles. Also in this 
way, software is developed by a fairly closed community 
of ‘co-producers’: those actually using it and with the 
ability to make and change it. But do they mistakenly 
continue to exploit their own labour by not selling it? 
Clearly this is a much longer discussion about the 
politics of free software and its take-up by large 
corporations (an issue that will be returned to in chapter 5). 
For Fuller, the problem lies in the closed loop (what 
he calls ‘open-source internalism’ 2003: 25) between 
developers and users: only when they are one and the 
same does this system actually work for mutual benefit, 
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and therefore it needs to be expanded to be more widely 
available to other users. This point could be applied 
to the use of the operating system Linux, where the 
benefits of free software simply cannot be entertained 
without adequate instruction. The ‘culture of experts’ 
needs to be broken down, as Fuller puts it (2003: 26). 
Having stressed this point, there are numerous examples 
of projects that directly address this issue of access 
to skills and technologies. For instance, the Redundant 
Technology Initiative are an example of many groups that 
recycle redundant computers, install Linux and free 
software and train people to use them. Related to this 
but offering even more specialised open source knowledge 
are the Unix workshops as part of the free education 
initiative of the Faculty of Unix at the University of 
Openness, in London. Both examples stress that social 
software needs to ensure it operates inclusively and 
only then can genuinely be seen to be ‘open’ and ‘social’. 
To do this, a critical approach needs to be developed 
that takes account of the layers and processes involved 
on a technical level and in relation to social context. 
Exploring the potential for new forms of software, 
Fuller’s third category is ‘speculative software’ 
that creates new connections between data, machines, 
and networks. He describes this as the ‘reinvention 
of software by its own means’, in using software to 
make software about software: ‘Software whose work is 
partly to reflexively investigate itself as software, 
software as science fiction, as mutant epistemology.’ 
(2003: 30) By breaking with conventions of production 
and criticism, some of the antagonistic social relations 
between the different agencies involved in software can 
be made visible. Fuller describes these potential spaces 
as ‘blips’, and this is where politics lies (behind 
the blip). As has been demonstrated in the previous 
section, the structural qualities of code lend itself 
to poetic forms, but speculative software offers the 
additional potential for new forms of critical practice. 
Written in 2001, Harwood’s translation (or ‘porting’) 
of William Blake’s poem _London_ (of 1792) into Perl, 
is a notable example of software art that is more 
than simply a formal exercise (2005: 151-8). In both 
old and new versions, statistics and the modulation 
of populations are used for social comment, but in 
Harwood’s version material conditions are registered 
more overtly as both content and form. The politics of 
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Blake’s poem describing the social conditions of London 
are translated to a contemporary cultural and technical 
reality in which people are reduced to data. 
The example demonstrates the potential to extend the 
expressive potential of programming and to develop 
critical forms that are reflexive - both being and 
becoming software. It is speculative software that 
arguably comes closest to what can be understood as an 
artistic approach to software (according to Broeckmann 
2003), and one that particularly informs the approach to 
this thesis in revealing practices that use the formal 
qualities of programming to express how structures can 
be manipulated and reconfigured. Perl poetry such as 
_London.pl_ indicates how the concept of change might 
be embedded in the process of making programs. This 
speculative approach to software art and criticism 
makes reference to earlier critical modernist practices 
that engage with the apparatus of production and the 
materiality of language.
# code materiality
The formal qualities of language have influenced 
subsequent approaches to software art. The assumption is 
that language constitutes the determining model of all 
other signifying systems, as it is inherently rule-based 
and contains a finite number of elements. There is a 
history to this ‘formalist’ position typified by Vladimir 
Propp’s ‘Morphology of the Folktale’ (1927) that 
demonstrates a structural analysis or an algorithmic 
approach to criticism in which a universal formula is 
proposed.[14] Formalist experimentation in literature 
also follows this logic in which a text can be seen to 
be autonomous from the act of writing - a situation in 
which writing writes, not writers. Tzvetan Todorov in 
_Littérature et signification_ (1967) explains:
‘Every work, every novel, tells through its fabric of 
events the story of its own creation, its own history 
[...] the meaning of a work lies in its telling itself, 
its speaking of its own existence’ (in Hawkes 1986: 
100).
The quote describes a situation where language itself 
has autonomy over the writer, where words are arranged 
in such a way that subjective intention does not appear 
to figure. This formalist or structuralist position 
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is further developed by Roland Barthes’s essay ‘The 
Death of the Author’ (1977) wishing to make the reader 
no longer a consumer but a producer of the text. The 
‘death’ is a metaphoric gesture: ‘the birth of the 
reader must be at the cost of the death of the Author’ 
(1977: 148) as an expression of the author’s inability 
to claim the privileged source of meaning or value of a 
work of art.[15] But where does authorship lie in all 
this? It has not simply disappeared but is recast in 
recognition of its own constructedness. To state the 
obvious, even Barthes is the author of his own position 
on the author’s disappearance.[16] Text and code are 
both written and write. 
Furthermore, the programmer or writer is intimately 
connected to the writing machine - be it book or 
computer. The material form this thesis takes is an 
attempt to draw attention to these issues as both a 
text and program script. This is also what N. Katherine 
Hayles attempts in _Writing Machines_ (2002), a book 
that draws attention to its material properties.[17] The 
production of literature is both material and immaterial 
in other words, expressing both the physical reality of 
writing and reading the book, as well as the imaginative 
world that the book depicts. A written text can bring 
into view the technical apparatus or writing machine 
that produces it, such as in the case of something 
typewritten, where the marks of the letters are 
imprinted in the paper. Working with code goes further 
than this sense of reflexivity associated with written 
forms. Cramer explains this as ‘a recursive loop, in 
which literature writes its own instrumentation’ (in 
Goriunova & Shulgin 2003: 54). He is interested in the 
ways that notation and the execution of a concept or 
of code are collapsed into one event. His key example 
(and what he considers to be a seminal software art 
work) is the Fluxus performance score of La Monte 
Young’s _Composition 1961 No. I, January I_, a piece of 
paper with the instruction: ‘draw a straight line and 
follow it’. Clearly code cannot be separated from an 
understanding of the overall structure of which it is 
part, that includes its writing and execution. This is 
even more the case with the self-replicating source code 
of a ‘Quine’ - a program whose output is exactly the 
same as its complete source code.[18] 
In treating a work of art in terms of itself, the 
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influence of the art historian Clement Greenberg is often 
cited and his position that each art must isolate and 
make explicit that which is unique to the nature of its 
medium (1992).[19] The problem is that this suggests a 
description of ‘pure form’ outside of social context, 
or one in which the work of art is autonomous. This 
criticism is often levelled at formalist experimentation 
with software, in which process and hence the social 
implications are underplayed, especially in generative 
art according to Arns (2004, and mentioned in the 
earlier part to this chapter). However, there is 
evidently an ambiguity here in the descriptions of 
formalism. Russian formalism (associated with the 
above references to Propp and Todorov) rejects the 
idea of pure form. A hard distinction between form and 
content is undermined. In software art too, there are 
plenty of examples of practices that reject pure form, 
and express far messier forms of critical engagement 
that signal a broader context outside of itself. For 
instance, messy (or dirty) code would suggest code that 
does not necessarily compile or be machine or human 
readable. Harwood’s _London.pl_ is an example of this, 
as a formal experiment that follows the syntax of Perl 
but is not intended to be, nor is, executable. There 
are many examples of artists working with ‘pseudo-
code’ in this way, such as Mez, who writes in a hybrid 
‘creole’ of English language and ‘pseudo-code’ that 
she calls ‘mezangelle.pseudo.codework’ (in Block et al 
2004: 254).[20] Using a phrase from Mez, the title of 
Cramer’s essay ‘exe.cut[up]able statements’ exemplifies 
the creative potential of mixed language forms, using 
both a filename for sourcecode that is executable (.exe) 
and making reference to cut-up poetry such as in the 
work of William Burroughs (2003: 98). Texts that combine 
so-called natural and artificial languages can be seen 
to play with signification and undermine the semiotic 
categories of signifier and signified (a literal and 
metaphoric understanding of signification). In such 
examples, meaning and authorship remain in question 
(as does the dubious distinction between natural and 
artificial language).
It is entirely possible for software art to contain 
formal elements and at the same time social critique. 
However, in much practice an assumption is made that an 
engagement with formal elements and self-referentiality 
somehow equals political engagement. This is an issue 
40
that Yvonne Volkart describes as similar to the debates 
around net-art in the late nineties, that: 
‘... as soon as software is used as a tool in a manner 
for which it was not intended, so that it at best 
generates and reveals its own regulatory mechanisms, 
it is interpreted as artistic, critical and political’ 
(2004). 
To Volkart, abstraction and what she calls ‘code 
fetishism’ are simply assumed to be radical and outside 
of commercial imperatives. For instance, JODI’s _Jet Set 
Willy Variations_ (2002) is an example of the tendency 
to use very simple programs and assembly languages that 
seem to express the raw materiality of code - such as in 
their modification of the 1984 game _Jet Set Willy_ first 
designed for the ZX Spectrum computer. The significance 
is that low-level languages are seen to have a close 
proximity to the mechanics of the hardware and so evoke 
an engagement with the apparatus at a deeper level. But 
what is the significance of this engagement? 
In examining open source culture and software arts 
practice, Josephine Berry Slater describes the practice 
of hiding source code as narrowing its creative 
potential, and enforcing a series of mythologies around 
creativity and property rights (2005). With a rejection 
of private property in mind, 0100101110101101.org’s 
project _life_sharing_ rendered the data on a networked 
computer public property. The logic of open source 
was extended to the ‘laying bare’ of the apparatus 
associated with Russian Formalism [26] in what the 
artists refer to as ‘data-nudism’: ‘It sets its kernel 
free and all the functions that concern it, in the same 
way as a programmer who frees the source code of their 
software.’ (2001) 
For Berry Slater, the approach of 0100101110101101.org 
confirms the engagement with code and the relations of 
production that are expressed in the shared production 
of free software. This allows her to question that 
if ‘net artists use proprietary software to produce 
their work, to what extent can they be said to be 
transforming the apparatus of production?’ She is asking 
what constitutes a radical work of software art in 
the context of previous claims for engaging with the 
technical apparatus. Berry Slater makes an explicit 
reference to Benjamin’s essay ‘The Author as Producer’, 
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first presented as a lecture in April 1934 at the 
Institute for the Study of Fascism in Paris, to clarify 
the potential problem. In this essay, Benjamin claimed 
that: 
‘An author who has carefully thought about the 
conditions of production today [...] will never be 
concerned with the products alone, but always, at the 
same time, with the means of production. In other words, 
his [sic] products must possess an organising function 
besides and before their character as finished works.’ 
(1992b: 98) 
 
The significance of the engagement with the means of 
cultural production lies in requiring the producer to 
act as an active agent in the production process, to 
transform the apparatus and thereby effect a change in 
the relations of production. For Benjamin, it is not 
enough for cultural producers to express political 
commitment, however radical it may seem, ‘without at 
the same time being able to think through in a really 
revolutionary way the question of their own work, 
its relationship to the means of production and its 
technique’ (1992b: 91). The cultural producer must 
reflect upon his or her position within the production 
process like a technician, demonstrating expertise 
alongside solidarity, acknowledging whose interests 
or more particularly class interests the producing 
serves. This is an issue of property not least, in 
taking control over the means of production, and in the 
case of software production opening it up to potential 
transformation.[22] 
This position will be developed in subsequent chapters 
but is one that relies on an engagement with software 
that is not separate from the materials and institutions 
that produce it. The approach goes some way to counter 
the criticisms levelled at software art that it provides 
the appearance of political engagement but without 
substance (privileging form over content, or product 
over process). Self-referentiality is not enough in 
itself - it must be combined with an improved apparatus 
if the materialist position of Benjamin is followed. 
Predating 0100101110101101.org’s _life_sharing_ and with 
similar intentions, was the browser _Manifest_ (1999) by 
46liverpoolst.org (now offline).[23] Using the browser 
rendered the user’s hard drive public in the spirit of 
a rejection of private property (advocated by Karl Marx 
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and Friedrich Engels in _The Communist Manifesto_, first 
printed at 46 Liverpool Street, London in 1848). In this 
way, the hardware were made open source in addition to 
software. The user’s guide was simply a reprint of _The 
Communist Manifesto_ in the form of screen shots of the 
text in the browser. The suggestion of this section and 
the selected examples of projects, is that a materialist 
approach comes close to an understanding of ‘speculative 
software’ that reflexively investigates the conditions in 
which it operates. Through an engagement with the means 
of production, some of the antagonistic social relations 
involved in software production can be made more visible 
and open to change. This is inherent to a critical 
practice that recognises its material and historical 
foundations. 
--------------------------
2.3 - software art history
--------------------------
The contemporary artistic preoccupation with software 
production clearly has a history.[28] In addition to 
a history of literature, it can be traced through 
an art historical lineage that would include Dada, 
Conceptualism, and other practices such as performance 
that have sought to challenge art’s commodity form. 
Software art has an ambiguous relation to use-value in 
this respect,[25] and manages to challenge some of the 
precepts of what constitutes art. Combining software 
art and performance practices, The Museum of Ordure 
(UKMO) exploits this ambiguous relation to value by 
collecting ordure (rubbish, shit, waste), aiming to draw 
attention to what and how cultural systems assign value 
to objects. Operating in the spirit of artists dealing 
with the material of shit (such as Piero Manzoni, and 
Stuart Brisley who is also a trustee of UKMO), objects 
submitted to the museum archives in the form of data 
files are subject to a destructive process running on its 
server that corrupts these files. Statements on the web 
site suggest that the museum sees itself as a reflection 
of the destructive tendencies of capitalism itself. The 
museum implies that the best kind of ordure resists 
commodification.
Some of the examples of software art mentioned so far 
in this chapter represent a further development of 
radical practices in art prone to recuperation. This 
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section will chart some of these histories, without 
intending to be a comprehensive historical or systemic 
account - it is far too selective and partial to make 
this claim. The key argument is that rather than 
software art representing a further art historical 
genre, it offers the potential to rupture this sense 
of continuum (the following chapter 3 will introduce 
historical materialism that underpins this claim). In 
terms of a comparison to previous practices, like ‘the 
work of art of the Dadaists became an instrument of 
ballistics’ according to Benjamin (1999d: 231), software 
art might similarly be deployed in explosive tactics. 
For instance, in JODI’s website wwwwwwwwww.jodi.org 
(1995) the source code behind an abstract arrangement 
of characters on screen reveals a diagram of a hydrogen 
bomb. JODI ‘turn software inside out’ according to 
Julian Stallabrass (2003: 38), revealing something of 
the hidden ideological nature of the system in clearly 
materialist terms.
Despite the grand claim to explode the continuum of 
art history, firstly a more straightforward historical 
approach is taken.[26] It is also worth noting that 
‘newness’ is historically bound, and this is what 
Charlie Gere suggests with his paradoxical title 
‘When New Media was New’ (in Kimbell 2004: 46-63) - 
derived from Carolyn Marvin’s _When Old Technologies 
were New_ (1990). This principle underpins Gere’s 
historical work on early computer arts (some examples 
of which were mentioned in the first section of this 
chapter) that weaves together information theory and 
artistic experimentation, and retains a belief in the 
radical potential of art.[27] To stress the importance 
of history in relation to emergent arts practices goes 
against the grain of the tendency for forward-looking 
theories associated with technology. The paradox is 
that much historical work tends towards futuristic 
theories, such as the ‘visionary work’ of Roy Ascott 
and other futurologists like Buckminster Fuller or 
the futurist Filippo Marinetti.[28] These figures are 
taken to be pioneers (as well they may be) or part of 
an ‘avant-garde’. However the avant-garde has failed to 
deliver what it promised - both Dada and Conceptualism 
are perceived examples of art’s inability to deliver 
social transformation. Is software art doomed to the 
same fate? 
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The suggestion of this section of the chapter is that 
art should deal with the central issue of transformation 
rather than representation reflecting the properties of 
software (whether used directly or not). On the surface 
this sounds like a very contemporary position, supported 
by the curator Nicolas Bourriaud’s claim that the image 
is now defined by its ‘generative power’, and that art 
can be seen to be a program(me) for the generation of 
forms and situations (2002: 70). His term ‘relational 
aesthetics’ describes a practice that involves human 
interactions, social context and the new aesthetic and 
cultural concerns that arise from this. He is referring 
to artwork that is a programme to be followed, a model 
to be reproduced, or an encouragement to do something 
- and points to the parallel activities of artists 
engaging in ideas of interaction and sociability, set 
against the hype of interactive computer systems. To 
Bourriaud, artwork not using the computer has as much 
potential to make work about its effects. This may well 
be the case, but his statements appear to take their cue 
from systems thinking. They could easily be paraphrased 
from Gregory Bateson’s 1971 position on art (from _Steps 
to an Ecology of Mind_) that focuses attention not on 
the message but the code (2000: 130). Working across 
multiple disciplines including anthropology, social 
science, linguistics and cybernetics, Bateson considers 
the production of art, and art as product, in terms of 
behaviours or rules that are embodied in the machinery 
that then generates transformations (2000: 271-2). 
For art historian Edward Shanken, the emphasis on 
behaviour points to the ‘paradoxical nature of 
knowledge and the contradictions inherent in formal 
epistemologies’ (2003: 5), predicated on Bateson’s 
critique of scientific method that combines strict and 
loose thinking (2000: 75). Bateson’s cybernetic ideas 
were influential on Ascott’s radical art pedagogy of the 
1970s, in which art and the teaching situation were seen 
to be subject to feedback loops that produce creativity. 
To the artist and teacher Ascott, the production of 
art and learning were mutually supportive, becoming a 
‘force for change in society’ (2003: 98).[29] Thus the 
potential for change in the system exists in the sense 
that: ‘out of the flux, a many-sided organism may evolve’ 
(2003: 102). This is a reference to _La Plissure du 
Texte_ (1983), one of Ascott’s pioneering distributed 
authorship artworks that used early telecommunications 
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networks - or what he calls ‘telematic art’. The project 
extended his interest in cybernetics to the use of 
emerging pre-Internet network technologies that seemed 
to exemplify ‘connectivist’ thinking,[30] together with 
the post-structuralist reference to Barthes’s _The 
Pleasure of the Text_ (1975). Text is taken as tissue, 
behind which lies the realm of meaning. Ascott quotes 
Barthes to this effect: 
‘the generative idea that the text is made, is worked 
out in a perpetual interweaving; lost in the tissue 
- this texture - the subject unmakes himself, like a 
spider dissolving in the constructive secretions of its 
web’ (2004: 198).
From this perspective, symbolic information systems 
containing numbers, text or code might be seen to be 
artistic material, to be rearranged accordingly. In the 
case of _La Plissure_, a distributed nonlinear narrative 
or improvised ‘planetary fairy tale’ was generated over 
the network, in the manner of weaving a textile with 
multiple authors. To some art historians, this is the 
beginning of ‘interactive art’ and of course ‘Internet 
art’.[31] If software art presents the possibility of 
software itself as art, then Ascott’s statement lays the 
historical ground in 1966: ‘The computer may be linked 
to an artwork, and the artwork may in some sense be a 
computer.’ (2003: 129) It is this line of thinking that 
underpins how software characterises arts practices 
that privilege the idea, code, process, system and its 
transformational qualities. Whether using a computer or 
not, art has become like software. 
  
# software as cultural metaphor
Clearly there is a history to software art and a canon 
appears to have emerged. Andreas Broegger is one 
researcher amongst many who situates the contemporary 
term software art in the historical context of the _
Radical Software_ journal published by the Raindance 
collective (launched in 1970), and Jack Burnham’s 
exhibition _Software, Information Technology: Its 
Meaning for Art_ at the Jewish Museum, New York (also 
1970). Broegger describes the ways the term software 
was used as a metaphor for arts practice at that time, 
to stand for the transmission of information using 
available communications technologies, in contrast 
to the ‘hardware’ of object-based art (2003a).[32]
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Although any discussion of software requires an 
understanding of its relationship to hardware (even 
if it is accepted that software can exist without 
hardware), it is clear that the term software is being 
used in a rather different sense in the 1970s. In the 
field of art at least, the description runs in parallel 
to conceptualism and its associated shift away from the 
end-product at that time. A contemporary use of the 
term software reflects an emphasis on process, that has 
become the orthodoxy in contemporary cultural practices. 
In the light of this, Broegger insists on the need to 
inquire whether to accept software art as art or not. 
Again, this is the wrong question to ask (according to 
Benjamin); software is more than just art and expands an 
understanding of art’s possibilities. 
In Benjamin’s artwork essay, the meaning of art changes 
with the character of its technical reproduction. As 
a result, he insists ‘the total function of art is 
reversed. Instead of being based on ritual, it begins to 
be based on another practice - politics’ (1999d: 218). 
It is this line of thinking that appears to influence 
the _Radical Software_ journal. A statement from the 
first issue gives some idea of its agenda to engage 
overtly with politics: ‘Power is no longer measured in 
land, labour or capital, but by access to information 
and the means to disseminate it’ (Ross 2003).[33] On a 
technical level (in tune with the democratic potential 
that Benjamin attributed to technical reproducibility), 
it was the widespread availability of the video 
portapak that inspired the belief that this could 
contribute to social transformation, through people 
gaining increased access to the means of production and 
becoming producers. In the context of its publication 
in the United States, the position of the journal was 
influenced by the rise of the civil rights movement, a 
general mistrust of the communications media on offer, 
requiring more independent and alternative media and 
cultural practices, combined with ecological concerns 
(according to Ross 2003). Those associated with this 
project ‘imagined a world in which the contest of ideas 
and values could take place freely and openly’ outside 
of the existing institutional and ideological frameworks 
of commercial telecommunications. They proposed ‘a new 
information order in which the very idea of hierarchical 
power structure might be transformed or even eliminated’ 
(Ross 2003). In this sense, what is radical about 
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software is that it acts upon hardware. It operates as 
a metaphor for an emphasis on social processes that 
involve an engagement with relations of production 
and ‘radical’ transformation. In a sense, Benjamin’s 
call for a politics of representation is upgraded to a 
politics of transformation. 
In parallel to the _Radical Software_ journal, ‘software 
as a metaphor for art’ was explored in Burnham’s 
_Software_ exhibition. The show can be seen as a 
product of its times with its overt structuralist 
and conceptualist concerns, and its aim to focus 
attention on the technical apparatus. It corresponds 
to what has since become commonplace in looking to the 
‘dematerialisation’ associated with the conceptual arts 
tradition and the ‘immaterialisation’ of information and 
communications technology. In his essay ‘The House that 
Jack Built’ (1998), Shanken traces Burnham’s concerns 
with particular reference to his book _Beyond Modern 
Sculpture: The Effects of Science and Technology on the 
Sculpture of this Century_ (1968a) that ends with an 
account of ‘systems aesthetics’.[34] By an aesthetics 
of systems, Burnham refers to non-object based art 
and time-based based practices such as performance, 
interactive and conceptual art, but also public interaction 
that breaks down the false distinction between the 
operating systems of art and non-art. This is software 
metaphorically-speaking, the abstract ‘internal logic’ 
of a program receiving feedback from human subjects. For 
example, works in the exhibition included Hans Haacke’s 
_Visitor’s Profile_ where personal information was 
entered into a system, and Sonia Sheridan’s _Interactive 
Paper Systems_ where visitors were encouraged to engage 
with the artist and a photocopy machine. Clearly neither 
of these artworks correspond to formalism but exemplify 
what Burnham refers to as examples of ‘post-formalist 
art’ (to include the influence of an understanding of 
subjectivity). The term ‘post-formalist’ (more commonly 
called ‘post-structuralist’) is used with reference to 
some of the influences on his thinking - such as Claude 
Lévi-Strauss’s structural anthropology and Thomas Kuhn’s 
critique of scientific objectivity, as well as Barthes’s 
semiotic distinction between readerly and writerly texts. 
In summary, the exhibition _Software_ was an attempt 
to reveal some of the contradictions between object 
and non-object, art and non-art, artist and non-
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artist, evident in art’s organisational and systemic 
logic. In this respect, particularly important to the 
development of Burnham’s writing and the _Software_ 
show are the influences of information theory associated 
with Claude Shannon and Warren Weaver, systems theory 
associated with Ludwig von Bertalanffy, and cybernetic 
theory associated with Norbert Wiener. An interest in 
cybernetics and ideas of feedback had already been 
tested in Jasia Reichardt’s exhibition _Cybernetic 
Serendipity_ at the ICA, London, in 1968, which is 
widely regarded as an historical marker for first 
combining art and cybernetic ideas. This approach 
arguably takes an even earlier cue from Ascott’s 
interest in cybernetics and behaviour, encapsulated in 
the following quote from ‘The Construction of Change’, 
published in 1964:  
‘To discuss what one is doing rather than the artwork 
which results, to attempt to unravel the loops of 
creative activity, is, in many ways, a behavioural 
problem. The fusion of art, science and personality 
is involved. It leads to a consideration of our total 
relationship to a work of art, in which physical moves 
may lead to conceptual moves, in which Behaviour relates 
to Idea [...] “An organism is most efficient when it 
knows its own internal order”.’ (2003: 97)
   
# dematerialisation and conceptual traditions
The Ascott quote exemplifies an approach to arts practice 
that rejects the hardware of the physical object for 
process. Therefore, it is no accident of history that 
it also introduces Lucy Lippard’s _Six Years: The 
Dematerialisation of the Art Object from 1966 to 1972_ 
(1997). Lippard’s concept ‘dematerialisation of the art 
object’, first introduced in 1968 with John Chandler, 
characterises arts practice of this time in two ways 
- ‘art as idea and art as action’ (Lippard 1997: 43) - 
and of course not art as object. This approach departs 
from arts practices of preceding years and its perceived 
‘anti-intellectual, emotional intuitive processes of 
art-making’, replacing it with ‘an ultra-conceptual art 
that emphasizes the thinking process almost exclusively’ 
(Lippard 1997: 42). Dematerialisation in this sense 
serves to de-emphasise not simply art as object but 
the related orthodoxies of originality, permanence, 
and beauty into an ‘anti-form’ or ‘process art’ or 
‘concept art’.[35] Its influences were derived more 
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from Dada-ist ‘poem-objects’ or ‘found-objects’ such 
as Marcel Duchamp’s ‘ready-made’ to shock people into 
new understandings of the material world. For instance, 
Tristan Tzara had advised aspiring poets to cut a 
newspaper article into words and make a poem by shaking 
them out of a bag at random, revealing the hidden 
possibilities of language, and clearly undermining 
notions of creativity and genius by providing a way 
for anyone to work with words. With scissors and glue, 
words could be made to appear as arbitrary patterns, 
rhythmical noise, mere chance arrangements of words 
and sounds, reflecting the confusion and emptiness of 
the world and renouncing the language of the mass 
media. In this procedure, there is a consistent concern 
with everyday objects challenging the judgement of 
originality and authority, through the Duchampian 
‘readymade’ and montage techniques. In a similar way, 
conceptual art established an attack on the conventions 
of the art-world and the commodity status of the work 
of art - what in a contemporary setting would be called 
‘hacking the art operating system’ (Sollfrank 2001).  
Conceptualism has been particularly influential in 
attempts to draw software art into an art historical 
register. Referring to Lippard’s portrayal of 
dematerialisation, software art is clearly both idea 
and action, and on a conceptual and technical level 
embodies a description of source code and its execution. 
The generative approach of conceptual artist LeWitt is 
evocative of software in this connection: ‘The idea 
becomes a machine that makes the art’. (in Lippard 1997: 
xiv)[36] The quote was used in the publicity materials 
for the _Generator_ show with this connection in mind. 
LeWitt provided explicit instructions for the production 
of artworks that are then executed by other people.
[37] For instance, the program for _Wall Drawing #69_ 
(1971) reads: ‘Lines not long, not strait, not touching, 
drawn at random using four colors, uniformly dispersed 
with maximum density, covering the entire surface of the 
wall.’ (in Reas 2004: 277)
Casey Reas’s _{Software}Structures_ (2004) takes these 
instructions for wall drawings as the inspiration 
for software, writing source code that generates 
software drawings. Examples such as this demonstrate 
how it has become commonplace to position software art 
within a conceptual tradition as a continuation of the 
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‘dematerialisation of art’, treating code as artistic 
material in a similar way to taking ideas or concepts as 
material. Jacob Lillemose develops the parallel between 
programming and conceptualism by defining linguistic, 
political and performative modes. Firstly, he describes 
‘linguistic conceptualism’ (associated with LeWitt, Art 
& Language and Joseph Kosuth), that considers art as a 
‘self-reflexive logistic system composed by writing and 
ideas, and a language in which form and content tended 
to merge’, and the work of art as a set of instructions 
or composition (associated with La Monte Young and Cage 
in particular), ‘as a purely mental, non-physical, 
phenomena’ (2004: 139). In addition to this, there is 
a more cultural or political dimension (associated 
with Haacke, Victor Burgin, and Gordon Matta-Clark), 
and a more performative one (associated with Vito 
Acconci, Bruce Nauman and Chris Burden), according to 
Lillemose. Clearly it is possible to cast software art 
in these terms but the point for Lillemose is that both 
an internal logic and wider social issues are evoked. 
Paraphrasing Sarah Charlesworth’s ‘A Declaration of 
Dependence’ of 1975 (that Lillemose adapts for the title 
of his essay ‘A Re-declaration of Dependence’), he 
says: ‘the contextual nature of conceptual art points 
towards an aesthetics based on the relationship between 
the internal structure of the work of art and external 
non-artistic structures’ (2004: 140). Featured in the 
Runme.org software art repository, one example selected 
by Lillemose that makes context explicit is _Anti-
Capitalist Operating System_ attributed to ‘Together we 
can defeat Capitalism’ (2003).[38] It is a platform for 
anti-capitalist activities that takes on the appearance 
of a conventional operating system, and a working 
prototype in this respect for full development. With 
‘browser art’ and software art in general, the context 
for the work is an integral part of the work - the frame 
as part of the artwork. This conceptual attitude gained 
some legitimacy when the GNU/Linux operating system was 
awarded a prize at the Ars Electronica festival in 1999.
By historicising these software practices, Lillemose 
is trying to avoid describing emergent practices as 
‘avant-gardist’ (2004: 145). Instead, he argues for a 
contextual understanding of software art and ‘software 
not-just art’ (like Burnham in _Software_). Adopting 
Peter Weibel’s thesis that proposes three generations 
of artists interpreting the legacy of conceptual art, 
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Lillemose proposes software art as a fourth generation. 
This is speculation perhaps (or ‘speculative software 
art history’), as he does emphasise that art history 
is not an exact science but an interpretative form. 
However, it seems a mistake to simply place software 
art in an art historical continuum in this way. In the 
context of the argument of this thesis, software art 
holds the potential to break this continuum. This is an 
important point of emphasis. 
# from representation to transformation
If art holds radical potential at all, the issue remains 
how to produce art that resists its seemingly inevitable 
commodification and how to reconcile the apparent 
failure of the avant-garde to deliver its promises 
(evident in Conceptualism and Dada). Do the historical 
tactics of radical art require complete overhaul 
or better implementation? Whereas Eric Kluitenberg, 
in ‘Transfiguration of the Avant-Garde/The Negative 
Dialectics of the Net’ (2002), sees the opportunity for 
avant-garde tactics to be deployed in the larger context 
of the network society, Duna Mavor is highly skeptical 
of such claims.[38] Mavor is bitingly cynical about 
the interventions of art-activist groups, regarding 
their strategies as tired repetitions of obsolete 
dialectical logic leading to inevitable recuperation. 
She is thinking of art-activist groups such as the anti-
corporate corporation RTmark. Perhaps it is right to 
be suspicious of RTmark’s work if it invites interest 
from the commercial art world but also their rejection 
and auction of their invitations to take part in the 
prestigious Whitney Biennial is a blatent attempt to 
resist this. It is worth quoting Mavor at length for her 
ideological verve (and despite her opposition to the 
dialectical approach of this thesis):   
‘Dialectics never died. It lives every time another 
tired exhibit of the relics of dada or situationism 
opens at the houses of culture across the world. It 
lives when the hackers who haunt the net repeat the 
slogans and gestures of the dead and then congratulate 
themselves when they are finally inducted into the halls 
of power of the Venice Biennale or Ars Electronica. 
It lives when the theorists and cartographers of new 
deterritorialized flows of desire sell their interests 
by entering a classroom to become functionaries of the 
empire of production, offering packaged knowledge to 
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students who eagerly produce whatever stupidity is asked 
of them in exchange for the general equivalent of a 
grade. It lives when the anti-globalization “multitude” 
faithfully ascend to the stage of negation to recite 
their memorized roles, proudly displaying the garments 
of an ideology that long ago betrayed its exhaustion. 
Dialectics consumes the desire of life as it beats its 
wings against the limits of the impossible.’ (2002)
Mavor’s position is in keeping with Peter Bürger’s 
notion of the ‘post avant-garde’ (1984) with which he 
describes the failure of the historical avant-garde. 
This is also a trajectory reworked in Eric Hobsbawm’s 
_Behind the Times_ (1998), on the failure of visual 
arts to deal with reproducibility and hence remain 
radical. But rather than give up on the tactics of 
the avant-garde altogether or indeed dialectics as a 
positive force, Jürgen Habermas’s suggestion is to 
learn from past mistakes and from previous attempts at 
negating modernity. The radical potential of newness 
is associated with modernity and the avant-garde has 
encapsulated this revolutionary potential. This position 
is informed by a dialectical understanding of modernity, 
representing a transitional state between the old and 
the new - it remains an ‘incomplete project’, to use 
Habermas’s phrase (1991 [1980]). He says: 
‘The avant-garde understands itself as invading unknown 
territory, exposing itself to the dangers of sudden, 
shocking encounters, conquering an as yet unoccupied 
future. [...] The new value placed on the transitory, 
the elusive and the ephemeral, the very celebration 
of dynamism, discloses a longing for an undefiled, 
immaculate and stable present.’ (1991: 5) 
In this way, Habermas accounts for the interruption 
of the continuum of history (drawing upon Benjamin’s 
concept of history, which the following chapter explains 
in more detail) in articulating the present as a moment 
of revelation. Taking this interventionalist view of 
history, it is possible to ‘make the continuum of 
history explode’, in Benjamin’s words (1999c: 253). He 
also refers to the inherent violence in Dada, such as 
the use of explosive and destructive tactics directly 
applied to the work of art as a metaphor for change in 
the social realm. In the 1960s, ‘Auto-destructive’ art 
associated with Gustav Metzger was similarly conceived 
as a way of transforming people’s thoughts and feelings 
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about art and hence society, using an ‘aesthetics of 
revulsion’ including acid, ballistics, corrosion, 
radiation, and such like as artistic material (1996: 
27).[39] Like Dada, the artistic tactic is one that 
appears irrational but is intended to be a rational 
response to the irrationality of society - particularly 
in response to the emerging ‘potential-probable 
destruction’ of nuclear, biological, and chemical 
weapons (1996: 28), just as Dada responded to the First 
World War. In Metzger’s view, artists should develop 
techniques in response to discoveries in science and 
technology (and clearly an understanding of entropy). He 
quotes László Moholy-Nagy’s prophetic _Vision in Motion_ 
of 1922 to stress the point:
‘Carrying further the unit of construction, a dynamic 
constructive system of force is attained whereby man 
[sic], heretofore merely receptive in his observation 
of works of art, experiences a heightening of his own 
faculties, and becomes himself an active partner to the 
forces unfolding themselves.’ (1996: 37-8) 
Whilst recognising that growth was a further possibility 
in the form of what Metzger called ‘auto-creative 
art’ (a term introduced in 1960) (1996: 55), the 
ideological position of auto-destructive art remains 
rather different, with its social agenda to negate 
the destructive tendencies of the social world.[40] 
A more contemporary example of destructive tendencies 
entering the art world is the _biennale.py_ virus that 
contaminated the Venice Biennale’s web site (produced by 
0100101110101101.org with epidemiC, for the Slovenian 
pavilion of 2000).[41] The cultural form of a virus 
appears to embody the principles of auto-destructive art 
and negation. A virus describes the self-reproducing 
activities of a program that can simply spread and effect 
other programs, and thereby reflects the structural 
properties of the computer and the Internet it operates 
through. For Jaromil, the source code of a virus is 
potential lyrical poetry. Related to this, the elegance 
of his Unix shell _forkbomb_ (2002) encapsulates 
this aesthetic approach in presenting only thirteen 
characters to dramatic effect.[42] Once entered into 
the command line of a Unix shell and run, the program 
exhausts the system’s resources, causing the computer to 
crash. It was included in the exhibition _I Love You: 
Computer, Viren, Hacker, Kultur_ (held at the Museum für 
Angewandte Kunst, Frankfurt am Main, in 2002), referring 
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to the _I Love You_ virus (of 2000) that spread through 
the communities of the Internet. Opening the message 
‘love letter for you’ would activate a program that 
would erase documents from your hard drive and then 
propagate itself by sending new copies of itself 
through the address book of your mail program.[43] The 
destructive potential of a virus operates in the spirit 
of auto-destruction and Dadaist tactics. 
The comparison of software art to earlier avant-
garde movements, and particularly the avant-garde 
activities of the 1920s in Russia and Germany, provides 
an historical understanding of radical forms and 
strategies. In the contemporary situation, it appears 
that many of the claims of the historical avant-garde 
have become:
‘... embedded in the commands and interface metaphors 
of computer software. In short, the avant-garde vision 
became materialized in a computer. All the strategies 
developed to awaken audiences from a dream-existence 
of bourgeois society [...] now define the basic routine 
of a post-industrial society: the interaction with a 
computer.’ (Manovich 1999) 
The once radical technique of montage has become 
commonplace. On the surface, it seems that what was 
once a radical aesthetic vision to reveal the social 
structure behind the visible surfaces, has become 
a standardised form through the use of computer 
technology. Lev Manovich discusses these perceptions of 
change, and the ways in which ideology naturalises these 
changes. This reflects contemporary culture’s reliance 
on appropriation, wherein recycling, re-working, and 
re-combining media are the standard techniques.[44] 
He concludes that ‘the avant-garde becomes software’ 
(1999) and that it continues to introduce revolutionary 
techniques but the terms are different:
‘software does not simply adopt avant-garde techniques 
without changing them; on the contrary, these techniques 
are further developed, formalized in algorithms, codified 
in software, made more efficient and effective’ (1999). 
Whereas the ‘old media avant garde’ was concerned 
with vision and representation, the ‘new media avant 
garde’ is concerned with the manipulation, generation 
and transformation of data (a position in keeping with 
Bateson’s, discussed earlier). Maurizio Bolognini’s 
55
installations under the series name _Sealed Computers_ 
(1992-) exemplify this interest in generative and 
transformational processes. Computers are networked 
together, positioned across the floor of a space, but 
there is no way to access what processes are running, 
as the monitor ports are sealed with wax. Although 
society is saturated with images, in this work there 
appears to be no way to penetrate the inner world of 
the computer, in the way that radical practices have 
previously sought to make these processes transparent. 
If, as Manovich thinks, software has naturalised montage 
techniques, how can software be further developed as a 
radical project in revealing the ideological processes 
at work? In _Montage-Transformation-Allegory_, Wright 
argues that transformation operates in the spirit of 
montage, inducing new shock effects for the digital age 
(1998). This is a rather different position to Manovich, 
who emphasises a non-dialectical ‘anti-montage’ of 
digital compositing, in which elements are blended 
into a whole rather than brought into collision (2001: 
143). For Manovich, it is the database that forms the 
‘new symbolic form of the computer age’ (2001: 219) and 
his concept of the ‘data-base movie’ derives from this 
logic. In contrast, Wright draws directly upon Sergei 
Eisenstein’s ‘A Dialectical Approach to Film Form’, 
written in 1929, in which reality is not described directly, 
but must be reconstructed to reveal the hidden structure 
that otherwise remains obscured by ideological preconceptions.
Rather than seeing digital imaging in terms of smooth 
and normalised transitions and imperatives, Wright 
argues for the possibility of a digital aesthetic that 
amplifies the dialectical method. Even a stockpile 
of fragments, such as a database, could be seen as 
a site of conflict in this way, and one where hidden 
structures should be revealed. Indeed, the ‘tendencies 
of the montage method are not opposed by any unifying 
tendencies of the transformation but by its particular 
dynamics of dispersion’ (Wright 1999). Wright’s 
assertion is informed by Benjamin’s concept of allegory, 
in which new understandings emerge through the bringing 
together of historical fragments.[45] Exploring some of 
these ideas, Wright’s project _The Bank of Time_ (2001, 
produced under the name Futurenatural), is a screensaver 
that makes an allegorical comment on idleness and 
growth.[46] Wright notes how the germinating plant 
is a recurring metaphor in financial and investment 
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advertising, as well as in Baroque imagery. The user’s 
idle time is directly proportional to the rate of growth 
of the plant on their desktop   from seedling to fully 
grown plant through to its decay. In _The Bank of Time_, 
the more idle the user, the faster the plant grows, 
suggesting idleness at work as a creative force. 
In dialectical allegories such as this, objects are 
brought together through montage to disrupt the continuity 
of historical and ideological conceptions. Through montage, 
the objects that constitute ‘the material world could be 
rearranged out of their conventional, found or “natural” 
order so that the forces which shaped them would become 
visible, manifest and accessible to the senses’ (Wright 
1999). The principles of montage thus take on a wider 
political status in the context of a history of art, and 
even more so with respect to artwork that uses software 
- that in itself is transformative. Is it possible 
to apply the principle of software to history in a 
similar manner, by paying attention to its processes 
and events? This is the challenge for software art and 
for the argument of this thesis that aims to develop a 
dialectical approach. In _Das Passegen-Werk_, Benjamin 
applies the principle of montage directly to his 
writing: ‘This work has to develop to the highest degree 
the art of citing without quotation marks. Its theory is 
intimately related to that of montage.’ (1999a: 458) 
Unfortunately the protocols of PhD submission legislate 
against taking such an approach with this thesis. The re-
appropriation of existing materials presents Benjamin 
with the concept of applying materialist principles 
of montage to history, in order to understand its 
construction.[47] Crucial to this method is the retention 
of contradiction. The challenge for a critical practice 
in software art is to maintain contradiction in the 
process of transformation, for this is where politics 
is evident and where re-invention takes place. This 
assertion is carried over in the rest of this thesis. In 
terms of the legacy of previous radical arts practice, 
the lessons of art history verify the point that Lippard 
makes: that in a contemporary situation where conceptual 
strategies have become the orthodoxy of contemporary art 
and effectively recuperated, radical art can be found in 
social energies not yet recognised as art (1997: xxii). 
Perhaps software art and culture represents such an 
instance - for now at least.
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 =====================
3. *emergent history*
=====================
‘There is an irony deep laid in the very relations of 
life. It is the duty of the historian as of the artist 
to bring it to the surface.’ (Trotsky [1938], in Mosley 
1972: 11)
The previous chapter’s argument for contradiction in the 
production of software art is extended in this chapter, 
by introducing a dialectical approach to history itself. 
In this way, it develops an argument against ideas of 
universal history, in favour of a process of unfolding 
contradictions that are emergent and indeterminate. 
By adopting this approach to the conceptualisation 
of historical processes, an analogy is made to the 
emergent properties of software. It is also important 
to reinforce the argument that software art should not 
simply be placed within an art historicisation - for 
instance as a further example of previous work or as a 
new genre - but that it should be seen as an opportunity 
to rupture the continuum. 
Section 3.1 begins by introducing some of the principles 
of historical materialism, that treat history as 
material which can be reconstructed like montage to 
reveal its inner workings, its constructedness and the 
inherent distortions in which technology plays no small 
part. It is human agency that is obscured in these 
processes and this is clearly one influence among many, 
in relation to ideas of emancipation and strategies for 
political action. This section describes dialectical 
thinking as a technique to reject causality or over-
determinism, for an ongoing process of unfolding 
contradictions of development and feedback. What is 
important in this is the retention of contradiction, so 
as not to treat dialectics itself as a deterministic 
method, as it is often conceived. Thus, the inner 
potential and outside influences of an object are 
continually held in contradiction, between what is 
possible and what exists, the recognition of which 
reveals the possibility of further transformations. 
In addition to this principle of an ‘incomplete 
synthesis’, section 3.2 provides more detail on the 
dialectical method to explain how complex arguments are 
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developed. The concept of ‘negation of negation’ is 
crucial here, to understand how dialectics is not simply 
a method that proposes a reversal of one thing with 
another but a deeper engagement. Much of the skepticism 
over dialectics has failed to engage fully with this 
concept, in which negation can be seen to operate twice 
- once, and then again upon itself in a reflexive manner 
(that evokes ‘speculative software’, as described in 
chapter 2). Like political action, software remains 
written in advance of its action. 
According to this position, things are decided before 
they are enacted in actuality, but there is a delay 
that forms a part of the dynamic of history. Section 
3.3 develops an understanding of dialectics to reveal 
this relatively hidden relation between the past and the 
possibilities for future transformation. An openness 
of dialectical method is substantiated by the concept 
‘transformative praxis’ (Bhaskar 1998) to reject 
‘endism’ and to emphasise human agency. Historical 
processes are thereby articulated as dynamic and 
emergent phenomena, subject to feedback. The approach 
suggests that nothing is finished or resolved but in a 
continual state of change, appropriate to the emergent 
properties of software itself. The concept of software 
praxis arises from this, and is expounded in the final 
chapter of this thesis. 
----------------------------
3.1 - historical materialism
----------------------------
Software, like history, reveals the possibilities 
for change in the present. Both can be seen to be 
dynamic and unsettled in this way. This approach draws 
particularly upon Benjamin’s essay ‘Thesis on the 
Philosophy of History’ of 1940 (‘Über den Begriff der 
Geschichte’, sometimes translated into English as ‘On 
the Concept of History’, 1999c). The German compound 
word ‘Geschichtsphilosophie’ demonstrates how the 
two concepts come together as montage to suggest the 
reconstruction of historical material, in order to 
construct not a philosophy of history but a philosophy 
out of history (Buck-Morss 1995: 55). In contrast to 
traditional approaches to history, Benjamin rummages for 
truth in the ‘garbage heap’, in the ‘ruins of commodity 
production’ (Buck-Morss 1995: 217-8). He describes 
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his method as: ‘literary montage. I needn’t _say_ 
anything. Merely show. I shall appropriate no ingenious 
formulations, purloin no valuables. But the rags, the 
refuse - these I will not describe but put on display.’ 
(Benjamin 1999a: 860) 
The suggestion of this chapter is that this materialist 
approach might be applied to software in a similar 
manner, to reconstruct new understandings of software 
out of existing material and source code. This is common 
practice in general terms, but it is less common to 
think of software in terms of historical materialism, 
where what is present demonstrates its potential 
for further transformation, and where human agency 
is foregrounded. Historical materialism describes 
the application of Marxist thinking to historical 
development, to stress the importance of ideas or 
the active role of individuals in history. In ‘The 
Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte’ of 1851-2, Marx 
claimed that: 
‘Men [sic] make their own history but they do not 
make it just as they please; they do not make it 
under circumstances chosen by themselves, but 
under circumstances directly encountered, given and 
transmitted by the past.’ (1980: 96)
In other words, there are social forces that intervene 
in the process of history, and the critical impulse of 
the historical materialist, according to Benjamin, is to 
brush received history against the grain, in order to 
‘make the continuum of history explode’ (1999c: 253). 
For Benjamin, the _Angelus Novus_ image by Paul Klee 
(1910)[1] captures history’s capacity for progression 
and regression: 
‘There is an image by Klee called _Angelus Novus_. On 
it an angel is depicted who looks as if he is about to 
distance himself from something that he is staring at. 
His eyes are wide-open, his mouth is agape, and his 
wings are spread. This is how the angel of history must 
look. He has turned his face towards the past. Where, 
in front of us, a chain of events appear, he sees one 
single catastrophe. This unrelentingly piles rubble on 
rubble and flings it at his feet. He would really like to 
stay, awaken the dead, and repair the smashed pieces. 
But a storm is blowing over from paradise, and it is 
tangled in his wings and is so strong that the angel can 
no longer close them. This storm forces him irresistibly 
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into the future to which his back is turned, while the 
pile of rubble in front of him grows skyward. This storm 
is what we call progress.’ (Leslie [translating Benjamin 
from the German] 2000: 202)[2]
The angel wants to gather up the wreckage of terrible 
past events, wasted lives and worthless objects to 
make things better but cannot, because of the dominant 
forces at work. This is the catastrophe of the ‘status 
quo’.[3] What is crucial to this approach is that any 
moment in time can be traced historically in order 
to reveal its constructedness, and hence reveal the 
possibility of change in the present. Benjamin calls 
this ‘Jetztzeit’ (the presence of the now): ‘History is 
the object of a construction, whose site is not that 
of homogeneous and empty time, but one filled with now-
time’ (Leslie [translation of Benjamin] 2000: 198). The 
significance of the materialist presentation of history 
forces the present into a critical state: ‘It is the 
present that polarizes the event into fore- and after-
history’ (1999a: 471) It is as if time stands still, 
and the past and the future converge not harmoniously, 
but explosively. The suggestion is that software might 
be similarly conceived as filled with now-time, held 
at a critical state where its past construction and 
future execution remain in dialectical tension (see final 
chapter for more detail). 
History, and the history of technology, is full of the 
use of trickery to make it seem natural and beyond the 
scope of human intervention. Leslie cites a statement 
by Theodor W. Adorno (in a radio lecture of 1962) to 
insist that the angel of history is not only the angel 
of history but the angel of the machine. Benjamin argues 
that any conception of history changes with the times, 
as does its analysis in accordance with changes in the 
material mode of production: 
‘It is the particularity of _technological_ forms 
of production (as opposed to art forms) that their 
progress and their success are proportionate to the _
transparency_ of their social content.’ (1999a: 465) 
Although Benjamin is referring to glass architecture, 
the formulation can be applied to other technologies 
to emphasise the availability of either open or closed 
social content (like open source and proprietary models 
of software production). A Marxist view of history is 
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informed by an understanding of the material factors in 
production and the relations of production. According 
to this position, capitalism is simply a temporary 
organisational form that is neither fixed nor desirable. 
It is therefore subject to change and influence by those 
involved in the material, productive forces, and social 
relations where class antagonism and consequently social 
transformation derives. Historical materialism (or what 
Marx himself called ‘the materialist conception of 
history’) indicates an understanding of the growth and 
development of human history founded on these principles. 
# fake history
At the beginning of Benjamin’s ‘Thesis on the Philosophy 
of History’, there is a short passage by means of 
introduction: 
‘The story is told of an automaton constructed in such 
a way that it could respond to each move in a game of 
chess with a countermove that ensured him victory. A 
puppet in Turkish attire, and with a hookah in his 
mouth, sat in front of a chessboard placed on a large 
table. A system of mirrors created the illusion of a 
table transparent from all sides. Actually a hunchback 
dwarf, who was an expert chess player, sat inside and 
guided the puppet’s hand by means of strings. One can 
imagine a philosophical counterpart to this device. 
The puppet known as ‘historical materialism’ is always 
supposed to win. It can easily be a match for anyone if 
it ropes in the services of theology, which today, as 
the story goes, is small and ugly and must, as it is, 
keep out of sight.’ ([translation by Leslie] 2000: 172)[4]
The critical method of historical materialism is 
introduced as the figure of the automaton, that relies 
on the services of a dwarf hidden from view. The dwarf 
further evokes the labour of the operator, or even 
consciousness according to Esther Leslie (2000: 173). 
The success of the automaton is contingent on the 
recognition that the dwarf has to gain control of the 
technology, rather like taking control of the means 
of production. The reference is to a chess-playing 
automaton, built by the Hungarian mathematician Wolfgang 
von Kempelen in 1769, that subsequently received 
widespread attention. There was much speculation as to 
whether the machine was driven by magic or by some other 
illusory device - a spectre or demon. By the time it 
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was exhibited in London in 1783-4, a parallel interest 
sought to expose it as an illusion in another sense, 
as a trick based on a disbelief that a machine could 
demonstrate intelligence sufficient to play chess. Part 
of the theatre of the presentation was for Kempelen to 
show the audience the clockwork mechanism beneath the 
automaton, opening doors to compartments of the desk 
one by one and revealing what lay beneath the Turkish 
attire. On the one hand, Karl Gottlieb von Windisch 
described this as the ‘automaton stripped naked’ (as if 
making its source code open) and thereby its workings 
shown to be authentic.[5] On the other hand, Joseph 
Friedrich Freiherr zu Racknitz in a pamphlet of 1789 
suggested that someone was hidden in the desk: ‘the 
Automaton chess player is a man within a man; for 
whatever his outward form be composed of, he bears a 
living soul within’ (in Wood 2002: 66). This is the 
dwarf that Benjamin refers to, first suggested by Henri 
Decremps, and embellished by Racknitz, who described the 
hiding place in detail and how the dwarf would operate 
the chess pieces by the use of magnets and a duplicate 
board hidden inside the machine. In engravings, the 
scenario is imagined in such a way that the dwarf looks 
like a puppet of the Turk rather than the other way around. 
After Kempelen’s death, Johan Nepomuk Maelsel bought the 
machine in 1818 and added some improvements including 
speech - the announcement of ‘Echec’ (check) by means of 
bellows. It is this version that Wiener refers to as a 
‘fraudulent machine’ in his note on the accomplishment 
of artificial intelligence (2000: 165). This version is 
also referred to in Edgar Allan Poe’s essay ‘Maelzel’s 
Chess Player’ (1836), in which he makes direct 
comparison to Charles Babbage’s calculating machine, in 
asking: 
‘What should we think [of a machine that operates] 
without the slightest intervention of the intellect of 
man? It will, perhaps, be said in reply, that a machine 
as we have described is altogether above comparison 
with the Chess Player of Maelzel. By no means - it is 
altogether beneath it - that is to say, provided we 
assume (what should never for one moment be assumed) 
that the Chess Player is a pure machine, and performs 
its operations without any immediate human agency.’ (in 
Wood 2002: 72) 
The link between technology and human agency is 
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made explicit in such descriptions. The illusion is 
that human agency is not involved in these machine 
operations, and that they are somehow autonomous (as 
with artificial intelligence). In Benjamin’s application 
of the chess-playing automaton, the illusion relates 
to received history that is also not autonomous and 
can be corrected by human intervention, assisted by 
the historical materialist approach. This concurs with 
Leslie’s account of the story in that the dwarf has to 
gain control of the technology to reveal the otherwise 
hidden relations of production. It is the perceived 
autonomy of technology and history that are revealed to 
be fake. The theatrics show the lengths that proprietary 
interests and manufacture goes to in order to mask the 
operating system and source code of any mechanism. 
Pretending to reveal this through trick mirrors has 
become part of the illusion of the history of computing. 
Much software production operates in this way too, 
giving the impression of access but one that often hides 
a more detailed understanding of the mechanism at a 
deeper level. For instance, the graphical user interface 
of operating systems reveals only a very partial view. 
Under the surface of the interface lie other complex 
technical procedures that are kept out of view. The 
task of the historical materialist is to reveal these 
inner workings in order to develop a counter strategy to 
received history. A historical materialist understanding 
of software would similarly be engaged in developing 
counteractions to received notions of historical and 
technological processes, so that these might be changed 
through collective action. 
# dialectical and historical processes
The operations of history, like operating systems in 
general, are far more complex than surface impressions 
suggest. Certainly historical processes cannot be simply 
described in terms of progress from one point in time 
to another. If a more complex formulation is upheld 
that rejects teleological approaches, then the position 
of Georg W.F. Hegel is questionable: that history 
is no mere accident but happens ‘necessarily’: ‘The 
history of the world is none other than the progress 
of the consciousness of freedom’ (1953: 19). This 
belief in history as an unfolding of meaning towards 
freedom does not appear to account sufficiently for the 
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complexities of human subjectivity or societies. This 
is certainly the view of Gianni Vattimo, who argues 
that the ‘ideal of emancipation’ needs upgrading to 
accommodate ‘oscillation, plurality and, ultimately 
[...] the erosion of the very “principle of reality”’ 
(1992: 7). However, he does not reject the idea of 
emancipation altogether but maintains that emancipatory 
potential lies in the ‘relative chaos’ of a ‘society 
of communication’ (see section 4.3 for more detail on 
this). Or even, bearing in mind the previous section, 
‘our images of the present do not identify agencies and 
processes of change’ sufficiently (Levitas 1995: 265), 
so that any lingering possibilities of emancipation or 
social change remain hidden or consigned to fantasy. 
 
Unashamedly utopian in spirit, Hegel’s concept of 
history is predicated on the ‘necessity’ of progress, in 
as much as historical change and positive development 
can take place in the human condition and consciousness. 
In _The Phenomenology of Mind_ (1967[1807]), he points 
to the ways in which the mind itself appears to the 
observer; this is inextricably linked to history and 
progress towards a consciousness of freedom. In other 
words, to Hegel, history is the development of the 
mind. This presents a conceptual paradox that involves 
the complexity of consciousness, in that to study the 
mind is to study the way the mind appears to itself.[6] 
Knowledge of something is only what appears to be known 
to the mind, adding another level of consciousness, 
and so on, in a developmental and generative process 
of learning. Although the goal of such a method may be 
absolute knowledge, this clearly remains impossible 
in practical terms. What this dialectical description 
suggests is a process of critical reflection, where a 
thesis is posed only for an antithesis to be counter-
posed that reveals inadequacies in the first concept, 
and the pursuit of new knowledge to make up for these 
inadequacies. Any synthesis can only be temporary in 
this way, and part of an ongoing critical process. 
With more reflection the synthesis will reveal itself 
to be a new thesis in some other respect, and so 
require the same dialectical treatment, and so on, in 
order to continue a chain of knowing something better, 
rather than towards a final resolution (as commonly 
attributed to Hegelian dialectics). The idea of 
synthesis as complete follows the influence of Christian 
doctrine (thus Marx, and other ‘young Hegelians’ 
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such as Ludwig Feuerabach, rejected Christianity 
and thereby the determinism of the approach). The 
principle of ‘progressive unification’ is grounded by 
Engels by emphasising matter and materiality in the 
concept ‘dialectical materialism’. For Engels, without 
contradiction nothing would exist at all, let alone be 
able to develop or change.[7] Historical materialism 
stops short of applying the concept as universally as 
this. The cultural-historical dialectical methodology is 
explained by Benjamin:
‘It is therefore of decisive importance that a new 
partition be applied to this initially excluded, 
negative component so that, by a displacement of the 
angle of vision (but not of the criteria!), a positive 
element emerges anew in it too - something different 
from that previously signified. And so on, ad infinitum, 
until the entire past is brought into the present in a 
historical apocatastasis’. (1999a: 459)[8]
For Marx too, the dialectical process of contradictory 
forces are accounted for in history itself. But this 
is where Vattimo identifies the problem of assuming a 
unilinear history and whether there is an ultimate 
‘reconciliation’ that he identifies with both Marx and Hegel. 
This issue of closure is a complex and contentious 
one, with many competing interpretations (whether 
Hegelian, neo-Hegelian, or anti-neo-Hegelian). However 
in this account of the dialectical method, it should be 
emphasised that any harmonising dialectical synthesis 
must be rejected for an ongoing critical process that 
retains contradiction at all stages of the development. 
# incomplete synthesis
Against the popular interpretation of Hegel’s work 
(exemplified by Vattimo in the above comments), Slavoj 
Žižek stresses Hegel’s ‘tarrying of the negative’ to 
describe the retention of contradiction rather than the 
perceived false harmonising at the point of synthesis 
- what is sometimes called ‘higher-order synthesis’ 
(1999a). The principle behind this is that the system 
becomes stale, unless it is continuously challenged. In 
other words, herein lies the necessity of contradiction, 
and the impossibility of achieving full synthesis on 
both practical and conceptual levels. In Hegel’s terms, 
this is a move from ‘in-itself’ to ‘for-itself’ - from 
‘ground’ to ‘conditions’ (where ground is the essence 
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and the conditions are what brings this about). The 
two opposing factors must be combined without losing 
the antagonism between them, between the inner essence 
and the external circumstances that gives rise to that 
essence. Žižek stresses Hegel’s position as a radical 
anti-evolutionary approach to dialectic synthesis in 
this way: 
‘The simultaneous reading of these two aspects 
undermines the usual idea of dialectical progress as a 
gradual realization of the object’s inner potentials, as 
its spontaneous self-development. Hegel is here quite 
outspoken and explicit: the inner potentials of the self-
development of an object and the pressure exerted on it 
by an external force are strictly correlative; they form 
the two parts of the same conjunction.’ (1999a: 228) 
The antagonism between internal and external factors 
means that the human subject exists within an ‘absolute 
unrest of becoming’ (Žižek 1999a: 239). This is an 
evocative emergent state that is thoroughly embedded in 
historical process, which raises the issue of whether 
human subjects create the external world from within, or 
as a result of external circumstances expressed by Marx 
(quoted earlier in this section) that they: 
‘... make their own history but they do not make it just 
as they please; they do not make it under circumstances 
chosen by themselves, but under circumstances directly 
encountered, given and transmitted by the past’. 
(1980: 96)[9]
 
Hegel, as Žižek points out, would reject the view 
that human subjects make their own history as far too 
deterministic. The statement does not take account of 
the ways in which inner essence can be transformed into 
external conditions and vice versa. Yet, seen from a 
different perspective, Hegel’s work can be understood as 
deterministic. For example, Hegel’s view of the State 
is that which holds society together as the culmination 
of human achievement. This is the Hegelian assertion 
of the ‘end of history’ - a history that culminates in 
the present, that Francis Fukuyama appropriated for 
his _The End of History and the Last Man_ (1992) to 
insist on the triumph of neo-liberalism over Marxist 
‘materialist economism’, thus expressing a false 
totality.[10] To Marx, the State holds society together 
but is also subject to historical conditions, hence 
cannot be complete and so requires continual dialectical 
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attention. Marx simply insists that human consciousness 
is seen as a ‘succession of changing stages and shifting 
moments’ (becoming) and sees a contradiction in Hegel’s 
insistence on the end of history (Lefebvre 1968: 28). 
Marx both continues Hegel’s project, and at the same 
time breaks with him. His ‘Postface to the Second 
Edition’ of _Capital_ of 1867, makes this clear: 
‘My dialectical method is, in its foundations, not only 
different from the Hegelian, but exactly the opposite to 
it. For Hegel, the process of thinking, which he even 
transforms into an independent subject, under the name 
of ‘the Idea’, is the creator of the real world, and 
the real world is only the external appearance of the 
idea. With me the reverse is true: the ideal is nothing 
but the material world reflected in the mind of man, and 
translated into forms of thought. [...] The mystification 
which the dialectic suffers in Hegel’s hands by no 
means prevents him from being the first to present its 
general forms of motion in a comprehensive and conscious 
manner. With him it is standing on its head. It must 
be inverted, in order to discover the rational kernel 
within the mystical shell.’ (1990: 102 & 103)[11] 
Dialectics is thus reinterpreted in a non-idealist 
manner, to assert the contradictory and dynamic nature 
of the material world, outside our perception of it. The 
dialectical process is marked by stages and there is no 
limit to further development, following an open-ended 
process rather than a set of received truths or towards 
an ultimate truth. The point of this section is not to 
assert the importance of one thinker over the other or 
to make an undialectical claim for authentic meaning, 
but to use these differing positions to substantiate the 
claim that a dialectical approach to history is not 
deterministic. As with historical materialism, these 
dialectical principles allow for an understanding of 
software in historical terms: between what is possible 
and what actually exists. 
--------------
3.2 - negation
--------------
As the previous section demonstrates, the dialectical 
movement is not from one extreme to its opposite 
extreme (from yes to no) and from there to ‘higher 
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unity’, but rather a ‘radicalisation’ of the first 
position (Žižek 1999b: 71). Žižek quotes Wendy Brown’s 
_States of Injury_ to make this point more clearly of 
how dialectical arguments are posed. Brown describes 
a familiar scenario where an oppressed group imagine 
themselves in a future better world with the oppressor 
removed (1996: 36). She then describes how this logic is 
problematic, as it fails to recognise how one identity 
position is infiltrated and mediated by the other (as 
a result of the capitalist production process). Žižek 
likens this to the misunderstandings at the root of the 
Hegelian idea of ‘negation of negation’. He explains: 
‘... its matrix is not that of a loss and its 
recuperation, but simply that of a process of passage 
from state A to state B: the first immediate ‘negation’ 
of A negates the position of A while remaining within 
its symbolic confines, so it must be followed by another 
negation, which then negates the very symbolic space 
common to A and its immediate negation [...]. Here the 
gap that separates the negated system’s “real” death 
from its “symbolic” death is crucial: the system has to 
die twice.’ (1999b: 72) 
As Žižek puts it, negation of negation presupposes no 
magical reversal (1999b: 77). Explained further but 
in different terms, the Hegelian terms ‘abstract’ and 
‘concrete’ universality relate to this - something 
only becomes ‘concrete’ when it reintegrates with 
its primary state. This logic underpins the Hegelian 
principle that it is only through ‘abstract negativity’ 
that ‘concrete universality’ can be attained. One can 
easily see how the relationship between the universal 
and the particular is an entirely political struggle, 
and as such the basis of representational democracy and 
its distortions. Žižek expands on this idea of post-
politics describing the traditional relation between the 
particular and the universal that underpins politics. 
In this way, the detail on how a single issue becomes 
representative of a wider struggle is foreclosed and 
kept in the realm of the particular (1999b: 204). So-
called socially-engaged arts practice runs into similar 
problems by failing to see how it is often left at the 
level of the particular, and infiltrated and mediated by 
the wider culture and economy it is part of, and yet 
that it seeks to challenge. Recent cultural policies 
that address ‘social inclusion’ are a case in point, 
where the particularity of the focus fails to address 
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the wider issues that lead to exclusion. Furthermore, 
the identification of the issue in itself paradoxically 
leads to a perpetuation of the same logic of exclusion. 
This relates to what Žižek calls the failure of 
identity politics, that casts multiculturalism as 
a ‘disavowed, inverted, self-referential form of 
racism which empties itself of all positive content’ 
(1999b: 216) wherein the ‘Other’ takes on an assumed 
superiority - or the ‘privileged empty point of 
universality’, in Hegelian terms. The multiculturalist 
vision of hybrid, fluid identifications or ‘unity in 
difference’ (endorsed by what Arif Dirlik calls the 
‘intelligentsia of global capitalism’, 1997: 77), is 
really a tolerance of the Western capitalist world order 
in which all alleged differences are not differentiated 
but ultimately homogenised. In summary, it can be said 
that oppositional identities are essential parts of 
oppressive systems. 
The role of negation, and its negation, in this context 
is important to understand some of the ways in which 
dominant ideas attempt to reproduce themselves, even 
when an oppositional stance is taken.[12] So where does 
this leave oppositional tactics? Clearly negation is 
only one part of a dialectical strategy and should be 
used with full knowledge of how the ‘expropriators are 
expropriated’ as Marx puts it (1990: 929). A politics 
of software requires similar attention to detail. One 
might envisage software that negates software, and then 
negates the wider operating system of which it is part. 
The negation of negation is crucial in this respect. For 
example, the production of free software first negates 
proprietary software, but still remains within the 
confines of private ownership, so an attempt must be 
made to further negate the whole principle of private 
ownership of the means of production, to avoid being 
appropriated. Expressed in Hegelian terms, free software 
needs to operate through ‘abstract negativity’ in order 
that ‘concrete universality’ can be achieved, based on 
inherent cooperative labour and its founding principles 
of common property. The difficulty of course is that 
these principles have been appropriated by capital, 
making the production of free software not simply an 
alternative to capitalism but an expression of new forms 
of labour tied to cultural production (see section 5.2 
for more detail). 
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# problem of totality
In orthodox Marxist terms, the proletariat stands 
for human universality, partly because it is the most 
exploited class but more importantly because it is a ‘living 
contradiction’, revealing the inherent antagonism in the 
capitalist system (based on the theft of labour power). 
The logic of this relies on the belief that the exploited 
class can express free will or autonomy sufficiently. 
Hegel thought the process of history involved the human 
spirit becoming conscious of its alienated conditions. 
In _History and Class Consciousness_ (1976[1922]), Georg 
Lukács describes any positive change of consciousness 
as synchronous to the (false conception of) reality it 
seeks to change. ‘False consciousness’ is a description 
of the lag between the way things are and the way we 
know. However, it does not take sufficient account of 
the fact that when we know something it has already 
transformed into something else by the act of knowing 
it (‘self-knowledge’). Lukács proposes that a ‘true’ 
recognition is the social whole, within which the 
proletariat can be seen to be positioned oppressively 
- what he calls ‘the problem of totality’ (1976: 151).
[13] The proletariat alone holds the potential for 
emancipation because the bourgeois class cannot see 
the whole. In this way, Lukács’s concept of totality 
evokes the concept of universality in Hegel (described 
in the previous section) at the expense of other 
contradictions. It is worth adding here that Lukács’s 
work is criticised heavily for being ‘essentialist’, 
in as much as it centres everything on the Hegelian 
idea of totality at the expense of other contradictions 
(Eagleton 1997: 185).[14]
The social whole is treated somewhat differently by Louis 
Althusser, who challenges some of the central tenets of 
classical Marxism and the centrality of the economic 
base (that it determines the superstructure) by adding 
levels of feedback. To Althusser, writing in 1969, 
the superstructure (that contains culture) is both 
relatively autonomous and exerts a reciprocal action on 
the base (1997: 105). This is important as it stresses 
the politics of culture, and the effectiveness of what he 
calls the ‘ideological State apparatuses’ to describe 
the mechanism of ideology to make things appear natural.
[15] Through this ‘naturalising’ of certain dominant 
ideas, what is presented to the human subject, and 
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internalised, is an imaginary representation of the real 
conditions of production and their place within these 
structures. However, these ideas are clearly formed as a 
result of:
‘... material actions inserted into material practices 
governed by material rituals which are themselves defined 
by the material ideological apparatus from which derive 
the ideas of that subject’ (1997: 127). 
From this, Althusser asserts that there is no ideology 
outside subjectivity, and he includes himself and the reader 
in this scenario as both thoroughly ‘in ideology’. To 
Althusser, we are ‘always-already subjects’ practising 
the rituals of ideological recognition: ‘all ideology 
hails or interpellates concrete individuals as concrete 
subjects’ (1997: 130). It interpellates or recruits 
subjects by hailing ‘Hey, you there!’ (1997: 131). 
Althusser further explores the Freudian connections in 
the construction of the human subject and in the willing 
acceptance of this condition, in that: 
‘... the individual is interpellated as a (free) subject 
in order that he [sic] shall submit freely to the 
commandments of the Subject, i.e. in order that he shall 
(freely) accept his subjection, i.e. in order that he 
shall make the gestures and actions of his subjection 
“all by himself”. There are no subjects except by and 
for their subjection.’ (1997: 136)
Drawing upon Althusser, but also the work of Hegel and 
Jacques Lacan, allows Žižek to formulate a critique of 
neo-liberalism and its ideological project, based on 
free market principles and the illusion of free choice. 
This is what Žižek calls the ‘vulgar liberal notion’ of 
freedom, as ‘not a choice between a series of objects 
leaving my subject position intact, but the fundamental 
choice by means of which I “choose myself”’ (1999b: 18). 
In other words, the human subject is interpellated and 
imagines him/herself to be a free agent. This is a 
paradoxical scenario where choice presents itself as no 
choice at all in effect, rather like the impoverished 
choices of ‘yes’ or ‘no’ in an interactive game (that 
remains ‘interpassive’ but without the user’s realisation). 
The Internet operates in this way too: ‘it hails you, 
it connects to you and gives you an IP number; it 
interpellates you into Imperial ideology’ (Holmes 2003). 
The choices offered are spurious ones.        
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However, this is given a more positive interpretation 
by Žižek in his defence of Hegel, and the idea of 
totality. In the case of political action, the subject 
is called by history to act in the right way and make 
the right choice of action. In other words, this is not 
ideological manipulation but what is almost preordained 
- it exists outside the subject’s knowledge of it but 
it exists all the same. Žižek quotes Bertrand Russell 
to illustrate the point: ‘I did not know I loved you 
till I heard myself telling you so’. It was not that 
love existed without the subject’s knowledge but that 
the subject loved all along (1999b: 54). There is a 
delay between an event in-itself and for-itself. The 
influence of Lacan is clear when he describes how this 
‘retro-active’ response often works with speech, in the 
shift from a virtual language to actual language - it 
is speech-in-itself, or speech that pre-exists itself, 
‘speech before speech’ (1999b: 54). Things are decided 
before they are enacted in actuality. The connection 
between the past and the present relates to human 
action. As with speech, software operates in the same 
way too, in as much as it is programmed in advance of 
its action (see section 6.2 for more detail). 
In contrast to the Hegelian idea that the social whole 
or totality will eventually be conceived of as the 
truth, Adorno sees this as largely realised in negative 
terms and therefore the whole must be conceived of as 
false. In the preface to _Negative Dialectics_ (2000 
[1966]), Adorno describes how the ‘negation of negation’ 
has been conventionally taken to achieve something 
positive by means of negation. In Adorno’s view, theory 
and criticism had to be combined as negation responding 
to this apparent failure of political philosophy to 
realise its aims, or to put its claims into practice.
[16] Positive criticism leads to nothing, as history 
appears to have demonstrated, and has become a self-
serving commodity (art criticism is notoriously 
uncritical in this way and mostly serves the interests 
of the art market). The collective Adilkno accuse 
contemporary criticism of operating an ‘ego trip of a 
better world that starts and ends with oneself’ (Adilkno 
1998: 57). This is not least a sobering thought for the 
production of academic work such as this thesis.
# dynamic history
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In _The Dialectic of Enlightenment_ (1997 [1944]), 
Adorno and Max Horkheimer reject the view of historical 
process as the recognition of false consciousness, 
as it makes too many assumptions about consciousness 
and subjectivity. Skeptical of the central role of 
class conflict, they argued that critical theory had to 
take account of how domination was being expressed in 
cultural forms rather than simply economic ones, which 
had led to the proletariat being thoroughly integrated 
into the system and no longer able to recognise their 
historical calling.[17] The revisionary Marxism of the 
Frankfurt Institut in general, of which they form a 
part,[18] draws together Marx and Freud, replacing the 
centrality of class conflict with a dynamic approach 
to history. According to Martin Jay these influences 
operate in a dialectical fashion: ‘For Marx, the past 
is pregnant with the future [...]. For Sigmund Freud, 
the future is pregnant with the past [...]’ (1996: 86, 
quoting Philip Rieff). To rely on change taking place 
at the level of the means of production did not go 
far enough, according to Horkheimer, and change could 
only come about through a ‘rupture in the continuum of 
history’ (echoing Benjamin’s phrase from ‘Theses on 
the Philosophy of History’). The rupture is necessary 
because the past is perceived as being false.  
To Benjamin, the representation of history operates like 
a series of dream images, that possess the potential 
to awaken consciousness that is otherwise fixed in a 
dream-state. These dream images, or indeed nightmares, 
operate like unprocessed montages, like source code, 
that reflect the conditions in which dreaming individuals 
find themselves. In this sense, political consciousness 
is ‘slumbering in the “once upon a time” of classical 
historical narrative’ (Tiedemann 1999: 933).[19] Rolf 
Tiedemann elaborates on this to explain that if history 
is dream-like: 
‘... past objects and events would not then be fixed 
data, an unchangeable given, because dialectical 
thinking “ransacks them, revolutionizes them, turns 
them upside down”; this is what must be accomplished by 
awakening from the dream [...]’ (1999: 935). 
Being awakened from this dream-like state refers to 
the idea of the human subject ‘not-yet knowing’ their 
role in history. According to Tiedemann, Benjamin is 
using the work of Ernst Bloch as a model (for instance, 
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in his _Spirit of Utopia_) by applying the ‘theory 
of not-yet conscious knowing’; the ultimate test for 
dialectics in penetrating former contexts to realise 
present actions (Tiedemann 1999: 936). This conception 
of not-yet conscious knowing was introduced earlier in 
the chapter by Žižek, who explains ‘class consciousness’ 
not as awakening as such but as the change from ‘class-
in-itself’ to ‘class-for-itself’ (1999a: 231). The 
knowledge required for any sense of freedom is self-
referential. In contrast to a view of consciousness 
as too complicated or too determined to allow humans 
to act as free agents, }i~ek asks: ‘Is the status of 
consciousness basically that of freedom in a system of 
radical determinism?’ (1999b: 60). The human subject is 
clearly not an autonomous agent that simply processes 
information through the senses like a computer. For 
Žižek (combining Marx and Lacan), the unconscious 
remains a useful framework for thinking, as it provides 
productive cracks that give rise to contradiction. Žižek 
is not seeking truth in this respect, but change. 
The unconscious haunts consciousness in a similar way 
to how historical ideas can be seen to haunt current 
thinking. Trying to exorcise his ghosts and reconcile 
his ‘post-Marxist’ position, Jacques Derrida’s _Spectres 
of Marx_ demonstrates how Marxism continues to haunt 
contemporary theorising (and politics).[20] Derrida 
likens the spirit of Marxism to Hamlet’s ghost and the 
sense in which ‘being’ raises the question ‘to be or 
not to be’ (1994: 10). That Marx, on his own admission 
was not a Marxist (as he allegedly confided to Engels), 
is a further example of the ways in which ideas are 
historically bound and open to problems of translation: 
‘How is one to receive, how is one to understand a 
speech, how is one to inherit it when it does not let 
itself be translated from itself into itself?’, Derrida 
asks (1994: 34). And how could Marx be a Marxist? It 
is clear to Derrida that Marx could not both be a 
follower of his own thought without becoming a ghost 
of his former self. Dialectical thinking encourages 
such reflexive moves, and Marx stresses the need for a 
continual reassessment of ideas (Engels too, in the 1888 
preface, explicitly talks of the ‘aging’ process of the 
text). Derrida is impressed by this self-critique: 
‘What other thinker has ever issued a similar warning in 
such an explicit fashion? Who has ever called for the 
transformation to come of their own theses? [...] so as 
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to take account there, another account, the effects of 
rupture and restructuration? And so as to incorporate 
in advance, beyond any possible programming, the 
unpredictability of new knowledge, new techniques, and 
new political givens.’ (1994: 13) 
Past ideas continue to have effects, and like the return 
of the repressed, re-emerge at unexpected moments. 
Against the relativism of postmodern theory with its 
tendency towards openness to anything, contradiction 
provides productive cracks. To Marshall Berman, the 
lack of recognition of contradiction in contemporary 
thinking accounts for the stagnation he observes, in 
which: ‘Open visions of modern life have been supplanted 
by closed ones, Both/And by Either/Or.’ (1999: 24) Open 
forms and conjunctions are key to this.[21] Crucial 
to Berman’s position, is the retention of history as 
inherently unstable, restless, contradictory, dynamic 
and dialectical force. In titling his book _All That is 
Solid Melts into Air_, he is specifically referring back 
to _The Communist Manifesto_ of 1848, to argue that what 
appears solid is fundamentally subject to change and 
influence:
‘All fixed, fast frozen relations, with their train of 
ancient and venerable prejudices and opinions, are swept 
away, all new-formed ones become antiquated before they 
can ossify. All that is solid melts into air, all that 
is holy is profaned, and man [sic] is at last compelled 
to face with sober senses, his real condition of life, 
and his relations with his kind.’ (Marx & Engels 1985: 83)
The quote reads as a truism now. Difficulty lies in the 
fact that constant change and almost instantaneous 
obsolescence have become mainstays of contemporary 
culture. If all new forms ossify, then how can 
alternatives emerge without being condemned to the 
same fate? The process of transformation itself 
clearly contains contradictory tendencies. As much as 
providing positive potential, crisis appears to serve 
the vested interests of capital, even strengthening it. 
Catastrophes are turned into lucrative opportunities 
for redevelopment and as an integrating force for the 
renewal of capital (one only has to look at current 
economic activities around ‘cultural regeneration’ for 
verification of this, or the re-development of countries 
after war by the same parties that destroyed them). This 
sense of paradox is evident in Marx too, in that crisis 
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is both the motor for the renewal of capital and the 
means of its demise. As a consequence of these worries, 
there exists a tendency to reject the strategies 
associated with dialectics, such as negation, as no 
longer able to respond to current conditions. In Marxist 
dialectics, this is where the concept of negation of 
negation is crucial. Berman for instance, does not want 
a way out of these contradictions but a deeper way into 
them. 
This section has attempted to give detail to the 
dialectical method, to suggest how complex arguments 
can be posed to respond to complex situations, and to 
understand the potential of the human subject in history 
to exert influence on the dynamic relation between 
what exists and future possibilities. The parallels 
of historical processes and contemporary ways of 
understanding transformation are introduced here, to add 
weight to the suggestion that reinvention is possible, 
and that reinvention is an intrinsic part of dialectics. 
---------------
3.3 - emergence
---------------
Historical development expresses predictable and 
unpredictable tendencies. Its unpredictability makes 
history full of emergent potential, and not simply 
a series of repetitive cycles or a straight line of 
progress, as some descriptions would have it. In very 
general terms, emergence describes a process by which 
complex patterns are formed from simple rules. This can 
be a dynamic process occurring over time, but to be considered 
emergent it should generally be unpredictable. 
Emergent phenomena can be explained through systems 
theory, and more particularly through an understanding 
of adaptive behaviour. For instance, society is an 
emergent system that is self-organised, able to 
demonstrate adaptive behaviour. Steven Johnson in 
_Emergence_ (2001), presents an example of the software 
program _Tracker_ that uses genetic algorithms to 
simulate the behaviour of an ant colony of sixteen 
thousand ants. The software does not simply follow 
instructions but responds to the principle that simple 
instructions might lead to complex behaviour. In effect, 
an antagonistic balance emerges from feedback (Solé & 
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Goodwin 2000: 100). The system appears to demonstrate 
a dialectical relation between feedback and control. A 
common conclusion of this type of work is that despite 
our tendency to look for a controlling mechanism: 
‘... we are starting to think using the conceptual 
tools of bottom-up systems. Like dialectical logic of 
the nineteenth century, the emergent worldview belongs 
to this moment in time, shaping our thought habits and 
colouring our perception of the world’ (Johnson 2001: 66). 
The world-view Johnson has in mind is one based on an 
understanding of complex adaptive systems, and clearly this 
has an impact upon an understanding of history. Although 
conceptual thinking can be situated historically, a 
rejection of dialectics, based on its correspondence 
to the industrial revolution, does not recognise the 
way that conceptual models are also subject to change. 
Johnson’s rejection of dialectics also comes without 
reference to its emergent properties. The final section 
of this chapter attempts to address the concept of 
emergence in relation to dialectics. Wider issues 
around the social implications of systems thinking will 
be introduced but also returned to in the following 
chapter, as will a more detailed discussion on the 
relation between complexity theory and dialectics. What 
follows will try to establish the connection between 
emergence and dialectics in as much as it has a bearing 
on an understanding of historical processes in general. 
# transformative praxis
A more complex understanding of emergence that takes 
into account dialectics is something that ‘critical 
realism’, associated with Roy Bhaskar, attempts to achieve. 
The objectives are ambitious (to say the least) in 
developing a general theory of dialectics that extends 
beyond Hegelian thinking, to form a critique of Western 
philosophy. In general, critical realism suggests that the 
realms of physics and history share a false perspective 
on natural science, in as much as one tends towards a causal 
explanation (positivism) and the other an interpretive 
understanding (hermeneutics). Instead, Bhaskar proposes a 
‘critical and non-reductionist, naturalism, based upon a 
transcendental realist account of science and, as such,  
necessarily respecting (indeed grounded in) the specificity 
and emergent properties of the social realm’ (1998: xiv). 
This position is informed by a number of historical 
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sources including Karl Popper, who argued that it was 
falsification not verification that laid the foundations 
of scientific method;[22] historians and sociologists 
of science such as Kuhn, who emphasised the social 
processes involved in scientific endeavour; and Ludwig 
Wittgenstein, who emphasised the mutable character of 
facts in science. In this way, scientific discovery can 
be seen to follow a dynamic logic that is revealed 
progressively, underpinned by generative mechanisms 
or laws. As a result (and pertinent to the preceding 
section of the chapter), Bhaskar considers society 
as both the condition and outcome of human agency, 
and that human agency both reproduces and transforms 
society. He explains: ‘Social structure, then, is 
both the ever-present condition and the continually 
reproduced outcome of intentional human agency.’ (1998: 
xvi) In a dialectical conjunction, human agents are 
described as actively able to transform society and yet 
simultaneously constrained by society. 
Bhaskar’s revisionist position (particularly in his 
_Dialectic: Pulse of Freedom_ of 1993) is based on the 
view that Hegelian thinking is closed rather than open-
ended, and that Marx never fully described scientific 
realism. His description of the dialectic in Marx as 
scientific, explains the contradictions in society in 
terms of the contradictory relations generating them as 
historical (rooted in the changes of the circumstances 
described), critical (demonstrating historical 
conditions) and systematic (tracing the historical 
conditions back to the mode of production) (1998: xxi). 
As for Hegel, Bhaskar explains the ‘rational kernel’ 
as a process of better knowing or learning through 
the dialectical process of greater critical depth: it 
generates what is already implicit but not explicitly 
articulated and by repairing some inadequacy as part 
of the ongoing critical process. The interpretation is 
close to }i~ek’s defence of Hegel’s ‘tarrying of the 
negative’ but with a very different set of references. 
Where for Žižek it is the unconscious, for Bhaskar 
it is the concept of absence that is crucial to an 
understanding of negation. He is supplementing what 
Hegel calls the ‘grasping of opposites in their unity or 
of the positive in the negative’ (in Bhaskar 1998: 580). 
The negative does not simply cancel the positive but 
reveals the logic that: 
‘a genus always contains, explicitly or proleptically, 
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its own differentiae; [...] negation always leads to 
a new richer determination - this is transformative 
negation - so imparting to categories and forms of life 
an immanent dynamic and to their conflict an immanent 
resolution rather than a mutual nullification’ (Bhaskar 
1998: 580). 
The immanent dynamic is what Bhaskar refers to 
as ‘transformative praxis’, where contradiction 
remains active, open and ongoing. Without this open-
ended approach, endism and other ‘fundamentalisms’ 
will dominate, in what Bhaskar calls ‘irrealist 
dialectics’. Whereas dialectics, in terms of critical 
realism, permits the gradual elimination of absences 
characterised in terms of emergence. 
# dialectical emergence
Emergence, for Bhaskar, is the generation of new 
possibilities, a ‘quantum leap: matter as creative 
or autopoietic’ (1998: 564). It is contradiction 
that allows connections to operate both separately 
and as part of a whole or totality. Echoing earlier 
descriptions of historical materialism, the ‘here and 
now’ is characterised by the influence of the outside 
and the past, in such a way that social phenomena can 
be seen to contain emergent properties. Emergence in 
this way describes the creative, autopoietic operation 
wherein new properties are generated out of pre-existing 
material forms (as with montage). The quantum leap is 
one that goes beyond Hegel and Marx. Bhaskar interprets 
the dialectical materialist position as teleological 
(too causal) in its characterisation of progress towards 
a better society.[23] In contrast, he describes society 
obliquely as an ‘open-systemic entropic totality, in 
which results [...] are neither autogenetically produced 
nor even constellationally closed, but the provisional 
outcome of a heterogeneous multiplicity of changing 
mechanisms, agencies and circumstances’ (1998: 600).
An understanding of adaptive systems informs this 
view, and undermines the teleological understanding 
of history. A teleological position is what Ilya 
Prigogine and Isabelle Stengers call ‘one time-directed 
evolution’, that does not take sufficient account of the 
complexity of systems. They ask the question: ‘What is 
the specific structure of dynamic systems that permits 
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[others] to “distinguish” between past and future? 
What is the minimum complexity involved?’ (1985: 16) 
Prigogine and Stengers are extending Hegelian thinking 
that rests on the ‘qualitative difference between the 
simple behavior described by mechanics and the behavior 
of more complex entities such as living beings’ (1985: 
89). They assert that at each iteration of a level in 
the dialectical hierarchy, there is a corresponding 
increase in complexity in nature.[24] The relationship 
to history is important too, where the oscillation between 
input-output is a consecutive relation of past-future 
(as is the case with computation of course). According 
to Wiener in _Cybernetics_ (2000 [1948]) in the chapter 
‘Newtonian and Bergsonian Time’, the modern conception 
of automata conforms not to a Newtonian model but to a 
Bergsonian one, in keeping with the description of living 
organisms. The reference to Henri Bergson emphasises the 
inadequacy of a Newtonian description of biology: ‘the 
difference between the reversible time of physics, in 
which nothing new happens, and the irreversible time 
of evolution and biology, in which there is always 
something new’ (Wiener 2000: 38). 
Duration has been much misunderstood according to Bergson, 
as a linear movement of an object through space, such that 
the non-linear complexity is avoided in favour of a 
convenient solution that best suits easy comprehension. 
Thus movement, to Bergson - referring to Zeno’s paradox 
that if an arrow [time’s arrow] has to pass through an 
infinity of points, how will it ever reach its target) 
- is not simply the passage between points but ‘a 
qualitative becoming that affects both the arrow, the 
archer and the overall context’ (Terranova 2004: 50). In 
dynamical systems, time and space work together to produce 
motion. Describing this added complexity, emergence 
is a useful concept, as it suggests non-causal, non-
teleological formations reflecting a historical materialist 
approach. Emergence also allows Bhaskar to conceptualise 
human agency in terms of incompleteness or absence, that 
propels the dialectic as an ongoing transformative process. 
It is Bhaskar’s concept of ‘transformative agency’ that 
characterises his work as ‘extra-Hegelian dialectics’ 
(1998: 638). He claims ‘for emancipation to be possible, 
knowable emergent laws must operate’ (quoting _Scientific 
Realism and Human Emancipation_, in Goodwin 1997: 121).
The concept of emergence, in as much as it informs 
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systems theory and complexity, will be developed in the 
next chapter. In terms of what has already been covered, 
emergence extends an understanding of historical 
materialism to deal with contemporary understandings of 
transformation. An ‘extra-historical materialism’ is 
implied in the way that transformative agency stresses 
the importance of ideas and the active role of people 
in historical development - recognising that people do 
not simply make their own history nor are determined by 
history, but both. As far as it develops the overall 
argument of a thesis about software, this chapter 
establishes an understanding of transformative praxis to 
introduce what will be later referred to as ‘software 
praxis’ (chapter 6) to stress the future possibilities 
of emergent action.
 
=======================
4. *complex technology*
=======================
‘Technology is neither good nor bad, nor is it neutral’ 
(Kranzberg, in Castells 1996: 65).
Building upon the dialectical understanding of history 
set out in the previous chapter, the historical 
development of informational technologies can be seen to 
express both lines of discontinuity and continuity from 
previous modes of production. Concepts are stored in 
memory and then processed. This chapter examines dynamic 
forms associated with computer technologies and, by 
drawing upon complexity theory, suggests a currency for 
dialectical thinking. 
Section 4.1 provides a description of technological 
development through its interaction with both 
history and society, thus rejecting any sense of 
technological determinism (confirming that technology 
does not determine society but is embodied by it). With 
reference to the economist Ernest Mandel’s ‘periodising 
hypothesis’, wherein each period of technological 
innovation builds upon the previous one rather than 
making a distinct break, it argues that development is 
non-teleological, combining emergent and residual forms. 
The contemporary phase of development, characterised 
by a network model, is no different in this respect. 
Despite the appearance of a lack of hierarchy, control 
is exerted through distributed rather than centralised 
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forms. Detail on the nature of the processes running 
remains relatively hidden (like source code or DNA), 
expressed in ever more complex and ‘immaterial’ formations 
that obscure their historical and material conditions. 
 
An understanding of computational processes and networks 
reveals more detail on the dynamics of control and 
feedback within these systems. Section 4.2 presents a 
brief and partial history of these dynamic processes, 
paying particular attention to the concept of feedback, 
and the social and ethical dimension of cybernetics 
and systems theory. It seems clear that many of the 
concepts relating to self-regulating systems have been 
used to justify free market logic, at the expense of 
the use of systems theory for social critique. Computer 
processes and their interpretation operate as both a 
metaphor and description in this way, leading to a 
discussion of ‘digital dialectics’ that traces the 
binary underpinnings of machine code, in parallel to 
speculation on the potential of dialectical thinking for 
computer criticism.  
The complexity of systems such as were briefly described 
in the previous chapter, far from legislating against a 
dialectical approach, can be seen to demonstrate what 
has been referred to as ‘orderly disorder’, wherein deep 
structures of order exist within seemingly unpredictable 
and disorderly phenomena. Building on an understanding 
of emergence introduced in the previous chapter, section 
4.3 elaborates on the way in which emergent order has 
social and political significance, in as much as these 
systems are open to change from both external and 
internal factors. What is developed in the chapter is 
an approach that combines systems theory, and in turn 
complexity theory, with dialectical materialism. This is 
referred to as ‘systems dialectics’ and a more detailed 
description of this is presented with particular 
reference to an emergent view of dialectics, described 
in the previous chapter. In the combination of systems 
theory with dialectical materialism, the importance 
of negation is supplemented by disorder that can give 
rise to a new sense of order, and thereby gives rise to 
further disorder and so on (what might be referred to as 
‘the tarrying of disorder’ in ‘extra-Hegelian’ terms). 
An argument for transformative praxis associated with 
software art arises from this conceptual approach in the 
final chapter.  
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------------------------------- 
4.1 - technological development
-------------------------------
Many commentators have tried to characterise the so-
called ‘information technology revolution’ in similar 
terms to the impact of the industrial revolution. 
Manuel Castells is sympathetic to this, describing it 
as ‘a pattern of discontinuity in the material basis of 
economy, society and culture’ (1996: 30), but is keen to 
emphasise that _The Rise of the Network Society_ needs 
to be understood through the dynamic intersections of 
technology, society and historical change. It is this 
basic point that this first section will introduce, in 
keeping with a dialectical understanding of historical 
processes that this chapter aims to extend to 
technological processes. 
In general terms, capitalism has evolved into its contemporary 
form by embracing technological change, and done so 
whilst making sure it continues to protect its own 
interests. It can thereby be regarded as discontinuous 
from the industrial mode but its overall logic remains 
continuous. In dialectical style, Castells says: 
‘The rise of the network society [...] cannot be 
understood without the interaction between these two 
relatively autonomous trends: development of new 
information technologies, and the old society’s attempt 
to retool itself by using the power of technology to 
serve the technology of power.’ (1996: 52)[1]
Castells characterises these simultaneous conditions 
in his phrase ‘informational capitalism’ (1996: 18). 
The phrase avoids the danger of imposing too severe 
a model of change associated with terms like ‘post-
industrialism’, or what Daniel Bell contentiously 
called ‘postindustrial society’ to assert that new 
social formations no longer obey the laws of industrial 
production (Jameson 1991: 3). The lines of continuity 
are stressed by using the term ‘late-capitalism’ (as 
Jameson does) to reject too harsh a distinction and 
emphasise that this is more like a modification of 
capitalism than a new form as such. Related to this 
(though more extreme) is Mandel’s proposition ‘senile 
capitalism’, that suggests the irrationality of its 
continued logic (alluding to ‘senile-dementia’, 1990). 
The various choice of terms points to some of the 
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ideological issues that arise from the descriptions of 
the force of change. 
The discontinuity to which Castells points is the 
change in the ways in which technological processes 
are organised: from a mode of development focussed on 
economic growth and surplus-value (industrialism) to 
one based on the pursuit of knowledge and increased 
levels of complexity of information. Industrial 
production has been supplemented by information, 
and capital regenerated in a new form that reflects 
technological innovation. ‘Informationalism’ as 
Castells calls it, is the result of the restructuring 
of capitalism, and the new crucial material resource 
of informationalism is knowledge. In terms of the 
continuity of capitalist logic, Castells states: 
‘Indeed, we observe the parallel unleashing of 
formidable productive forces of the information 
revolution, and the consolidation of black holes of 
human misery in the global economy.’ (1996: 2) 
That wealth and power is ever more concentrated in 
a small number of giant industrial and financial 
corporations, lends weight to the Marxist position 
of Mandel, who observes that contemporary society 
reflects the model presented in _Capital_ (1990) in a 
‘purer form’ than when it was first composed in 1867. 
He is writing this in 1976, and points to various 
examples of late-capitalism’s crises at that time 
(for example, from the student and workers’ riots in 
Paris of 1968, to ecological concerns as a result of 
nuclear power). He claims that contradictions continue 
to manifest themselves in all aspects of capitalism’s 
workings, however latent they may appear, such that 
impetuous growth is combined with its negation. Both 
Mandel’s position and the one adopted in this chapter 
are historical in scope, in order to situate the 
specific mode of production in the context of previous 
modes. The lines of continuity are easily overlooked 
in descriptions that rush to dramatise technological 
change and forget the lines of continuity. As much as 
technology might itself contribute to these changes, it 
does not determine them. Contradictions are inherent to 
the historical development of technology.     
# third stage of development
85
Technological development can be characterised in terms 
of generation and feedback. Castells refers to this 
as ‘a cumulative feedback loop between innovation and 
the uses of innovation’. He charts ‘The Historical 
Sequence of the Information Technology Revolution’ 
(1996: 32 & 40-46) beginning with the invention of 
the telephone in 1876, and the invention of the first 
programmable computer after the Second World War. 
According to Castells, development only enters a 
significantly revolutionary phase by the 1970s with 
the interrelated fields of microelectronics, computers 
and telecommunications, and adds that biotechnology 
contributes a further phase that might well constitute 
a revolution in itself (but this remains unproven in his 
view, as with nanotechnology in a more current context 
no doubt).  
The historical sequence used by Castells is an overt 
reference to Mandel’s ‘periodising hypothesis’ of 
expanding and stagnating economic cycles (in _The Long 
Waves of Capitalist Development_, 1978), a model further 
adapted by Frederic Jameson to chart trends in cultural 
production (in _Postmodernism, or, The Cultural Logic 
of Late Capitalism_, 1984).[2] The importance of the 
principle is that each period is seen to build upon 
the previous rather than making a distinct break, in 
emergent and residual forms. Clearly influenced by a 
dialectical materialist understanding of history, Mandel 
thus accounts for the evolution of technology:
‘The fundamental revolutions in power technology - the 
technology of the production of motive machines by 
machines - thus appears as the determinant moment in 
revolutions of technology as a whole. Machine production 
of steam-driven motors since 1848; machine production of 
electric and combustion motors since the 90s of the 19th 
century; machine production of electronic and nuclear-
powered apparatuses since the 40s of the 20th century 
- these are the three general revolutions in technology 
engendered by the capitalist mode of production since 
the “original” industrial revolution of the later 18th 
century.’ (in Jameson 1991: 35)
 
The so-called ‘third phase’ has been supplemented by 
networked and interactive computer systems. In parallel, 
social and organisational structures and interactions 
have changed to a network model, made possible by 
telecommunications technologies enabling the interactive 
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‘real-time’ broadband networks of the present Internet 
and mobile cellular technologies - what is often 
referred to as ‘ubiquitous computing’ (computing that 
is omnipresent and everywhere).[3] At the core of 
technological revolutions, changes are ‘characterised 
by pervasiveness, that is by their penetration of all 
domains of human activity’ (quoting Kranzberg & Pursell 
1967, in Castells 1996: 31). Biotechnology seems to 
encapsulate this pervasiveness in the recognition that 
organic and technical processes contain self-organising 
functions that genetic algorithms aim to replicate. 
The machine is seen to work like an organism, and as a 
result seem life-like. As Donna Haraway puts it in ‘The 
Cyborg Manifesto’: 
‘But basically machines were not self-moving, self-
designing, autonomous. They could not achieve man’s 
dream, only mock it. They were not man, an author of 
himself, but only a caricature of that masculinist 
reproductive dream. To think they were otherwise was to 
be paranoid. Now we are not so sure [...]. Our machines 
are disturbingly lively, and we ourselves frighteningly 
inert.’ (1991: 194)
Quite literally, the ‘dead labour’ of the machine has 
become reanimated by its comparison to biological 
systems (see chapter 5 for more detail). Such a view 
is typified by the position of Kevin Kelly, who enthuses 
about the technological future as one informed, if not 
determined, by biology (sometimes called the ‘post-
biological era’ to indicate the force of change). The 
software program _Tracker_ mentioned in the previous 
chapter, is an example of simulating the complex 
behaviour of an ant colony. The study of ant colonies 
is a popular example to explain the lack of a 
discernable organisational hierarchy.[4] As opposed 
to mechanical systems or the factory assembly line, 
distributed systems have no obvious chain of command 
and represent what Kelly calls a ‘swarm model’ (2003: 
39). However, such an enthusiastic reception avoids the 
ideological implications, making the lack of control 
somehow appear as ‘natural’ as an ant colony or swarm 
of bees, masking new forms of control that operate a 
distributed approach.[5] Control within distributed 
systems can be partly explained by the mathematical 
expression called a ‘power law’, that describes how 
few events manifest most of the action, reflecting the 
existence of large numbers of nodes but few hubs. 
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Albert-László Barabási uses this understanding of power 
to understand the ‘laws behind complex networks’ (2002: 
73). He quotes the work of the Italian economist, 
Vilfredo Pareto, who observed the ‘universal law’ that 
80 per cent of peas (or property) were produced (or are 
owned) by 20 per cent of pea pods (2002: 66). Although 
this ‘80/20 rule’ seems rather generalised, it does offer 
some insight, not to universal laws of nature but to the 
politics of networked systems.  
The revelation that Barabási’s thinking was influenced by 
an economist strikes a historical parallel to the detail 
that Charles Darwin’s theory of evolution was influenced 
by the economic theory of Thomas Malthus, who researched 
population growth and the efficient management of scarce 
resources. The ideological dimension of Darwinism (or 
what Sherry Turkle calls ‘unnatural selection’ 1997: 
149) emphasises how scientific claims are developed in 
parallel to the cultural narrative of the time. As a 
further example, Sarah Kember describes how the neo-
Darwinist position of Richard Dawkins’s _The Selfish 
Gene_ (1976) can be read against the discourse around 
subjectivity during the 1970s, under the influence of 
post-structuralist thinking.[6] Hence the cultural 
narrative can be seen to be ‘about displaced agency, 
about a subjectivity that has the illusion of control 
while the real locus of control lies with another agent 
who inhabits the subject and uses him for its own ends’ 
(quoting Hayles, in Kember 2003: 18). Following this 
narrative, the human is correspondingly characterised as 
an autonomous ‘selfish’ machine. It is precisely to avoid 
genetic determinism that Dawkins proposes ‘memes’ to 
characterise the cultural aspect of evolution (a hybrid 
term combining the Greek word for imitate ‘mimeme’ and 
gene). These memes, according to Dawkins, are ideas 
that pass from human to human but still subject to the 
laws of natural selection. There may be some degree of 
human agency but only in a selfish sense (like the gene) 
in response to the scarcity of resources and survival. 
Kember sees a paradox and weakness here: 
‘Free will, it would seem, simultaneously counters 
and legitimises determinism. Metaphors of genetic and 
memetic agency and the ideological loop-hole which 
Dawkins constructs within them permeate the creation 
of artificial life worlds which are, to this extent, 
biologically determined.’ (2003: 39)
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In contrast to Dawkins’s deterministic view of human 
agency, the neurobiologist Steven Rose argues for an 
active human subject that is capable of acting not only 
in, but upon the world. Paraphrasing Marx’s statement 
from the ‘The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte’ 
(1980), Rose claims ‘we have the ability to construct 
our own futures, albeit in circumstances not of our 
own choosing’ (in Kember 2003: 22). He wishes to 
characterise human agency in terms of ‘auto-poiesis’ 
(from ‘poiesis’ meaning creation), adapted from the work 
of Humberto Maturana and Francisco Varela (1973) who 
state:
‘An autopoietic machine is a machine organized (defined 
as a unity) as a network of processes of production 
(transformation and destruction) of components which: 
(i) through their interactions and transformations 
continuously regenerate and realize the network of 
processes (relations) that produced them; and (ii) 
constitute it (the machine) as a concrete unity in space 
in which they (the components) exist by specifying the 
topological domain of its realization as such a network. 
(1980: 78)
Human agency in terms of auto-poiesis offers an argument 
against what Evelyn Fox Keller calls the ‘end-game’ 
of molecular biology’s quest to discover the ultimate 
code or secrets of life (in Kember 2003: 25). As with 
Bhaskar’s concept ‘transformative agency’ (in the 
previous chapter), human agency is not merely encoded 
or determined but is auto-poietic. Therefore, although 
descriptions of complex behaviour within distributed 
networks tend towards biological determinism, human agents 
express emergent behaviour that is transformative. 
# networked production logic
With a historical perspective, networked informational 
production continues to make a calculation not in human 
terms, but by forcing together humans and machines to 
extend the productivity of labour at all costs.[7] In 
the industrial period, Marx refers to the worker who 
performs repetitive tasks coming to embody ‘the living 
mechanism of manufacture’ (1990: 458). This is even 
more the case with informational production, wherein 
constant networked interaction is required between 
workers, management and machines (see chapter 5 for more 
on ‘machinic’ relations). Systems must be networked and 
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integrated in order to process information efficiently, 
arranged in decentralised and centralised working 
relations. This is all part of the shift from single 
entities of computer processing units, to systems served 
by computers that form complex and flexible networks. The 
network logic now deploys informational technologies and 
reflects the complexity of interactions and the unpredictable 
patterns of development arising from these interactions. 
For Kelly, rather than entrenching (or globalising) 
exploitation as Castells describes, this network logic 
‘revolutionises’ social practices under the conditions 
of what he calls ‘network economics’ (2003: 236). Under 
these conditions, companies take on the character of 
software (2003: 244). Kelly’s example is Microsoft’s 
new operating system (at that time), pointing to the 
ways in which companies invest heavily in developing the 
manufacturing process rather than the product. Perhaps a 
better example (and indeed business model) would be the 
development of open source software, where many in the 
community of users are also involved in developing the 
software for free. However, in both network and previous 
economic frameworks, efficient development is contingent 
on bugs and errors in the system, making the analogy to 
software of further use in demonstrating how distributed 
production is combined with its negation. 
These are the conditions of the networked ‘factory 
without walls’, as a self-perpetuating system which 
exhibits distributed, decentralised, and adaptive 
behaviours, evoking the working organism that 
Marx described in the industrial period, in which 
inherent human sociability is forced to turn against 
itself. These are the technical foundations of the 
industrial revolution, that the information revolution 
develops further. Quoting Andrew Ure’s ‘Philosophy of 
Manufactures’ (of 1835), Marx describes the automatic 
factory as a fully integrated system: 
‘a vast automaton, composed of various mechanical and 
intellectual organs, acting in an uninterrupted concert 
for the production of a common object, all of them being 
subordinate to a self-regulating moving force’ (1990: 544).[8] 
Acknowledging these earlier descriptions, Castells claims that 
automation comes of age with information technology, 
and labour is transformed by the need for the required 
knowledge to operate it, offering new relational patterns 
in the performing of tasks (1996: 244). He characterises 
90
this new labour force as ‘networkers’ and ‘flextimers’, 
in terms of the increased individualisation of work and 
the fragmentation of society in general (1996: 201). 
New employment patterns correspond to the modes of 
development outlined at the beginning of this section - 
broadly, in relation to interlocking historical stages 
that reflect the agricultural, industrial (what could 
be described as post-agricultural) and informational 
(or post-industrial) forms. The necessity of the continued 
supply of cheap labour is an essential part of 
globalisation, as it has been since the sixteenth century 
when capitalism first sought to expand its operations on 
a global scale. What distinguishes the global economy 
now is that: ‘it is an economy with the capacity to work 
as a unit in real time on a planetary scale’ (Castells 
1996: 92). Networked technologies serve this purpose.
Consistent with earlier phases of technological development, 
the networked computer combines contradictory impulses 
in encouraging highly socialised forms of labour. It 
would be plainly ridiculous to deny the possibility of 
technology, and of collective effort, increasing the 
social productivity of labour and contributing to 
social transformation. However, in the global economy, 
contradictions unfold: 
‘Ironically, it is the very people whose labour is so 
carefully hidden inside the hygienic white boxes on the 
desks on the wired world [...] who will be left outside 
in the world their work creates. In this way, the 
production of the material infrastructure for the Internet 
is itself erased under the sign of the universality of 
its language, its claim to speak for all and with every 
voice [...] representation, in both the democratic 
and the semiotic senses, is in question in cybernetic 
technologies of communication’ (Cubitt 1999: 6).[9] 
To a large extent, in the ‘over-developed world’, the 
assembly lines have been replaced by the network as the 
organisational model and metaphor for production in 
general. Castells thinks that increasingly: 
‘... the multimedia world will be populated by two 
essentially distinct populations: the interacting and 
the interacted, meaning those who are able to select 
their multidirectional circuits of communication and 
those who are provided with a restricted number of 
prepackaged choices. And who is what will be largely 
determined by class, race, gender and country’ (1996: 371).
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He formulates class distinctions on this basis too: 
between the networkers, who set up connections on their 
initiative; the networked, who are online but without 
any control over decisions; and another category of the 
switched-off who are tied to tasks and operate through 
non-interactive, one-way instructions. This indicates 
greater social stratification rather than the reverse: 
class divisions based on the difference between the 
information rich and poor. 
# network control
There has been a tendency to think of networks as 
equitable systems, viewed as fundamentally random 
simply because they are too complex to comprehend how 
power is distributed in them (Barabási 2002: 24). In 
social systems, nodes gather together in clusters. 
Nodes with a large number of links or connections are 
present within diverse systems - from society to the 
cell (or cellular systems that includes genes, proteins 
and other molecules). This further accounts for the 
inappropriateness of a term such as randomness, as well 
as the perceived lack of democracy within systems. 
Despite the appearance of disorder in networks, clearly 
there is an underlying order - all nodes are not 
equal by any means (or some nodes are more equal than 
others). In _Empire_, Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri 
claim ‘the new paradigm is both system and hierarchy’, 
that demonstrates the structural logic of ‘governance 
without government’ (2000: 13, 14).[10] That any 
node connects to an exponential number of others is 
deceptively simple, and the historical development of 
the Internet reveals more detail on this. In 1964, 
searching for a robust communications infrastructure 
that could withstand attack, Paul Baran discovered that 
both centralised and decentralised models were too 
vulnerable, and so a distributed ‘mesh’ architecture 
was proposed, such that if any one node was attacked 
the distributed architecture of the network would 
compensate. This distributed structure is the basis 
of the Internet.
There is clearly more critical work to be done in this 
area of network theory, that requires an understanding 
of how the network works on a technical level, 
without losing sight of politics. For instance, and 
in the context of networked computing, Alex Galloway 
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describes the Unix operating system and in turn TCP/IP 
(Transmission Control Protocol/Internet Protocol). He 
adopts the concept of the ‘protocol’ as more than just 
a metaphor - although clearly it is a compelling one 
all the same in suggesting correct or proper behaviour 
or social practices - to describe how computers in 
a network agree technical standards of action, by 
following the protocols that ‘govern’ their usage at 
the level of code (2004: 7). Protocols thus operate 
ostensibly as a distributed management system coding 
packets of information, documents and communication.[11] 
The crucial issue remains about how power is articulated 
in a distributed model and and how power might be 
redistributed. Although the Internet is largely 
nonhierarchical in structure, conforming to the way TCP/
IP connects one machine to others, it is also subject 
to the DNS (domain name system) information stored in 
decentralised databases but organised in hierarchical, 
inverted tree-structures. For example, in the current 
model the Internet’s address structure (DNS), which 
enables communication between the world’s computers, is 
managed by the California-based, not-for-profit Internet 
Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN) under 
contract to the US department of commerce (Wray 2005). 
In question is the centralisation of control and whether 
other countries should be allowed more control over 
their Internet domains.
 
This is not to say that control is bad of course, 
and certainly protocols have no vested interest in 
themselves. The issue lies in the fact that standards 
are set according to certain ruling interests - and is 
therefore a political issue. Certainly control might be 
exerted to undermine these interests. For instance, peer 
to peer networks are one obvious example of principles 
based on a different set of social practices, that simply 
optimise the existing open structure of the Internet. 
Technical detail here also reveals some of the cracks 
in the system. The Internet may be relatively robust 
as a result of its distributed topology, but it also 
displays elements of vulnerability if attention is paid 
to technical detail. For instance, ‘cascading failures’ 
are well known explanations of a situation where a local 
failure redistributes responsibilities to linked nodes, 
cascading through the system sometimes to disastrous 
effect, depending on how central the role of the node is 
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within the system as a whole. This can be demonstrated 
with a wide variety of systems: failed routers within 
the Internet, or species within an eco-system, or 
in economics with the collapse of a certain company 
(Barabási 2002: 120).
Technical detail such as this is clearly of use to 
those wanting the system to become more robust, or 
those wishing to bring about its destruction. The more 
advanced the capitalist economy becomes, Marx argued, 
the greater the contradictions and the more it sows 
the seeds of its own destruction in that it creates 
its grave-diggers: the working class. Perhaps the 
seeds of destruction, that Marx thought to be internal 
to the production of the commodity, are now evident 
in code. Closer attention to computational processes 
might reveal some of these internal contradictions and 
the ways in which capitalism has sought to overcome 
these contradictions (what Castells calls ‘the 
recapitalisation of capitalism’, 1996: 85). Capitalism 
evidently contains the seeds of its own destruction but 
knows it - aware of its immanent crisis, in other words. 
An understanding of the interactions between history and 
the development of technology seems to confirm the point. 
-----------------------
4.2 - dynamic processes
-----------------------
In considering the development of informational technologies 
and the ways in which they are embedded in society, a 
long history of mechanisms that relate to ‘computation’ 
is invoked - mechanisms that perform logical or physical 
processes of generation. A more detailed understanding 
of these mechanisms requires the linking of computational 
machines to the development of logical thinking (that 
would include Blaise Pascal’s adding machine of 1642, 
Gottfried Wilhelm von Leibniz’s multiplication machine 
of 1671, Babbage’s analytical machine of 1835, as well 
as von Kempelen’s chess-playing automaton mentioned in 
the previous chapter). For instance, a logic derived 
from the ‘clockwork’ mechanism has been particularly 
influential in setting mechanical production and thinking 
to the imperial standard of Greenwich Mean Time.
[12] Where and when invention arises is distinctly 
unreliable, as a result of the ways in which ideas 
emerge rather than occur at discrete times in history. 
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In a history of computing, Babbage’s ‘Analytical Engine’ 
is generally considered the first device that might be 
considered to be a computer in the modern sense of the 
word. However, it is Ada Lovelace who describes the 
engine as able to ‘compose elaborate and scientific 
pieces of music of any degree of complexity or extent’ 
(in Hofstadter 2000: 25). It was Lovelace who first 
envisaged an engine as not merely calculating numbers 
but arranging and combining letters and other symbolic 
systems - not as a calculator but as a logic machine. 
Adapting mechanical ideas of data storage and processing 
from Babbage, the von Neumann machine of the mid 1940s 
first presented a single structure to hold both the 
set of instructions on how to perform the computation 
and the data required or generated by the computation. 
This is the first modern computer in most accounts.[13] 
For Bolter, the combining of the program instructions 
and the data into the same code also represents the 
ultimate ‘assembly line’, and becomes an archetype 
for industry that requires specialised collective 
labour and knowledge (1984: 34). The resulting system 
can be described as self-regulating, in parallel to 
Marx’s description of the nineteenth-century factory 
as a ‘self-regulating system in embryonic form’ (1990: 
503).[14] The description also lends itself to an 
understanding of the development of ideas through the 
simultaneous storing and processing of information. 
As the previous section discussed, the computer is 
not merely a part of these cybernetic processes but 
also a metaphor for them, and as such it expresses 
ideological issues. In relation to cybernetic systems, 
Nichols refers to ‘the negative dominant tendency 
towards control and positive latent potential towards 
collectivity’ (1988: 23). Making explicit reference 
to Benjamin’s ‘Artwork’ essay, in which the technical 
apparatus was an essential part of the critical 
process and what he calls ‘the equipment-free aspect 
of reality’, Nichols argues that this equipment-free 
aspect is even more pronounced with cybernetic systems, 
deeply embedded in code and operating systems. It is 
no longer merely about suspension of disbelief but of 
our absorption into code, as our interest is diverted 
from products to processes. This section of the chapter 
introduces some key concepts related to computational 
processes such as feedback and recursion, to stress 
transformative possibilities of systems, and in order 
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that in the last section these can be further described 
in dialectical terms. The histories of computing 
mentioned above demonstrate some of the dialectical 
principles of development and feedback expressed in 
systems, as a series of actions similar to historical 
processes that execute past results for future 
operations. 
# systems theory and social critique
Feedback is either positive or negative, and most 
systems require both (positive feedback increases the 
change that brought it about, negative feedback reduces 
it). The classic example of the principle of feedback 
is the thermostat, switching on or off depending on the 
temperature of a particular space at a point in time. 
If all works well, the temperature remains constant. 
The governor of a steam engine is a classic example of 
a mechanical version of the same principle, regulating 
velocity depending on the load the machine bears and 
keeping its operations constant. In such a scenario, a 
‘compensator’ (something that can be controlled from the 
outside because the load fluctuates) is required as well 
as an ‘effector’ (the input-output relations), in order 
to compensate for the faulty information feedback and to 
reinstate control (Wiener 2000: 113). This is a rather 
oversimplified description but the overall principles 
clearly hold relevance to both living organisms and 
artificial mechanisms, as exemplified by the full title of 
Wiener’s book _Cybernetics: or Control and Communication 
in the Animal and the Machine_, of 1948. However, the 
human brain and the computer are clearly not reducible 
to one another, despite some operational similarities. 
In very general terms, both process information to 
execute actions by combining ‘structure [hardware] with 
the instructions given it at the beginning of a chain 
of operations [software] and with all the additional 
information stored and gained from outside in the course 
of this chain [feedback]’ (Wiener 2000: 146). Systems 
with long chains of instructions (such as the human 
brain) are particularly prone to errors, malfunctions 
and disorders, even breakdown. Complexity is one factor, 
but also some systems are just inefficient.  
Free competition is a particularly inefficient system, 
according to Wiener. He calls it a simple-minded theory, 
in which the individual capitalist is regarded as a public 
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servant who deserves the profits gained from his actions, 
as opposed to a selfish individual who steals surplus 
profit and disrupts the social equilibrium (2000: 158). 
According to Wiener, in the pursuit of profit certain 
tendencies emerge that lead to: 
‘... the elimination of the less profitable means for 
the more profitable; the fact that these means are in 
the hands of the very limited class of wealthy men, 
and thus naturally express the opinions of that class; 
and the further fact that, as one of the chief avenues 
to political and personal power, they attract above all 
those ambitious for such power. That system which more 
than all others should contribute to social homeostasis 
is thrown directly into the hands of those most 
concerned in the game of power and money, which we have 
already seen to be one of the chief anti-homeostatic 
elements in the community. [Tragically] the State is 
stupider than most of its components.’ (2000: 161-2)
This moral dimension is an interesting aspect of Wiener’s 
work on cybernetics. In the context of the free market, 
he relates this to a theory of games and a situation 
where there are winners and losers (no doubt, drawing 
upon John von Neumann and Oskar Morgenstern’s general 
theory of games, in their _Theory of Games and Economic 
Behaviour_, 1944). Wiener provides numerous examples, 
including the idea of the automatic factory, in which a 
workforce of mechanical slaves performing human labour 
is imagined.[15] He remains open as to whether this is 
a good thing or a bad thing, but thinks any assessment 
cannot simply be formed in terms of the market; it must 
also include an understanding of the conditions of labour. 
To Wiener, any level of ‘competition’ between machine 
slave labour and human labour is a certain acceptance of 
the conditions of slave labour, even if on the surface 
it appears to decrease human suffrage. This is why the 
direction a society takes cannot be left to the market. 
Otherwise, development is determined by ‘business cycles 
of boom and failure, in the successions of dictatorship 
and revolution, in the wars which everyone loses, which 
are so real a feature of modern times’ (Wiener 2000: 159). 
To Wiener, the solution lies in a better understanding 
of behaviour within social systems. In this way, his 
understanding of technical systems informed his critique 
of the social function of science and technology. For 
instance, the term homeostasis is taken from physiology 
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and then applied to social and political systems. Small 
groups are efficient (where relative homeostasis can be 
discerned) and self-organise into relatively equitable 
conditions. In contrast, larger communities protect 
their interests by exerting inequitable property rights 
and individualism. Implicit to the idea of homeostasis 
(self-regulation) is that the results of any changes in 
the system’s organisation are available as input to the 
system (such as recursive feedback).
 
# recursive transitions
The very structure of the system is reactive to its 
own actions, which includes the interaction of the 
scientist with the subject of study (Wiener 2000: 191). 
A reflexive approach in arts practice is commonplace 
but also has some currency in scientific practices, 
in recognition that to study something is distorted 
by the act of studying it. Additionally, any data on 
offer for study is not the equivalent of actual objects 
but representations of these objects, and therefore a 
certain transformation or recoding takes place between 
the object and the scientist. Furthermore, the selection 
of data is determined by what is possible to observe 
(or indeed, the vested interests of funding, and other 
outside influences). The data is therefore never ‘raw’ 
or pure, but subject to transformations by the human 
subject and the instruments used. It is from this 
position of skepticism over the verification of findings 
that the scientific process should proceed. What Bateson 
calls a ‘critical faculty’ is required on the part of 
the scientist to balance this ‘mass of quasi-theoretical 
speculation’ (2000: xxviii). In Bateson’s work, 
this reflexive approach is referred to as ‘recursive 
epistemology’ (adopting Peter Harries-Jones’s phrase) 
to incorporate processes of knowing that include the 
relationship between the knower and the known (2000: 
xiii). Clearly other non-verifiable and non-scientific 
work must also be taken account of in any analysis 
undertaken. It has become quite common to recognise the 
ways in which subjective elements impinge upon objective 
method (for instance, in contemporary anthropology that 
considers the subjectivity of the observer). 
Knowledge, like the efficiency of cybernetic machines, 
is constructed for its transformative qualities in 
later usage (Latour 1999: 59). Thus, according to Bruno 
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Latour, science should be understood as a practice that 
is produced both in a social context and as a result 
of the technical and institutional apparatus. It is a 
‘disorderly mixture’ revealed ‘in action’ rather than an 
‘orderly pattern of scientific method and rationality’ 
(1999: 15). Scientists have tended to work on the 
reductionist assumption that by taking something apart 
we will gain an understanding of how it works from its 
constituent parts. But as with Humpty-Dumpty, from the 
knowledge of the pieces it does not necessarily follow 
that we understand how to put the pieces together or 
indeed how these parts operate together as a system 
(what Christopher Scholz refers to as the ‘humpty-dumpty 
effect’ of not being in a position to fully join two 
broken pieces back together again, in Gleick 1998: 106). 
The parts remain incomplete, according to the principles 
of fractal geometry.[16] Although at a gross scale, the 
broken crockery of Ono’s _Mend Peace for the World_ 
(mentioned in chapter 2) appears to fit together, at a 
smaller scale it remains incomplete (or something to be 
continually strived for perhaps). 
Facts appear to be held in dialectical contrast to 
speculations. For Bateson, advances in scientific thought come 
from a ‘combination of loose and strict thinking’, in 
which looseness is measured against ‘rigid concreteness’ 
(2000: 75) - evoking the Hegelian principle that ‘concrete 
universality’ can only be attained through ‘abstract 
negativity’. Applied to the understanding of human 
societies based upon the analogy between society and 
organism as complex systems, Bateson sees social change 
as a slippage of the system, in which there is the 
possibility that a variable may reach a point of crisis. 
This reflects the dialectical method of contestation, 
although admittedly Bateson’s concerns are more ecological. 
Relays of ‘on’ and ‘off’ work as a series of actions, 
as part of a set of iterative processes that include 
‘memory’ (the ability to use past results for future 
operations). For instance, Babbage’s ‘Difference Engine’ 
rested on the logic of the ‘method of differences’ and 
employed the principle of the ‘strange loop’, capable 
of altering its own stored program (able ‘to eat its 
own tail’ in Babbage’s words, cited in Hofstadter 2000: 
25). Strange loops suggest rules by which new rules 
will emerge, rules that change themselves in self-
organising structures. What was once a clean, linear 
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and hierarchical structure has become a strange loop, 
or ‘tangled hierarchy’. Douglas Hofstadter further 
illustrates the strange loop by referring to M.C. Escher’s 
lithograph _Drawing Hands_ (1948) where ‘that which 
draws, and that which is drawn - turn back on each other’ 
(2000: 689). In these examples, some aspect acts upon 
the system as if it were operating outside the system. 
It is both simultaneously outside and inside the system, 
acting and being acted upon, both subject and object. As 
with the principle of feedback, it endlessly acts upon 
itself like a computer program running an infinite loop.
[17] In terms of software art, an example mentioned in 
chapter 2 is McLean’s _forkbomb.pl_ (2001): a program 
that exhausts the system resources on which it runs and 
causes the computer to crash. 
# digital dialectical logic
Instructions for computing operate in a binary mode of 0 
and 1 - combining contingencies by using algorithms that 
follow this logic. One of the simplest expressions of this 
logic is ‘Boolean’, based on the dichotomy between ‘yes’ 
and ‘no’ (and in turn true or false, and so on [18]). Data 
follows both an arithmetical and logical binary form, as 
a set of choices between two conditions - for instance, 
in the case of switching between ‘on’ or ‘off’ in a series 
of relays. However, computation can also be extended to 
include more complex and conditional formations such as 
‘or’, ‘and’, ‘not’, as well as rules about contradiction, 
consistency and implication (Bolter 1984: 69).
 
Further complexity relates to what has become known as 
‘artificial intelligence’ (what Marvin Minsky described 
as ‘the science of making machines do things that 
would require intelligence if done by men [sic]’, 
in Bolter 1984: 193).[19] The term ‘artificial life’ 
also is relevant here (as a development of artificial 
intelligence), derived from von Neumann’s experiments 
in constructing self-replicating automata. A computer 
program can model these behaviours using self-
replicating algorithms such as the example of Ray’s 
_Tierra_ software, in which synthetic organisms have 
been created based on a computer metaphor of organic 
life and evolution. The idea of software evolving or 
‘learning’ becomes the way out of the paradox that 
an automated process, working on a repetitive cycle 
of answering ‘yes’ and ‘no’, would never arrive at an 
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equilibrium. Through feedback, a computing machine might 
display ‘conditioned reflexes’ as a ‘nervous computing 
machine’ - more than simply a machine in action, which 
combines relays and storage mechanisms. This is clearly 
a description of a learning machine that might arrive 
at a solution but only (as with dialectics) as a result 
of an ‘iterative process of successive approximations’ 
(Wiener 2000: 130) - if indeed a final resolution is 
desirable at all (as with dialectics). This is the 
approach that Richard Levins and Richard Lewontin 
adopt in their dialectical approach to biology (1985). 
They focus on the relationship between the whole and 
its parts, and develop a less deterministic view of 
evolution following an open-ended dialectical process. 
The parallel between digital and dialectical processes 
is what Peter Lunenfeld attempts in his introduction 
to _The Digital Dialectic_ (2000). However, he is 
cautious of too easy a conflation between the two. 
He claims that the on-off switching of cybernetic 
calculation does not create a synthesis, and merely 
reflects the contradictory condition of thesis and 
antithesis. This is a very generalised position and 
does not account for a deep understanding of negation 
or of incomplete synthesis. Lunenfeld is not dismissing 
the dialectical method altogether but drawing attention 
to its limitations. He sees its strength in the central 
dialectic of theory and practice, and in its application 
to detail in pursuit of the general (the difference 
between the particular and the universal, for Hegel). 
It is therefore ironic that Lunenfeld appears to 
overlook detail on the dialectical method itself. 
Also in _The Digital Dialectic_, Michael Heim distances 
himself from a dialectical materialist interpretation, 
instead concentrating on what he calls the ‘joke or 
paradox that propels all dialectical thinking’ (in 
Lunenfeld 2000: 26). He argues that an ongoing 
exchange between competing positions is a useful 
analytical strategy, and rejects deeper antagonisms 
related to power.[20]   
There are plenty of detractors of the dialectical method, 
who are more systematic. Some commentators simply see 
the method as too crude to account for the ways in which 
communications are organised and dispersed in complex 
systems.[21] A challenge to Boolean logic comes from 
quantum computing (Bone & Castro 1997). Rather than 
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considering a ‘bit’ in one of two states (0 or 1), a 
‘qubit’ (quantum bit) can exist in three states (0 or 1 or 
both). Thus a layer of complexity is added to the description 
of a computer, suggesting possible directions of development 
that are less deterministic and more transformative. New 
ways of codifying and processing data might be envisaged 
as a result. The difference lies in that standard computing 
follows Newtonian physics and only allows a bit to be 
any one determined state at a time - on or off. Whereas 
a quantum computer ‘exploits the possibility of quantum 
states of atomic particles to store digital registers in 
a definable but still undetermined quantum superposition 
of two states at the same time’ (Floridi 1999: 189). 
Might this suggest a ‘quantum dialectics’? 
In _Philosophy and Computing_, Luciano Floridi suggests that 
Hegelian dialectics might help explain this principle of 
quantum superposition, whereby contradictory positions 
are reconciled in a higher unity by both being annulled 
and preserved in temporary synthesis (1999: 190). Although 
Floridi describes dialectics in ‘absolute’ terms (the 
example provided is the synthesis of the finite and infinite 
making the absolute, 1999: 190), synthesis might still 
be thought of as incomplete (it is explained that special 
logic gates would have to be developed to control the 
interactions between qubits and to generate coherent 
change). The potential is vast but largely speculative. 
In other words, the achievement of the absolute is only a 
potential state, and as such synthesis remains incomplete.
 
The suggestion in the context of this thesis is that 
digital-dialectical processes operate reflexively: 
as both a technical description of a system and a 
suitable critical method for its analysis. A well-
formed theorem contains both the theorem and negations 
of theorems, as Hofstadter puts it (2000: 71). He 
points to the significance of recursion within computer 
science, in moving from level to level in an operation 
whilst storing in memory all previous levels such 
that operations might be returned to in ‘recursive 
transitions’ (2000: 128). 
Following the dialectical principles described, this 
section has tried to introduce some of these technical 
principles, in order that they can be employed in the 
development of the overall thesis. As with recursion, it 
is hoped this is evident in the interlocking structure 
102
of any written thesis (such as this), and the way it 
returns to previous arguments at various points along 
the way, just as in programming parenthesis is used 
to produce sub-clauses, whilst retaining the overall 
flow of logic. Systems theory describes these dynamic 
interactions at both a technical and cultural level of 
understanding.   
-------------------------------
4.3 - complexity and dialectics
-------------------------------
The recent interest in complexity theory derives from 
an understanding of dynamic systems. That a relatively 
small input can have massive consequences suggests 
analogies between complexity and social phenomena, even 
with history. In the concluding section of this chapter, 
the intention is to draw together an understanding of 
complexity theory and dialectical materialism - and 
the way both engage with systems - to stress their 
openness to ideas of transformation. Despite inevitable 
confusions, the suggestion is that together complexity 
and dialectics can help to identify some of the material 
working conditions within systems and networks. Although 
some of these principles have been introduced in the 
previous chapter through emergence, more detail will be 
added in this section to stress the possibilities of 
social transformation through disorder. The significance 
for dialectics is that the role of negation is upgraded 
to disorder, and that new order can be created out of disorder. 
The contradictory phrase ‘orderly disorder’, taken from 
Hayles’s ‘Chaos as Orderly Disorder’ encapsulates the 
phenomenon for the purposes of this thesis (1989: 305-
22). Evidently, the relationship between order (that 
which can be classified and rationalised) and disorder 
(that which cannot, because it is too chaotic and 
generalised) does not lie simply in opposition but 
in more complex formations. What has been discovered 
by the science of complexity is that within the 
unpredictability of chaotic systems lie deep structures 
of order. In complex systems, what may appear to be 
unpredictable and closed, remains open to influence 
from internal and external factors.[22] The scientific 
basis for this can be explained by the notorious 
unpredictability of the weather. In Edward Lorenz’s 1963 
paper ‘Deterministic Nonperiodic Flow’, it was shown 
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that very simple and small differences of input could 
have overwhelming consequences in terms of output. This 
has become known as the ‘butterfly effect’ in ‘popular 
science’ literature to describe the possibility of 
changes in weather conditions resulting from the 
movement of the wings of a butterfly in one part of the 
world stirring the air and thus potentially transforming 
the weather into storm conditions in another part of the 
world (from Lorenz’s essay ‘Predictability: Does the 
Flap of a Butterfly’s Wings in Brazil Set Off a Tornado in 
Texas?’ of 1979). This effect was further explained and 
visualised in the ‘Lorenz Attractor’ of 1963 that became 
known as the ‘strange attractor’ (that coincidentally 
looks like the wings of a butterfly), in which an ordered 
structure can be seen within a disorderly stream of data 
(Gleick 1998: 150-1).[23] The behaviour is so complex 
that conventional mathematical methods cannot adequately 
account for these processes. 
Clearly there are implications here for wider social and 
ethical issues. In _Emergence_ (2001), Johnson describes 
the development of the industrial city of Manchester, 
revealing its chaotic emergence at the centre of the 
industrial revolution. He does so to make reference to 
Engels’s description of 1845, in ‘The Condition of the 
Working Class in England’, witnessing its: 
‘... filth and disgusting grime, the equal of which is 
not to be found [...] a planless chaos of houses, more 
or less on the verge of uninhabitableness, whose unclean 
interiors fully correspond with their filthy external 
surroundings. And how can people be clean with no proper 
opportunity for satisfying the most natural and ordinary 
wants.’ (1978: 580, 582) 
Engels is not observing chaos or an entirely 
unpredictable phenomenon. The city emerges according to 
an underlying order related to class interests. But how? 
Engels sought to explain this by the dialectical laws 
in nature but also the capitalist lust for profit, ahead 
of the welfare of people. In contrast, Johnson does not 
develop emergence as an ideological issue, but instead 
chooses to explain it as a ‘systematic’ complexity, and 
as ‘a strange kind of order, a pattern in the streets 
that furthered the political values of Manchester’s 
elite without being planned by them’ (2001: 40). Both 
explanations are productive. The final section of the 
chapter introduces the idea that systems theory extends 
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dialectical logic. Both systems theory and dialectics 
share a common interest in conceptualising the material 
world in terms of processes, as the interaction between 
parts of the system and the development of the whole 
system that expresses dynamic interactions. 
# systems dialectics
In _Systems Dialectics_ (1996), Wu Jie attempts to 
combine systems theory with dialectical materialist 
thinking, citing von Bertalanffy’s _General Theory of 
Systems_ (1968) as a precedent for his approach. Von 
Bertalanffy’s work is important in the development of 
‘second-order cybernetics’, which sought to uncover some 
common principles that govern open, evolving systems; 
and he refers to ‘dynamic transformation’ in the case 
of the social realm. Wu also recognises systems theory 
reflects new pluralistic structures, that have replaced 
the post-cold war period of bipolar antagonisms - what 
Hakim Bey elsewhere calls the ‘tweedledum/tweedledee 
clash of Capitalism and Stalinism’ (2003: xi). That 
Wu is writing from the paradoxical political context 
of contemporary State Capitalism of Communist China, 
suggests that antagonisms have been internalised under 
free market principles (and the free market, according 
to Wiener, is a particularly inefficient system). Wu’s 
position is similarly paradoxical in developing Marxist 
philosophy in the context of a recent history of 
China: reading Joseph Stalin’s ‘Four laws’ alongside 
engineering physics in Russia in the 1950s, reading Mao 
Tsetung’s work on contradiction whilst imprisoned as 
part of the ‘cultural revolution’, and then studying 
modern management science and systems science in the 
United States in the 1980s. To Wu, the time is right 
to argue that systems dialectics is to informational 
capitalism what dialectical materialism was to 
industrial capitalism, and this is what he refers to as 
its ‘historical summons’ (1996: 368). 
Dialectical materialist philosophy can be seen to 
operate in parallel to the understanding of the 
transformation of systems, but requires a series of 
upgrades: from ‘material object-centered theory’ to 
‘contradiction-centered theory’ to ‘system-centred 
theory’ (Wu 1996: 51-2). Constituent parts of systems, 
as well as the overall system itself, are continually 
in a state of change. Wu makes explicit reference to 
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Engels’s ‘Introduction to Dialectics of Nature’ (1980 
[1875-6]) that outlines the defining characteristics 
of the dialectical laws of motion. Echoing the phrase 
‘all that is solid melts into air’ (in _The Communist 
Manifesto_), Engels summarises motion in the following 
terms: 
‘all rigidity was dissolved, all fixity dissipated, all 
particularity that had been regarded as eternal became 
transient, the whole of nature shown as moving in 
eternal flux and cycles’. [As a result:] ‘All nature from 
protista to man, has its existence in eternal coming 
into being and going out of being, in ceaseless flux, in 
unresting motion and change.’ (1980: 346)
That the dialectic is applicable to all nature is a 
highly contentious position. For instance, according 
to Herbert Marcuse, Engels had been wrong to assume 
he could apply dialectical thinking to nature as he 
would to history - that nature has a history but is not 
history (Jay 1996: 73).[24] However Engels’s description 
of motion does sound uncannily contemporary, and Wu 
asserts that nature arises from differentiation and does 
so historically, making reference to systems theory for 
verification. Systems theory also confirms the truism that 
a system is more than the sum of its interconnecting 
parts. Wu quotes Hegel on this principle, that ‘a 
severed hand is no longer a hand’, to emphasise that a 
part is only a part in terms of its overall relation 
to the larger whole system (1996: 77). This applies 
to matter, but also in the case of information, where 
a node is not a node if it is disconnected from the 
network as a whole, and in which the interactions are 
expressed towards an optimisation of the whole network. 
Wu explains:
‘So when the system is under self-organization, self-
reproduction and self-catalysis, and is receiving 
feedback and exchanging mass, energy and information 
with its environment it may move and develop toward 
decreasing entropy and increasing order. In the end, it 
will gradually arrive at the optimum state of the whole 
system. This is what Hegel and Aristotle meant when 
they talked about “thesis, antithesis and synthesis” 
and “movement of the whole”. In Hegel’s view, the third 
category, synthesis, is the truth of the two former 
categories.’ (1996: 81)
Although it should be added that the description of 
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the Hegelian position in terms of the completeness 
of synthesis in a universal concept like truth is 
misleading - in as much as continual improvement 
is necessary for the system not to stagnate - in 
preference, the synthesis should remain incomplete 
and open (as has been stated earlier in the thesis 
[25]). The development of human societies works in this 
way too, but is distinguished by the added element 
of subjective critical reflection in the optimisation 
process. The law of optimisation, according to Wu, is 
characterised by the self-perfecting process of negation 
of negation, part of the movement from disorder towards 
order and improved organisation, laying open the nature 
of hierarchy and diversity. He explains the logic as 
follows: 
‘This upgrades the law of negation of negation to the 
domain of the disordered - ordered - newly disordered - 
newly ordered, which is a more extensive and penetrating 
domain than the former.’ (1996: 88)
 
Disequilibrium produces change in this way. It affects 
the equilibrium of the system, partly explaining the 
shift to what Wu refers to as ‘synergetic equilibrium’, 
where ‘the whole system comes into a stable state in 
the ordered structure’ (1996: 172). This is an explicit 
reference to Prigogine’s theory of ‘dissipative 
structure’, more common in systems that are complicated 
and that express ‘advanced motion forms’. In dialectical 
terms, systems express a cyclical development of 
equilibrium to disequilibrium to new equilibrium - or 
from order to disorder to new order. This explains his 
revision of dialectical materialism to account for an 
understanding of complexity theory:
‘The birth of a system is a negation of nature disorder. 
The orderly system again contains disorderly factors, 
and the development of an orderly system with disorderly 
factors again leads the system into disorder, thereby 
a new orderly system is produced. [...] Without 
orderliness, there would be no processes, without the 
nature of disorder, there would be no development 
of processes. [...] The rule is that order conquers 
disorder, and disorder negates order, thus reaching a 
new orderly process. [...] The motional process of the 
whole world of systems is exactly the dialectical unity 
of order and disorder.’ (Wu 1996: 53-4)
It is a description of emergent behaviour, in which new 
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order might indeed be generated through disorder. This 
is verified by Prigogine and Stengers, who maintain that 
all systems contain sub-systems, and that within these 
systems and sub-systems, positive feedback loops might 
generate the further development of a process, to the 
point of causing a fundamental and unforeseeable change of the 
existing system (1985). This is an important principle, 
as it emphasises the constructive role that disorder 
might play in creating order, rather like the positive 
role that negation plays in dialectical materialism.   
# radical uncertainty
A living system such as society, although determined 
by rules, is emergent and unpredictable at the same 
time. Like Wu, Sue Owens has also adopted theories 
associated with self-organising systems, to explain 
the possibilities of social transformation. In her 
essay ‘Chaos Theory, Marxism and Literary History’, she 
explains how bifurcation theory is a common explanation 
for how ordered structures can arise from disorder:  
‘At a bifurcation point, chance takes over, and it is 
impossible to predict what will happen; but in between 
times, determinism takes over again, until fluctuations 
force the new system into far from equilibrium 
conditions and a new bifurcation point is reached.’ 
(1996: 88)
By ‘bifurcation’ she means splitting, the point where 
within a system, one path or another must be followed 
(as in Boolean logic). Although the choice is limited to 
one of two, the decision is thoroughly unpredictable. 
With increased frequency, bifurcations can lead to 
extremely complex systems. The link between bifurcation 
and literature here would suggest a number of examples 
such as Jorge Luis Borges’s ‘The Garden of Forking 
Paths’ (1941), but also the tree structure of Queneau’s 
‘A Story As You Like It’ in which the reader is provided 
with two choices of how to proceed at each stage of the 
story (Motte 1998: 156-8).[26] Computer programs follow 
this logic of bifurcation too. The bifurcation point is 
‘revolutionary’ in the sense that dramatic change takes 
place but it remains impossible to predict the direction 
change will take, and whether it will fall into a higher 
level of order or disintegrate into disorder. That the 
collective behaviour cannot be predicted at a global 
level, is analogous to the workings of society.[27] The 
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issue of unpredictability leads Prigogine and Stengers 
to explain history in terms of ‘radical uncertainty’ 
(citing André Neher). In _Order Out of Chaos_, they 
describe the emergent order within unstable systems such 
as societies, as: 
‘... immensely complex systems involving a potentially 
enormous number of bifurcations exemplified by the 
variety of cultures that have evolved in the relatively 
short span of human history. We know that such systems 
are highly sensitive to fluctuations. This leads both to 
hope and a threat: hope, since even small fluctuations 
may grow and change the overall structure. As a result, 
individual activity is not doomed to insignificance. On 
the other hand, this is also a threat, since in our 
universe the security of stable, permanent rules seems 
gone forever.’ (1985: 312-3)
Despite the skepticism of many in the scientific 
community, Hayles describes the importance of 
Prigogine’s work to validate ‘the dialectic between 
order and disorder by finding analogous processes in 
physical systems. Moreover, it imparts an optimistic 
turn to such processes by positing them as sources 
of renewal [...]’ (1991: 14). The description of the 
dialectic of order and disorder allows for the unpacking 
of deterministic or totalising theories and the 
possibility of conceiving positive change. This is in 
marked contrast to other contemporary cultural theories, 
that tend to deemphasise order in favour of randomness.
[28] Many scientific theories fall into the same trap. 
For instance, Hayles points to the mistaken ‘belief that 
the science of chaos opposes globalising theories is, 
then, a misapprehension about how these theories work’ 
(quoted in Owens 1996: 90). The same can be said of 
the manner in which postmodernism became a totalising 
theory on the subject of anti-totalising theory. If 
every attempt to provide an anti-totalising theory 
becomes a totalising theory in itself, one response is 
to emphasise contradiction. Contradiction between parts 
is required for the complex whole to adequately describe 
the ways in which these parts express both disorder and 
order. Thus a postmodern discourse around fragmentation 
is rejected for an ‘ordered complexity’, that is neither 
ordered nor disordered but both. Along these lines of 
thinking and in general terms, orthodox postmodernism 
(deconstruction, post-structuralism et al) rests on ‘bad 
science’ and ‘bad history’, claims Owens (1996: 94) - 
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and bad politics of course. 
This is a forceful argument but one not without 
difficulties. Clearly, disorder is not necessarily 
conceived of in these dialectical terms.[29] Many 
critics of dialectics think it too mechanistic. For 
instance, Prigogine and Stengers are no supporters of 
dialectical materialism, and despite recognising the 
undoubted similarities to the new science, think it 
too extreme in its rejection of determinism (1985: 
252-3). However, this is a misunderstanding in the 
broader sense, as dialectical materialism does not see 
everything as entirely fluid and in flux but simply more 
so than conventional deterministic systems, according 
to Owens (1996: 105).[30] Paradoxically, she supports 
this claim for the coexistence of determinism and flux 
by quoting Prigogine and Stengers: ‘being and becoming 
are not to be opposed one to the other: they express two 
related aspects of reality’ (1996: 102). Determinism 
and unpredictability are held together in a manner that 
reflects open systems and a more open view of dialectics.  
It is worth emphasising that the combination of systems 
theory and dialectics challenges the pessimism of 
much contemporary critical theory, by suggesting the 
possibility of transformation coexisting with a tight 
structural framework. It encapsulates the idea of 
‘orderly disorder’, wherein positive change remains a 
possibility. In keeping with these explanations, this 
chapter has argued that dialectics continues to remain 
a useful conception and model of change, particularly 
to describe systems that appear to contain the same 
logic. Whether it is a law of nature, as Engels and Wu 
argued, seems debatable but an understanding of both 
complexity and dialectics manages to draw together the 
interconnections of nature, history, society, technology 
and politics. It also affirms that human subjects are 
constituted through their relationship to society and 
institutions, and that society cannot be described 
simply as a collection of individual subjects. Rather, 
it is a far more complex system that takes account of 
individual differences but also of collective actions and 
counteractions. The constructive role of disorder is 
consistent with Tiziana Terranova’s position in _Network 
Culture_, in which she describes informational dynamics 
as ‘creative destruction, that is a _productive_ 
movement that releases (rather than simply inhibits) 
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social potentials for transformation’ (2004: 3). 
The suggestion is that software releases the social 
potential for transformation too. The following chapters 
add detail to this claim, first by focussing on work 
(chapter 5) and later action (chapter 6) to establish a 
better understanding of the dialectics of software art. 
This approach provides the possibility of change through 
human agency - at the point of bifurcation where two 
paths are possible.
 
===================
5. *complex labour*
===================
‘Work is no longer work, it is work which is liberated 
from work.’ 
(Negri 1991: 160)
Attention to labour relations was, in the industrial 
period, the foundation for a dialectical materialist 
methodology. Clearly circumstances have changed since then and 
so various updates are required. However the importance 
of labour has not disappeared but has been transformed.    
In section 5.1, the labour of people and machines is 
articulated to take account of complex interactions, 
in what has been called ‘machinic integration’. This 
integrated labour extends social relations from the 
interaction of workers to their interaction with 
machines. Consistent with the principle that the site 
of production remains where social antagonisms are 
expressed, the suggestion is that these new interrelations 
of humans and machines also presents new possibilities 
for operating in a disorderly manner. Rather than reject 
dialectics, as has been the case with much post-Marxist 
commentary, this thesis argues that contradiction needs 
to adapt to the times, to take account of the ways 
in which social relations are expressed in complex 
formations. This is how ideas introduced in the previous 
chapter become significant in practice.  
In section 5.2, these new forms of work are further 
explained by making reference to ideas developed by 
autonomist Marxism, and in particular through the 
concepts ‘immaterial labour’ and ‘general intellect’. 
These ideas result from the perceived importance of 
communicative interconnections in what the autonomists 
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call the ‘social factory’ to describe the way in 
which the mode of production has been extended to 
the whole of society. What was once considered the 
living contradiction of labour relations in the factory 
has been been extended by collectivity and networked 
communications technologies. The concept of general 
intellect, drawn from Marx’s early writing, is considered 
to be particularly useful. For instance, the open source 
movement is organised in collective and open forms, to 
allow for the sharing of source code and expertise. 
These developments present new contradictions expressed 
in the complexity of labour, characterised not least by 
the prevalence of free labour in the cultural realm, 
and the production of free software in particular. 
Section 5.3 also raises issues over the effectiveness of 
oppositional tactics that aim to respond critically to 
these conditions, such as the refusal to work. Negri’s 
quote at the beginning of the chapter is suggestive of 
the possibility of work that rejects the conditions 
under which work is currently performed. The discussion 
of work is allied to software work in a deliberately 
ambiguous way - to indicate both the work involved in 
making software, as well as the work that software does 
itself. The chapter ends by arguing for the continued 
relevance of dialectics to respond to these working 
contradictions, by drawing upon ideas introduced in the 
previous chapter. 
 
----------------------------------
5.1 - complex workers and machines
----------------------------------
Classical Marxism would maintain that the relations 
of production constitute the base from which the 
superstructure is derived, at any point in human 
history. All social relationships for Marx lie in 
social production and relationships between people 
in production. These ideas are predicated on the 
understanding that there is a dialectical relationship 
between nature and human society integrated through 
labour. Human production emerges from nature, then 
utilises it and abuses it. In addition, technology 
energises the labour force, and hence the force of social 
development, combining human and machine labour working at 
local and global levels of complex interaction.
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In _Chaosophy_ (1995), Félix Guattari refers to 
‘systematic disorganisation’, that plays an important 
part in understanding both individual and collective 
forms of subjectivity. Although working from the 
assumption that subjectivity is constructed according 
to social and economic conditions, Guattari is breaking 
with Althusser’s Marxist structuralism (as well as 
Lacan’s psychoanalytic structuralism) that stressed 
the determining role of language and communication. 
Rather than simply taking technology as part of a 
process of interpellation, something far more complex is 
articulated, that involves the interaction of the labour 
of people and machines. So rather than the dead labour 
of machines replacing human labour, he states: 
‘On the contrary, I think that machines must be used - 
and all kinds of machines, whether concrete or abstract, 
technical, scientific or artistic. Machines do more than 
revolutionize the world, they completely recreate it.’ 
(1995: 19)[1] 
According to this position, any concept of social 
production and the relations of production must take 
account of more complex and disorganised interactions 
between people and machines - what Guattari calls 
‘machinic agency’. The disorganisation, or what he 
also refers to as ‘craziness’ in systems, is accounted 
for in his reference to chaos (in the term ‘chaosophy’). 
Central to this idea is that change does not simply 
happen on a large-scale socio-economic level or in 
ideology but from mutations at a micro-scale molecular 
level. Here the link to complex systems would verify 
that a relatively small input can have massive consequences. 
The first section of this chapter investigates the 
possibilities for social transformation, in the 
‘machinic integration’ of the processes of production, 
circulation and information. Guattari would suggest 
that ‘a mutation like that introduced by microprocessors 
changes the actual substratum of human existence and, 
in reality, opens up fabulous possibilities for 
liberation’ (1995: 47-8). In other words, there is a 
dynamic tension between micro-politics and the body 
politic in general - integrating life and politics 
at all scales of operation. Guattari describes this 
reorientation of thinking as moving from ‘dream to 
social reality, from poetry to science, from the 
most violent social reality to the most tender daily 
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relations’ (1995: 50). 
In forging new ways of conceptualising these issues, 
Guattari calls himself an ‘idea-thief’. Concepts are 
taken to be tools, not fixed or universal ideas, but 
ideas in flux, open to influence from other fields of 
interest - such as combining the seemingly heterogeneous 
fields of chaos theory and philosophy in the case of 
‘chaosophy’.[2] The combining of the heterogeneous fields 
of complexity theory and dialectics to open up new 
critical possibilities, was introduced in the previous 
chapter in a similar way.   
# desiring production 
The spheres of production, distribution and consumption 
have been considered relatively autonomous in classical 
Marxism. Guattari, with Gilles Deleuze, argues that this 
is predicated upon Marxist description of the division 
of labour and the idea of false consciousness. To them, 
the distinctions collapse, making everything production: 
the ‘production of productions, of actions and of 
passions’ (1990: 4). Therefore when Deleuze and Guattari 
claim that nature is now experienced as a process of 
production, they are arguing something quite different 
from Engels or Wu (described in the previous chapter). 
Their understanding incorporates the production of 
subjectivity itself, machine production and consumption, 
making the human subject a ‘producer-product’. 
Like the work of the Frankfurt Institut that preceded 
them, Deleuze and Guattari are drawing together Marx and 
Freud to open up new possibilities for the unconscious 
to be seen as productive and not simply ‘false’, 
although their emphasis is on desire rather than 
history. For instance, in _Anti-Oedipus: Capitalism and 
Schizophrenia_ (1990 [1972]), the unconscious is cast as 
a factory not a theatre (and thereby they aim to reject 
the oedipal drama[3]). This is a reference to the work 
of Antonin Artaud, who described the body as a factory, 
or more accurately the sick body as an ‘overheated 
factory’ (Guattari 1995: 75). In Artaud’s ‘Theatre and 
the Plague’ (2001 [1964]), disorder in the form of the 
plague demonstrates the potential for transformation of 
the body and body politic: 
‘The plague takes dormant images, latent disorder and 
suddenly carries them to the point of the most extreme 
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gestures. Theatre also takes gestures and develops 
them to the limit. Just like the plague, it reforges 
the links between what does and what does not exist 
in material nature. [...] It restores all our dormant 
conflicts and their powers, giving these powers names we 
acknowledge as signs. Here a bitter clash of symbols 
takes place before us, hurled one against the other in 
an inconceivable riot.’ (2001: 18)
For Artaud, the plague disrupts human progress (order) 
and encourages irrationality (disorder), unleashing the 
potential for radical change. For Deleuze and Guattari, 
the liberation of creative social expression is bound 
up with desire, as it is capitalism that represses 
desire (precisely because desire is where the potential 
for transformation lies). There is a further link to 
the work of the Frankfurt Institut here, in the work 
of Marcuse in particular, who speculated on the power 
of sexuality to unsettle the repressive work ethic 
that sustains capitalism (in _Eros and Civilisation_, 
1972).[4] In Marcuse’s terms, non-work or play allows 
the freeing of desire. Art is part of the potential 
solution for Marcuse, as it contains both a critical 
and anticipatory function that ties it to politics. 
According to Deleuze and Guattari too, the failure to 
liberate desire sufficiently accounts for the failure 
of social revolutions thus far. In fact, to Deleuze 
and Guattari, all ideologies, even oppositional ones, 
mask desire, or repress it, and so as not to replace 
one repression with another, it is desire that requires 
liberation.[5]
 
As such, desire can be seen to be potentially 
revolutionary, especially when promiscuous and outside 
the ‘Mommy-Daddy’ family circle of traditional 
‘bourgeois psychiatry’.[6] This reference again draws 
upon the work of Artaud, who says: ‘I don’t believe in 
father/in mother,/got no/papamummy’ (quoted in Deleuze & 
Guattari 1990: 14). The critique of the Freudian Oedipal 
drama forces the analysis out of the family, to the 
wider mechanism of power that would include other social 
norms, many of which are irrational. This position owes 
something to the anti-psychiatry movement of Ronald D. 
Laing: 
‘In the context of our present pervasive madness that 
we call normality, sanity, freedom, all our frames of 
reference are ambiguous and equivocal. A man who prefers 
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to be dead rather than Red is normal. A man who says he 
has lost his soul is mad. A man who says that men are 
machines may be a great scientist. A man who says he is 
a machine is ‘depersonalized’ in psychiatric jargon. 
[...] Thus I would like to emphasize that our ‘normal’ 
state is too often the abdication of ecstasy, the 
betrayal of our true potentialities, that many of us are 
only too successful in acquiring a false self to adapt 
to false realities.’ (1965: 11-2)
Indeed the capitalist machine is a rational framework 
under an irrational impulse, according to Guattari: 
‘Everything is rational in capitalism, except capital 
or capitalism itself’ (1995: 54). Capital can simply 
be diagnosed as demented and at an advanced stage 
(similar to Mandel’s description of capitalism as senile 
dementia), hence Deleuze and Guattari s use of the 
term schizophrenia. The solution is not to impose an 
alternative ideology but liberate desire, what they call 
‘desiring-production’. Desiring machines follow rules of 
association, and are networked: 
‘The productive synthesis, the production of production, 
is inherently connective in nature: “and...” “and 
then...” This is because there is always a flow-
producing machine, and another machine connected to 
it that interrupts or draws off part of this flow (the 
breast - the mouth). And because the first machine is 
in turn connected to another whose flow it interrupts 
or partially drains off, the binary series is linear 
in every direction. Desire causes the current to flow, 
itself flows in turn, and breaks flows.’ (1990: 5)
These breaks and flows evoke information networks 
and this is made explicit in Deleuze and Guattari’s 
reference to code. They say that every machine has 
code built into it: ‘The data, the bits of information 
recorded, and their transmission form a grid of 
disjunctions of a type that differs from the previous 
connections’ (1990: 38). This appears to describe 
the differences between centralised, decentralised 
and distributed networks (described in the previous 
chapter). Desiring-production is networked, in that 
every machine is connected to another machine. Deleuze 
and Guattari proceed to draw a parallel between 
desiring-production and social production, allowing them 
to assert that capital is the ‘body without organs’ of 
the capitalist (from Artaud’s phrase). The body without 
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organs lies in opposition to desiring machines, in 
the realm of ‘antiproduction’ rather than desiring-
production: ‘The genesis of the machine lies precisely 
here: in the opposition of the process of production of 
the desiring-machines and the non-productive stasis of 
the body without organs.’ (Deleuze & Guattari 1990: 9) 
In comparable terms to the opposition between labour 
and capital in classical Marxism, desiring-machines can 
be seen to operate in parallel to labour in opposition 
to capital. Similarly, the body without organs can be 
seen to appropriate desiring production, just as the 
capitalist extorts value from labour. It is not simply 
labour that is stolen but desire too, or more precisely 
the energy associated with desire that is central to 
this extortion and its opposition (although it should 
be added that Marx also regarded labour as a living 
energy). What is distinctive in this formulation is that 
desire creates flows between units of production, and 
like the unconscious, fears it ‘lacks’ something and so 
strives for connectivity. However, it is not wholeness 
that is sought (for instance, as with the mother in a 
Freudian scenario), but something far less unified and 
multiple. This leads Serge Leclaire to think that the 
desiring machine is a ‘partial object’ in the sense that 
psychoanalyst Melanie Klein introduced. Klein explains 
that humans pretend that things are perfect and whole, 
to avoid the reality that they are flawed and in parts. 
She says: ‘It is a ‘perfect’ object which is in pieces’ 
(1988: 270). Deleuze and Guattari seem to concur:
‘We believe only in totalities that are peripheral. 
And if we discover such a totality alongside various 
separate parts, it is a whole of these particular parts 
but does not totalize them; it is a unity of all these 
particular parts but does not unify them.’ (1990: 42) 
But this does not really address Leclaire’s observation 
that Deleuze and Guattari’s theory is too ‘perfect’. He 
thinks it does not demonstrate flux sufficiently.[7] 
In the context of this thesis, it is useful to 
stress the description of the desiring-machine as 
a system of interruptions or breaks, and one that 
works paradoxically by breaking down and becoming 
dysfunctional to Capital (in Guattari 1995: 103). As 
a consequence, the theory comes closer to systems 
dialectics, where disorder can be seen to be a catalyst 
for changes to the system. The machine can be seen to 
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possess two characteristics, according to Guattari: 
the power of continuum and the rupture in direction 
or mutation. The machine, therefore, is a ‘break-flow’ 
process of connections and their rupture (1995: 126-
7), in parallel to the idea that change takes place 
through a rupture in the continuum of history. Desiring-
machines operate in this disruptive manner, and one 
might speculate upon desiring-software that represents 
a break-flow process, or indeed orderly disorder. 
Software, in these terms, might rupture the continuum, 
by doing something other than expected, perhaps simply 
by refusing to work or remaining non-executable, or 
crashing the machine it runs upon. These ideas will be 
developed later in this chapter.   
# marx after marx 
The concept of ‘machinic agency’ is one way to take 
account of desire and extend an understanding of 
production. Neither machine nor software simply acts on 
its own. In themselves, they demonstrate no sense of 
agency in promoting desire or repressing it. This is 
why Guattari would regard technology acting on its own 
(technological-determinism), under a sense of autonomy, 
as necessarily expressing a fascist tone in oppressing 
desire. Yet Guattari thought Marx mistaken in thinking 
social relations lie outside of the tool or machine. 
The issue can be traced historically, by the evolution 
of the tool into a machine that becomes more and more 
independent of the worker. To clarify this, Guattari 
reiterated Marx’s distinction between machines and 
tools, in that machines are a factor of communication, 
whereas tools merely extend control through direct 
contact. This is a much misunderstood distinction 
between tool and machine, and one often repeated in 
connection to the computer. Marx claims: ‘the tool is 
a simple machine and the machine is a complex tool 
[...] therefore, is a mechanism that, after being set 
in motion, performs with its tools the same operation 
as the worker’ (1990: 492, 495). The machine extends 
the limits of human effort, and becomes part of a wider 
scheme of machines working together collectively, as 
part of an extended industrial (machinic) apparatus. 
The ‘machinic’ relations between worker and machine, 
although prefigured in Marx’s description, does not go 
far enough for Guattari, who describes the worker and 
tool as part of the machine (1995: 142) - indeed both 
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are engineered ever more overtly. 
Building upon the thinking of Deleuze, Negri sees this 
conceptual trajectory evident in Marx’s early work.
[8] The complexity of the argument is exemplified by 
Negri’s book title _Marx Beyond Marx: Lessons on 
the Grundrisse_, paradoxically expressing that what 
lies beyond Marx is in itself a return to Marx. This 
represents a return to the _Grundrisse_ of 1857-8 (1981) 
for its conceptual openness and rawness. Thus it is 
considered ‘beyond’ _Capital_ in conceptual but not 
historical terms - as the _Grundrisse_ notebooks predate 
and inform the argument of _Capital_ of 1867 (1990). 
An orthodox historiography would find this ‘beyond’ yet 
simultaneously ‘before’ problematic, but the paradox 
reflects processes of renewal and rupture.[9] 
The preface to _Marx after Marx_ is written in the form 
of a dialogue between a prisoner and free man, reflecting 
Negri’s lengthy imprisonment. Clearly this is not simply 
autobiographical but allegorical: working in the factory 
is to be seen as equivalent to a jail sentence, to break 
out of jail is to break from capital (1991: xvi). The 
free man (Negri’s former and future self) states: ‘To 
be a communist today means to live as a communist’; to 
which the prisoner (Negri’s present self at the time of 
writing) responds: ‘This, I think, is possible even in 
prison. But not outside, until you free us all’ (1991: 
xvii). Here the dialogue evokes the dialectical Hegelian 
master-slave relation, in that it is only the slave who 
can become truly free. That is to say: ‘here, domination 
and reversal can only be accomplished by those who 
participate in an antagonistic relation’ (Negri 1991: 9).
When Negri uses the term antagonism, it is worth 
mentioning that he is a militant, exemplified in his 
views on the necessity of violence: ‘To suppress the 
violence of this process can only deliver it - tied 
hand and foot - to capital’ (1991: 173). Negri’s 
uncompromising position is bound up with the specific 
political context of Italy in the 1970s and the failures 
to engender social transformation (particularly the 
major strikes around the Fiat Factory of 1970). His 
position corresponds with the ‘Workerism’ movement 
[‘Operaismo’], that paradoxically, was against work in 
the sense they did not want it re-appropriated, but 
simply reduced. Rather than celebrating workers’ labour, 
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the influence of Simone Weil (who experienced the factory 
production line first hand) is evident in questioning 
whether it was possible at all to conceive of production 
that was not oppressive (explained by Sylvère Lotringer, 
in Virno 2004: 8). 
But Negri would not merely resort to dialectics here. 
Rather than see the critique embedded in its internal 
contradictions, Negri also points to another non-
dialectical dimension. In addition to the imposed unity 
of dialectical relations between worker and capitalist, 
there is another logic of ‘separation’ from forms of 
domination. Like the revisionist work of the Frankfurt 
Institut, the principle here is that capitalism as 
an irrational system cannot be replaced by anything 
that employs the same logic. For Negri, dialectics is 
the temporary logic of capitalist times and part of 
its internal contradictions to be overthrown, along 
with its domineering class in the ‘transition’ from 
socialism to communism. Nevertheless, if one resorts to 
dialectics, this might be described as the negation of 
negation, in that the dialectical method once employed 
is further negated (as described in chapter 3). In other 
words, to the dialectician the issue of whether this is 
dialectical or non-dialectical appears as a dialectical 
conjunction in itself (this issue will be developed 
in the last section of this chapter). Although not 
following this logic himself, Negri is anxious to find 
a method that can respond to a power base that is ever 
more complex.  
This is where Negri finds Michel Foucault’s concept 
of ‘biopower’ productive, as a concept of power that 
is multiple and adaptive. Foucault’s description of 
biopower is a significant intervention, operating in 
the tradition of materialist production and the ways 
in which subjectivities are constituted in complex 
and interactive relationships. To Negri, the idea of 
globalised biopolitical production does not mean that 
class antagonism has disappeared but is present in 
the wider social realm, and in everyday life: ‘life 
is made to work for production and production is made 
to work for life’ (Hardt & Negri 2000: 32). He argues 
that antagonism grows stronger as a result of these 
changes but stresses that Marx does not go far enough 
in describing the dynamic of capital. What is missing 
in Marx is an understanding of power in relation to 
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systems theory, and the importance of the machine that 
encapsulates production: 
‘The machine is self-validating, auto-poietic - that is, 
systemic. It constructs social fabrics that evacuate 
or render ineffective any contradiction; it creates 
situations in which, before coercively neutralising 
difference, seem to absorb it in an insignificant play of 
self-generating and self-regulating equilibria.’ (Hardt 
& Negri 2000: 33-4)
The description of contemporary power as an adaptive 
system also encourages the view that alternatives 
can adapt too. In Negri’s view, power operates not 
through contradiction but through separation and it 
does this currently through ‘the world market’ (or 
what is commonly known as globalisation). He argues 
that the critical strategy of contradiction needs 
to be reinstated in the realm of production, as 
this remains where social inequalities are revealed 
and where alternatives arise. The potential for 
transformation lies in identifying and acting upon 
these contradictions. This section has tried to outline 
some of the concerns that any reconceptualisation of 
work must take account of. Importantly, the complexity 
of social relations operates through interactions of 
machines and people, as does any sense of machinic 
agency involved in the transformation of these 
relations. It is clear that machines cannot simply 
be regarded as ‘dead labour’ but are integrated 
into ‘living labour’, and involved intimately in 
disseminating creative human energies more openly and 
widely - for better or worse.  
---------------------
5.2 - work after work
---------------------
In orthodox Marxism, the capitalist mode of production 
simultaneously produces and reproduces the antagonistic 
social relations between labour and capital. This 
situation is based on the need for workers to sell 
their labour and the corresponding need for capital to 
‘extort’ value from the workers. The antagonism that 
arises from this is expressed particularly directly 
in the German language: ‘Arbeitgeber’ (labour-giver) 
and ‘Arbeitnehmer’ (labour-taker). As the previous 
section makes clear, labour is no longer contained by 
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the factory walls, and as a consequence this serves to 
dislocate class antagonism. 
This process of dislocation is what Marx referred 
to as ‘real subsumption’, to conceptualise the way 
that class exploitation is dispersed and subsumed 
into the wider (global) social realm.[10] This is 
clearly more evident under contemporary conditions 
than in the mid-nineteenth century, but the logic is 
consistent. What Negri referred to as ‘separation’, at 
the end of the previous section, is another example of 
dispersion, in which capitalism restructures itself 
to avoid dissent and to diminish contradiction. For 
example, the dissent of the 1960s and 1970s (notably 
the student and worker movements in Italy, and Paris 
in 1968) was acted upon in the 1980s and 1990s by 
spreading class antagonism far and wide, and undermining 
its potential for collective action. At the same 
time, real subsumption, assisted by informational 
technologies, has transformed labour and made it more 
shared, collective, and communicative. This second 
section of the chapter introduces these ideas in 
relation to the concept ‘general intellect’, drawn from 
Marx’s early writings, that refers to the combination 
of socialised labour and technological expertise that 
has become important to production. Any critique of 
exploitation therefore must recognise social relations 
in terms of what the autonomists call a ‘social 
factory’, to describe the way the whole of society is 
turned into a site of production.
 
For capitalism to continue to produce surplus value, 
it has to construct not simply commodities, but also 
the appropriate subjectivities to do so. Subjectivities 
are constantly being generated and corrupted in the 
‘factories of subjectivity’, claim Hardt and Negri 
(2000: 197), in a phrase that echoes an understanding 
of biopower described in the previous section. In the 
‘social factory’, subjectivity as well as labour value 
is stolen from the worker (or ‘autonomous subjectivity’ 
is denied, in the terms of autonomous Marxism). Negri 
explains that two oppositions are at work: between use 
value and exchange value of orthodox Marxism, and in 
addition ‘objectified labor against subjective labor’ 
(1991: 68). In this latter opposition, Negri draws on 
a passage from Marx’s _Grundrisse_ to characterise 
labour in terms of the subjectivities of ‘worker and 
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capitalist, collective worker and collective capitalist’ 
(1991: 77). 
Oppositional subjectivities reflect these conditions of 
the social factory (often referred to as the ‘multitude’ 
in contemporary commentary[11]). The term ‘proletariat’ 
as the subject of labour and revolt continues to be 
relevant but requires redefinition to stress more 
collective and communicative forms.[12] The redefinition 
is further explained by its original meaning, describing 
someone who only has the ability to reproduce 
themselves, according to Peter Linebaugh, extending the 
Marxist interpretation applied to someone with 
only their labour to sell (Dyer-Witheford 1999: 107). 
Hardt and Negri define the term to include all those 
whose labour is directly or indirectly exploited, and 
argue that labour is becoming ever more proletarianised. 
Negri goes further, and drawing upon an understanding 
of machinic subjectivity, claims that capital tries 
to capture the communicative capacity of the socialised 
labour force and turn it into information - even into 
software. From this, it can be deduced that subjectivity 
and technology are also becoming proletarianised.
Consequently, the control of communications, and the 
labour related to communications, have become key sites 
of antagonism.[13] For instance, in software production, 
the contradictions that arise from open source 
principles are bound up with the way society responds by 
both encouraging and limiting software development: on 
the one hand, by employing the technical possibilities 
of the Internet that facilitates free and easy 
information sharing, and on the other, by exploiting 
the commercial benefits through proprietary licensing. 
This second section of the chapter draws upon an 
understanding of the concept ‘general intellect’ to 
reveal some of the contradictions in the relations 
of production between networked machines and collective 
human labour. The issue of property is at 
the core of this. 
# general intellect
The source of the concept ‘general intellect’ is 
a section in the _Grundrisse_ called ‘Fragment on 
Machines’ written in 1857-8, in which Marx describes 
that at a certain point in capitalist development, real 
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wealth will be measured not on labour time in production 
but on technological expertise and organisation 
(1981: 705-6). In summarising the concept, Nick Dyer-
Witheford stresses the importance of what Marx calls 
‘general powers of the human head’, ‘general social 
knowledge’, and ‘social intellect’, all resulting 
from the increasing importance of machinery (1999: 
220). Marx predicts that the productive forces of 
the intellect, of human knowledge and skills, will 
be incorporated into capital itself - into what has 
since become known as the ‘knowledge-based economy’. 
Marx was thinking of the developing importance of 
automatic systems for production and the networks of 
the world market. The crucial issue, both then and now, 
is that general intellect unleashes contradictions by 
combining technical knowledge and social cooperation. 
For instance, increasingly socialised labour and the 
replacement of labour by machines undermines existing 
hierarchical structures that protect private property, 
wage structures and class exploitation. 
It is in this context too, that the concept ‘immaterial 
labour’ is introduced by Maurizio Lazzarato and Negri 
to describe the nature of work, in a scenario where 
information and communication dominate the process of 
production. Immaterial labour is that which produces 
immaterial goods such as services and knowledge. It 
follows that as commodities and wealth have become 
less and less material and more defined by cultural, 
informational factors and knowledge, so too has labour. 
According to Lazzarato, labour constitutes itself in 
forms that are collective and, in terms of the network 
and flows, no longer just confined by the walls of the 
factory in a ‘mutation of “living labour”’ (1996). The 
productive labour of the industrial factory is becoming 
replaced by intellectual, immaterial and communicative 
labour, making everything like a factory and changing 
the social relations therein (this is where the term 
‘social factory’ applies). Furthermore, the concept of 
immaterial labour describes a rupture in the continuity 
of production, that breaks away from the centrality of 
waged labour in orthodox Marxism. Lazzarato says:
‘A polymorphous self-employed autonomous work has 
emerged as the dominant form, a kind of “intellectual 
worker” who is him- or herself an entrepreneur, inserted 
within a market that is constantly shifting and within 
networks that are changeable in time and space.’ (1996: 139)
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As a consequence of more emphasis on intellectual and 
creative work, the concept of immaterial labour accounts 
for the ways in which new management techniques appear 
to emphasise innovation, enterprise and problem-solving.  
All the same, these new techniques, such as ‘participative 
management’ may appear ‘flat’ rather than hierarchical 
but are still ‘techniques of power’ (Lazzarato 1996: 
134). As with the discussion of network control in 
the previous chapter, power is exerted through _
facilitation_ rather than direct repression. Lazzarato 
thinks participative management techniques are more 
totalitarian than the production line, as they involve 
the willing subjectivity of the worker in the process 
(1999: 224). However, conflict still arises between 
capital’s objective control and the relatively autonomous, 
subjective nature of the work. An activity such as 
hacking is a good example of the contradiction at the 
heart of capital’s attempt at control, as it is both a 
necessary and potentially disruptive skill and embodiment 
of technical knowledge in the information factory. This 
example will be expanded upon in the next section, but 
hacking represents technical knowledge useful to fix a 
problem or create a problem. The context determines 
whether complimentary or derogatory meanings are implied. 
These contradictions are particularly evident in new 
collective formations that utilise the networked 
technologies. For instance, Terranova regards mail lists 
as crucial to the development of network-organised 
forms of political organisation, enhancing connectivity 
and the open sharing of ideas. The composition of 
contemporary forms of protests in general, rejects the 
centralised form of mainstream broadcast media, for 
a counter-position that is distributed and collective 
(often referred to as a shift from a ‘one-to-many’ to 
a ‘many-to-many’ model of communication). Indymedia, 
a collective of independent media organisations and 
hundreds of journalists offering grassroots, non-
corporate coverage, is an example of this model. Such 
examples allow Terranova to argue that the Internet 
materialises ‘general intellect’ that ‘implies the 
release of a surplus value of potential’ (2002). 
Applied to the development of software in general, the 
collaborative gathering and analysis of information is 
reflected in the open source movement and what Felix 
Stalder and Jesse Hirsh call ‘open source intelligence’ 
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(2002). They point to open source principles of peer 
review, the free sharing of products, and flexible levels 
of involvement and responsibility that are all derived 
from practice and the technical possibilities of the 
Internet technologies, that facilitate free and easy 
information-sharing among peers, exemplified in ‘peer 2 
peer’ networks. Stalder and Hirsh’s examples are varied 
in scope: from the ‘collaborative text filtering’ of 
the _nettime_ mail list, itself running on the open 
source list package ‘majordomo’, to _Wikipedia_ the free 
encyclopedia built on open source principles, and the 
technological platform of ‘Wikiweb’, in which users can 
see the source code but also freely edit the content, 
archived and published under the GNU public license 
(2002). These examples illustrate general intellect and 
the ways that technical expertise and socialised labour 
work together. However, the ‘potential’ that Terranova 
refers to demonstrates both positive and negative 
tendencies, both releasing and limiting possibilities 
for future transformation. 
# open source intelligence
The effectiveness of ‘open source intelligence’ is clear 
(in contrast to what might be called ‘proprietary 
stupidity’). It is arguably more reliable, stable 
and less bug-ridden, as a result of peer review and 
collective development. There are numerous examples 
of high quality applications, operating systems 
and platforms that have been developed utilising 
collaborative programming and development environments. 
For instance, Linux was recognised by Microsoft as being 
superior to its own Windows operating system in 2000, 
and since, it has become the orthodoxy to develop even 
commercial software in this way. Fundamental to the 
commercial interest is the tradition of open source 
as a development method, based on a belief in ‘shared 
culture’ and ecology. Re-using existing code is part of 
this working principle, to avoid unnecessary work and 
the overproduction of code. Eric S. Raymond describes 
this in the following terms: ‘This attitude gives the 
best return both in the “soft” terms of developing human 
capital and in the “hard” terms of economic return on 
development investment.’ (2004: 375) 
Open source principles both contest and affirm 
capital investment on human and economic levels. The 
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contradictions reveal themselves in anomalies like the 
floatation of the open source supplier ‘Red Hat’ on the 
Stock Market, and can be seen to subsidise rather than 
undermine corporate capital. The apparent openness to 
commodification of ‘open code’ requires a distinction 
to be made between open source and free software, 
along ideological lines. This is what Richard Stallman 
(and the Free Software Foundation) attempts when he 
clarifies the distinction: ‘To understand the concept, 
you should think of “free” as in “free speech”’ (1996). 
The ‘rasta-programmer’ Jaromil goes further in referring 
to freedom from slavery to proprietary software. He has 
produced _dyne:bolic_ (2001) with these principles in 
mind: a GNU/Linux distribution on compact disc, with a 
useful assortment of applications designed to run on 
old computers and even on Xbox games consoles. In both 
references to free software, a political concept of 
freedom is emphasised, whereas open source is linked 
with pro-business computer libertarians, and the idea 
of releasing source code and developing software 
collaboratively as a potential antidote to the market 
dominance of Microsoft (Medosch 2005: 182).[14] For 
Lawrence Lessig too, in _Free Culture: How Big Business 
Uses Technology and the Law to Lock Down Culture and 
Control Creativity_ (2004), free speech is also evoked 
by quoting Thomas Jefferson on the nature of ideas, 
claiming it is a fundamental right for ideas to remain 
freely available in the public domain.
 
That ideas are not free once made tangible, and are 
subject to intellectual property rights, is a byproduct 
of an economy that has sought to commodify knowledge. 
Capital tries to treat knowledge as it would any other 
goods but does not always succeed in commodifying it, 
because knowledge cannot simply be reduced to the 
market. This is a point that Lazzarato adds, drawing 
upon the work of the sociologist Gabriel Tarde. The 
example given is the production of books, and how the 
exchange value of a book can be determined by the 
market as a product but not as knowledge, which is more 
determined by moral issues of gift or theft (Lazzarato 
1999: 162). It is easy to see evidence of this in the 
issue of intellectual property and what should or should 
not be in the public realm.[15] 
 
Another consequence of this knowledge economy is that 
places of learning are drawn closer to capitalism. At 
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the same time, it is argued by Dyer-Witheford (2005), 
drawing upon Lazzarato and Negri, that this also 
releases the potential for a more effective opposition 
(shifting antagonism from the industrial factory to 
the knowledge factory). For instance, as universities 
concentrate their energies on engineering and technology 
disciplines, forms of dissent employ the same tools. 
An example of this would be the work of The Institute 
for Applied Autonomy, who attempt to undermine the 
normalised ambivalence to art and social issues that 
characterises engineering practices, by their tactical 
interventions using robotics and mobile technologies 
(2005). The wide and free distribution of knowledge over 
the Internet is clearly a threat to the traditional 
learning institution (and the ideological state 
apparatus), and this has contributed to the rise of 
alternatives such as ‘free universities’ linked to the 
principle of ‘open source knowledge’. Henriette Heise 
and Jakob Jakobsen describe an example of this:
‘The Copenhagen Free University opened in May 2001 
in our flat. The Free University is an artist run 
institution dedicated to the production of critical 
consciousness and poetic language. We do not accept 
the so-called new knowledge economy as the framing 
understanding of knowledge. We work with forms of 
knowledge that are fleeting, fluid, schizophrenic, 
uncompromising[ly] subjective, uneconomic, acapitalist, 
produced in the kitchen, produced when asleep or arisen 
on a social excursion - collectively.’
The University of Openness, in London, is another 
example of what has become known as a ‘self-institution’ 
that allows individuals and organisations to pursue 
their shared interest in emerging forms of cultural 
production and start a ‘faculty’ to socialise their 
research.[16] Its Faculty of Unix offers free workshops 
as an alternative to the commodification of knowledge and 
of proprietary systems in general, demonstrating the 
potential of open source knowledge. Unix is a strategic 
choice of study in this respect, as it represents a folk 
tradition of ‘bottom-up’ development where ‘expertise’ 
comes from the shared culture itself, and the idealistic 
logic that a better cultural understanding of technology 
or indeed software will lead to ‘better’ implementation 
(Raymond 2004). Developed through an engineering 
tradition, Unix undoubtedly has a technical culture but 
also a conceptual and political culture (Raymond’s book 
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_The Art of UNIX Programming_ (2004) is testament to this). 
Proprietary software might be an inherently flawed 
concept on many levels, but private property remains 
a cornerstone of capitalism. The legal apparatus is 
particularly slow to adapt to the ways in which this 
paradoxical logic is challenged by the knowledge and 
information economy. This is the basis of the argument 
that Stallman makes in his ‘Why Software should not 
have Owners’, that to think of software in terms of 
material goods and to adopt its legal protections is 
anachronistic (1994). The legal apparatus remains 
poorly suited to dealing with the results of immaterial 
labour, as it still tends towards distinctions of 
property in terms of end-products after the making act, 
unable to deal with dynamic processes (Barron 2002).
Thus even on its own proprietary terms of turning 
information into commodities, the legal system fails 
to deliver. In the context of these inadequacies, 
alternative licenses, such as those provided by the 
Creative Commons initiative, are useful in providing 
flexible copyright licenses for creative works, but 
do not adequately address the criticism that they 
represent the potential for the further commodification 
of creativity and cultural work. Rather than relying 
on the legal apparatus (and particularly with Creative 
Commons in mind), David M. Berry instead proposes the 
‘Libre Commons’, rejecting ‘bureaucratic attempts to 
overcode the social through law’ and instead affirms 
the ‘intersubjective recognition and affirmation that 
commonality provides’ (2004).[17] Rather than deciding 
which license to use (from the pull down menu on the 
Creative Commons web site for instance), an alternative 
is simply deciding to reject the legal apparatus 
altogether. A weakness of open license agreements 
remains that they do not challenge intellectual property 
law at source - on the issue of property. In contrast, 
Berry’s position is in recognition of the importance of 
intellectual property and the antagonisms that arise 
from the issue of common property. 
Property thus remains, as it did at the time of Marx’s 
writing, as a key area of antagonism but its emphasis 
has changed in its application to software. As for 
software art, the issue of property is something that 
Robert Luxembourg’s _The Conceptual Crisis of Private 
Property as a Crisis in Practice_ (2003) comments upon. 
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A program script (crisis.php), an explanatory text file 
(crisis.txt) and a screenshot (crisis.png) are presented 
as a conceptual puzzle. If the program is run, it parses 
the screenshot into the full text of the novel 
_Cryptonomicon_ by Neal Stephenson (of 1999). The 
project thus forms a neat conceptual loop between 
form and content, addressing issues of encryption, 
privacy and intellectual property rights. It allows the 
reader to gain access to the novel in such a way that 
the author of the software remains within the legal 
constraints imposed on the author of the novel by the 
publishers. The lengthy title of the work indicates 
the critical trajectory of this work, based on a quote 
from Hardt and Negri’s _Empire_ (2000), and tests the 
limits of the legal apparatus that Hardt and Negri see 
as underpinning the power structures of contemporary 
capitalism. Property rights are only infringed on 
execution of the script. The software on the other hand 
is distributed overtly as free, open software under the 
terms of the GNU General Public License agreement. 
On closer examination, the work emerges from earlier 
works by Project Gnutenberg and the production of 
the software that lies behind the encryption process 
(pngreader v1.1), that works under the principle that 
images and texts have the same underlying code of 
zeros and ones. Any output that is encoded in such a 
way (using the pngwriter) can be decoded (using the 
pngreader), allowing for the covert distribution of 
copyrighted materials. The user is ‘instructed’ to 
perform an illegal act by running the php script but 
whether he/she does this or not is beyond the capacity 
of the software itself. An extreme case of the use 
of this principle and subsequent legal proceedings 
was Project Gnutenburg’s _walser.php_ (2002) in which 
the script generated a plain ascii version of Martin 
Walser’s controversial novel (of 2002) _Tod eines 
Kritikers_ [Death of a Critic]. Walser.php does not 
infringe copyright itself, but only if executed. 
The work arguably demonstrates a more radical strategy than 
clever licensing. It evokes piracy and plagiarism, already 
common practice in the wider culture, particularly in the 
distribution of music and movies, and peer to peer networks. 
Plagiarism is also an integral part of software practice 
in the free distribution and adaptation of source code 
- with or without attribution or acknowledgement. The 
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open source and free software movement clearly relies 
on forms of plagiarism for much of its work.[18] Vested 
interests around property are made evident in these 
operations of big business and the legal apparatus, in 
attempting to police these pirate operations. 
The figure of the pirate takes on a heroic status in 
these debates (and in popular culture in general), 
partly derived from its significance through action, 
uprising or insurrection - what Bey calls ‘pirate 
utopias’ in his essay ‘The Temporary Autonomous Zone’ 
(2003: 97). The historical parallel to the days of 
early capitalism is a useful one (where slave ships 
also sailed), and points to some of the underlying 
antagonisms that open code and free culture present. 
Related to this line of thinking is the project _The 
Kingdom of Piracy_ conceived by Armin Medosch, Shu Lea 
Cheang and Yukiko Shikata (2004), that explored the 
world of free software and copyleft culture. The term 
piracy is used in such work, not to describe illegal 
activity on the high seas, but more metaphorically in 
opposition to the moral legitimacy of capitalist logic. 
The moral issue is also something that the satiric 
project _Re-code.com_ highlights, responding to: ‘the 
absurdity of a system that allows corporate theft to go 
unpunished while deeply criminalising petty consumer 
theft’ (Conglomco.org & The Carbon Defense League 2004). 
The project web site contained instructions, scripts for 
generating UPC symbols, access databases of prices, etc, 
allowing consumers control over the prices they paid for 
supermarket goods. The site stayed online for ten days 
before being taken down in response to threats from Wal-
Mart. The challenge to private property in work such as 
this is overt: stealing back the value and subjectivity 
stolen from the public in the first place. What is also 
stolen back is general intellect. 
This section has tried to outline the concept of 
general intellect, to understand how the control 
of communications, and the labour related to 
communications, are crucial to the success and failure 
of the economy. However, this can only be a positive 
public force if it is at the same time political, as 
Paolo Virno explains: 
‘if the publicness of the intellect does not yield to 
the realm of the public sphere, of a political space 
in which the many can tend to common affairs, then it 
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produces terrifying effects. _A publicness without a 
public sphere_: here is the negative side - the evil if 
you wish - of the experience of the multitude.’ (2004: 40)
These issues around open source code and work represent 
an enormous subject that could occupy a thesis in 
itself, but important in this context is that these 
developments and the contradictions that arise from them 
can be seen to respond to both social and technical 
conditions. The production of software makes a good 
case study in this respect, in as far as the inherent 
contradictions can be revealed and acted upon. The next 
section addresses this issue. 
-------------------
5.3 - software work 
-------------------
Workers of all kinds find themselves in ever more 
‘precarious’ conditions. In the (overdeveloped) knowledge 
economy, the distinction between ‘cognitive’ and 
‘precarious’ work has collapsed into what chainworkers.
org call ‘precogs’.[19] The term is their attempt 
to characterise the combination of the intellectual 
labour of the ‘brainworkers’ and the manual labour of 
the ‘chainworkers’. To Lazzarato, the significance of 
this cuts across traditional class distinctions, and 
undermines the old distinction between material and 
immaterial labour introduced in the previous section. 
This also clarifies that immaterial labour has not 
replaced material labour but added to it. There is often 
confusion in this connection, as the term ‘immaterial’ 
does not mean insignificant or not material. Further 
qualification is required to emphasise that material 
goods are still being produced on a massive scale in 
parts of the world, and that the labour involved in 
producing immaterial goods is material in itself (Wright 
2005).[20] But labour has also expanded to involve 
cultural activities not traditionally considered in 
terms of work, including creative labour. Creative 
labour in this way stands for the combination of 
information worker and artist, or what in the context of 
this thesis would be the artist-programmer or software 
artist, whether working on a paid or voluntary basis. 
These developments present new contradictions over 
work, characterised not least by the prevalence of free 
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labour in the cultural realm (something familiar to arts 
practice in general). Indeed, the once straightforward 
distinction between paid and unpaid work or non-
work is also harder to differentiate. To Terranova, 
the complexity of labour in the digital economy is 
characterised by free labour in the production of 
free and open source software (2000: 33). She is 
skeptical of the link between free labour and the ‘gift 
economy’, to explain how gifts of time and ideas might 
indeed overthrow capital from within (2000: 36). She 
is referring to Richard Barbrook’s reference to the 
‘high-tech gift economy’ (1999), which is in itself a 
reference to Marcel Mauss’s anthropological examination 
of ‘gift economies’ and systems of exchange, that lie 
outside capitalism (1970).[21] The rejection of the so-
called free market for the ‘commons’ is characterised 
by Barbrook as ‘anarcho-communism’, but unlike Mauss’s 
studies of societies outside capitalism, the high-
tech gift economy is entwined in a complex relation to 
the capitalist market. What is considered ‘free’ is 
clearly based upon an infrastructure that is thoroughly 
commodified. The participatory ethic that Barbrook sees 
as shaping radical politics today in DIY culture would 
be understood by Lazzarato as an imposition of new 
forms of control and command over subjectivity, and 
like general intellect, thoroughly contradictory (1999: 
224). Social transformation, once thought to be tied to 
working class agency, now appears to be based on the 
more complex connection between the production of new 
machinic subjectivities and the recomposition of workers 
as a class linked to general intellect. 
The issue remains of how to organise a society in 
which producers-consumers give and receive, to the 
satisfaction of mutual interests that are not entirely 
based on individual reward.[22] This is a moral issue 
for Mauss, of how to shift emphasis from individualised 
benefit to social benefit. What he discovers is that 
because the ‘producer-exchanger’ is giving something of 
him/herself, he/she wants ‘recompense, however modest, 
for this gift’ (1970: 75). The recompense relies on a 
system of exchange not exclusively applied to goods and 
wealth, property and things of economic value, but other 
non-economic value. A cultural producer invests capital 
in the form of knowledge and skill, into a project with 
other rewards in mind such as peer recognition, what 
Bourdieu refers to as ‘cultural capital’. Cultural 
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capital is heavily institutionalised in various fields, 
such as the convention of academics giving papers at 
conferences and sharing knowledge for free (or even 
paying to give papers). The production of free software 
operates in similar ways but tends towards an emphasis 
on social not individual creativity. Drawing on these 
ideas and associating them with general intellect, 
Terranova explains free software not as an alternative 
to capitalism but as an expression of new forms of 
labour, that have: 
‘... developed in relation to the expansion of the 
cultural industries and are part of the process of 
economic experimentation with the creation of monetary 
value out of knowledge/culture/affect’ (2000: 38). 
In this scenario, the information worker is often 
conflated with the artist worker to characterise 
‘creative labour’. To Marina Vishmidt this conflation 
raises issues, not merely over the generality of the 
term ‘immaterial labour’ but also the ‘dogma of art 
or creativity’ (2005: 94). The final chapter will deal 
with this connection to software art in more detail, 
but first in what remains of this chapter a more general 
approach to software work will be introduced. The 
parallel between software and work is encapsulated in 
the way the personal computer has become like a personal 
factory, in which established social relations remain 
unchallenged or become even further entrenched. But 
is simply refusing to use certain software or hacking 
technologies effective refusal? The suggestion is that 
many oppositional strategies are not transformative, but 
merely oppositional. 
The chapter ends by arguing for the continued relevance 
of dialectics to respond to the contradictions in 
software work. Whereas the positions introduced in the 
first two sections point to the inadequacy of dialectics 
to deal with the crucial concept of immanence, the 
dialectical approach introduced in the previous chapter 
attempts to deal with this issue by integrating 
ideas associated with complex systems. In this way, 
contradiction can be reinstated.  
# software for work
Microsoft remain the symbolic target for criticism in 
terms of software work. Naomi Klein claims Microsoft 
134
‘wrote the operating manual’ for ‘engineering the 
perfect employee-less corporation’ through the extensive 
use of independent contractors, use of freelancers 
and outsourcing as a ‘disposable labour force’ (2001: 
249). But clearly Microsoft is symptomatic of a more 
widespread logic that applies to employment practices 
in general. Preferred patterns of work, including 
critical work, are made explicit in the availability 
and prevalence of Microsoft products in workplaces and 
universities across the world. Much commercial software 
appears to be designed to predetermine its use and deny 
the user autonomy over their work. The user or worker 
simply becomes one of the objects of a proprietary 
operating system, that permits little deviance from the 
prescriptive tasks the system allows. In ‘The Macintosh 
Computer: Archetypal Capitalist Machine?’, William 
Bowles argues that control is not only enhanced by the 
development of new technologies but also expressed 
through the technologies themselves. Writing in 1987, 
he regards the ‘user-friendly’ graphical interface of 
the computer as a further development of the industrial 
period: 
‘... where craft skills were stolen and locked into the 
industrial machine, then perfected to the point whereby 
general principles could be extracted and applied 
to ever more sophisticated machines, each in turn, 
requiring less and less skill [and labour] to operate!’ 
(2005: 50). 
In the case of Apple Macintosh,[23] what they tried to 
do with their operating system was to make a ‘universal’ 
graphic user interface, to set a standardised way 
of operating a computer that enabled the relatively 
‘unskilled’ user to gain access to computers. Yet 
specialised expertise is also required to maintain the 
‘inevitable inaccessibility of the machine itself’ at 
a deeper level. The separation serves to reinforce the 
split between technical operations and wider cultural 
work. The average user interacts with the operating 
system via a command structure, using a toolbox, and 
so on, that parallels the kinds of standards developed 
in machine tools. It may be easy to use but it is made 
impossible to use it at a greater level of operation 
(until recently at least, with Apple’s adoption of a 
Unix-based operating system). It is a closed system that 
‘mystifies’ the processes involved and the choices open 
to the user. The operating system ‘”masks” the “real” 
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operation of the computer by interposing itself between 
the user and the Central Processing Unit’, thus the 
Macintosh computer presents itself as a ‘black box’, 
denying access to its complexities (2005: 43).[24] This 
expresses dictatorial control, according to Bowles. 
The desktop metaphor of the graphical user interface 
positions the user as an office worker. In the broader 
context and ubiquity of Microsoft Office, Fuller explains 
the ‘disappearance of the worker is best achieved by 
the direct subsumption of all their potentiality within 
the apparatus of work’ (2003: 139). In the essay ‘It 
Looks Like You’re Writing a Letter’, Fuller provides a 
close analysis of the word-processing software Microsoft 
Word, distributed as part of the Microsoft Office 
package. Microsoft Word prescribes and universalises 
work and leisure activities as if the user is designed 
as part of the package, or even more so, the user’s 
labour and subjectivity are made to disappear into it 
- installed into the system, as Fuller puts it (2003: 
148). Lazzarato’s assertion (referred to earlier in 
the chapter) that facilitation involves the willing 
subjectivity of the worker, or user in the process of 
production, is a further explanation of the effectiveness 
and totalitarian tendency. 
In word-processing a text with Word, the writer becomes 
part of the machine, thoroughly embedded in the choice 
of computer and software program. This is one reason 
why Microsoft Word is not used to write this thesis, 
which also relates to Friedrich Kittler’s apology for 
the software he used to write the essay ‘There is no 
Software’ (1996). Bowles makes an issue of this too, in 
declaring his tools: a Macintosh computer and Macwrite 
word processing software (2005: 49 & 44). TextEdit, 
used to write these words, is a far simpler and less 
prescriptive program, but clearly the same issues apply. 
In the case of ‘Word’, Fuller’s suggestion is to ‘cut 
the word up, open, and into process’ (2003: 163) which 
is exactly what he did for the installation _A Song 
for Operations_, at the Lux gallery, London in 2000. 
Accompanying the exhibition, the essay lays bare ‘Word’, 
revealing it to be intentionally over-complicated but 
packaged under the mask of user-friendliness. There is 
an excess of programmed functions that serve to de-skill 
the user, such as the various forms of ‘help’ available, 
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exemplified (at the time of Fuller’s writing) by the 
cartoon Office assistant equipped with limited ‘artificial 
intelligence’ to confront the user’s assumed ‘stupidity’ 
and suggest ‘correct’ use of language. There are also a 
range of stupid templates available, such as ‘CV Wizard’, 
‘Envelope Wizard’ and ‘Letter Wizard’ (hence the title 
of his essay), but alas no ‘Suicide Note Wizard’ (2003: 
148) - something later attended to by Goriunova in 
‘Suicide Letter Wizard for Microsoft Word’ (2002), 
combining work and death (as opposed to art and life).[25] 
The underlying grammar of the software emphasises a set 
of standard tasks to be completed. The preferences of the 
program are particularly evident in ‘autocorrect’ with its 
automated spelling and grammatical corrections reflecting 
the dominance of correct English language as the globalised 
language of business. As a result, in the overall context of 
‘Office’ (the software and the workplace): ‘digital writing 
is not simply subsumed within an uninterrupted envelope 
for accessing various medial formations, but articulated, 
variegated, and positioned by the [...] culture of doing 
business’ (2003: 150). It is proprietary software in the 
fullest sense. Back home, it is likely the user is using the 
same operating system and software that they use at work, 
either working at home literally or unwittingly at leisure. 
# hacking work
Viable alternatives such as open source software can 
be identified but are they transformative? Fuller makes 
this point by asking whether ‘free software is too 
content with simply “reverse-engineering” proprietary 
software’ (2003: 162). For instance, OpenOffice’s copying 
of Microsoft Office feature-by-feature and opening up its 
source code does not represent freedom as such.[26] Its 
claim to be a free office suite rather misses the point 
and reinforces much of the same logic. Worse still, 
it could simply represent the tendency to position 
free labour within the knowledge economy (as Terranova 
expressed earlier). Both work and software should be 
open to more radical transformations.
There are numerous examples of the ways users adapt 
and use what would otherwise appear to be prescriptive 
consumer technologies - what Michel de Certeau 
calls ‘tactical’ forms and ‘makeshift creativity’, 
to assert that users oppose established rules in 
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the most ordinary of circumstances (1984: xxiv).
[27] According to Mirko Schäfer, software products 
are particularly prone to adaptation and further 
innovation by users with technical competence, and by 
the use of network communications to share ideas under 
open source principles. His examples are turning the 
Microsoft Xbox into a Linux web server, a Nintendo 
Gameboy into a music editor, and enhancing the Sony 
AIBO robot pet dog with feral behaviour (2004: 63). 
Are these positive examples of ‘general intellect’? 
Certainly modification or hacking of existing software 
and hardware demonstrates the creative and collective 
desire to adapt prescribed uses of technological goods, 
and positions the consumer as producer too. Yet these 
examples also serve to demonstrate how fast and adaptive 
companies are in recuperating these innovations. The 
unofficial development is recognised by manufacturers 
as free labour and research. Moreover, especially with 
an activity like hacking, the issue remains whether 
the activity is locked into resistance mode only, and 
does not engage sufficiently with the ways that capital 
endlessly restructures itself as an adaptive system. 
The autonomists refer to this restructuring aspect as 
the ‘cycle of struggle’. The term stresses a crucial 
issue: that resistance needs to transform itself in 
parallel to this recuperative process. This is what 
Mario Tronti calls a spiralling ‘double helix’ in which 
the restructuring of capital and the recomposition of 
the proletariat  chase each others tails  (in Dyer-
Witheford 1999: 68). It is in recognition of this 
adaptive behaviour, that more tactical and strategic 
alternatives need to be developed. Bey’s concept of the 
‘Temporary Autonomous Zone’ is one example of this, in 
response to the observation that: ‘Even the guerrilla 
Situationist tactics of street theatre are perhaps too 
well known and expected now.’ (2003: 5) Adapting the 
tradition of ‘independent media’, ‘tactical media’ is 
another strategy for making ‘temporary hybrids of old 
school political data and the aesthetics of new media’; 
for instance, producing anti-aesthetic software and 
other ‘hackivist’ strategies (Lovink 2002: 262).[28] 
Geert Lovink and Florian Schneider explain that when 
no other choice is possible, ‘sabotage can be seen as 
a sort of anticipated reverse engineering of the open 
source idea’ (2001). For example, ‘Floodnet’ software 
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was developed in 1998 by the Electronic Disturbance 
Theater, allowing for ‘virtual sit-ins’ (or online civil 
acts of disobedience) in the spirit of direct action, 
and offered as a tool to enable protestors to effectively 
shut down web servers of target institutions, by flooding 
them with requests.[29] In this example, the tactics 
associated with the refusal of labour in the material 
world are adapted to an understanding of immaterial and 
communicative labour. 
The intersections of activism and the alternative use 
of computer technologies are bound together in the term 
‘hacktivism’. As the previous section suggested, many of 
the alternatives to proprietary software do not attack 
the issue of property at source. This is the central 
argument of McKenzie Wark’s _The Hacker Manifesto_ (2004 
[2001]) to maintain a central emphasis on property. Wark 
argues that post-Marxist critique does not address this 
issue sufficiently, and the ways in which informational 
technologies have influenced the concept. His starting 
point is a Marxist position that class relations derive 
from the privatisation of the property relation, firstly 
through land and subsequently through industrial 
capital. Additionally, Wark claims intellectual property 
to be a third, distinct form of private property, which 
gives rise to a third, distinct class antagonism. He 
explains: 
‘Just as the development of land as a productive 
resource creates the historical advances for its 
abstraction in the form of capital, so too does the 
development of capital provide the historical advances 
for the further abstraction of information, in the form 
of “intellectual property”.’ (2004: 018)
Property rights have now been extended from land 
to capital to information. In Wark’s materialist 
formulation, class division is similarly regenerated, 
and it is the class associated with information 
as property and who reject its privatisation and 
commodification, who are the agents of social change. 
It is this ‘hacker class’ that hold the potential to 
exert a political agenda over property. Effectively, he 
describes a class war between those keen to privatise 
property (the legal hacks of patent and copyright by 
drug and media companies in particular) and those 
whose practice is involved in making property public 
(the hacks of file sharing and pirating activities on a 
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popular level). Wark claims: ‘Information wants to be 
free but everywhere is in chains’, playfully combining, 
or hacking, both _The Communist Manifesto_ and the hacker 
slogan (2004: 126).[30] According to his logic, information 
like other goods is owned and controlled by class 
interests, and the hacker is in a privileged position 
(like the proletariat) to overturn these relations. The 
hacker is able to disrupt the commodifying impulse of 
the legal apparatus that wants to turn information into 
property (described in the previous section in relation 
to the focus on alternative licenses). 
It is a convincing position, but there are difficulties 
(not least with the ambiguity of the term hacking itself). 
Certainly, there is no guarantee of a preferred ideological 
position in relation to hacking, despite its undoubted 
potential for forcing together new understandings from 
existing materials in the ways that montage might have 
done previously. Amy Alexander makes a similar point in 
stressing the ambiguity of the term and the apolitical 
motivation of much activity in this area. Although 
hacking generally describes an activity like crudely 
hacking a piece of wood with an axe, the application 
to computing is rather more subtle but still a general 
procedure of taking something apart, such as code. In 
general usage, the term refers to the illegal act of 
breaking into a computer, but Alexander explains the 
confusion between ‘hacking’ and ‘cracking’: the hacker 
as someone with proficiency and practical understanding 
of the structure and operations of computer networks 
and systems, but the cracker with more destructive 
tendencies: ‘some hackers crack, many hackers believe 
in exploratory cracking but not destructive cracking’ 
(2004).
 
For the purposes of this thesis, the importance is that 
the hacker expresses something of the sense of autonomy 
that the autonomists have described as lacking. This 
emphasis on the centrality of autonomous and creative 
labour is also characterised by Barbrook and Pit Schultz 
in their ‘Digital Artisans Manifesto’ (1997). It is 
argued that this transformation can come about by 
rejecting neo-liberal work patterns of the free market, 
the ‘californian ideology’ and formation of a ‘virtual 
class’. Instead they propose the ‘digital artisan’ in 
which autonomous work is made possible in the manner of 
past craft workers (1997). Yet both these formulations 
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tend towards the assumption that ‘artistic labour is 
productive labour’ (to cite Tarde, in Lazzarato 1999: 
165). Artistic labour may offer some critical potential 
in resisting commodification, but this is its potential 
more than what happens in practice. For the most part, 
the active productive human agent has been reduced to 
inert, irrelevant and useless labour-power, not least in 
the field of arts, to which it increasingly refers. 
There are other difficulties with the figure of the 
artist-programmer (or programmer as artisan in this 
connection), where the processes of programming have 
correspondingly become closed off, mystified, based 
on elitist knowledge and hence contribute to the 
return of a romanticised myth of creative genius, 
embodied in the hacker class. These positions seem to 
represent oversimplified (or mannered) versions of class 
antagonism, that do not sufficiently incorporate complex 
formulations of machinic agency, or the misery of 
precarious working conditions both in the overdeveloped 
world, but more particularly in the underdeveloped or 
developing world.[31] 
# refusing work 
Conceptual problems remain between the reconstitution of 
the proletariat and the idea of a ‘stalled dialectics’, 
in which the proletariat no longer can be seen to be 
the _privileged_ agents of social change (Terranova 
2002). To simply replace one privileged class with 
another, such as the hacker class, appears to miss the 
point. Perversely, as has been introduced earlier in the 
chapter, Negri looks to Marx to overcome the conceptual 
problems associated with revolutionary praxis. Referring 
to the _Grundrisse_, he argues that Marx uses both a 
dialectical and a non-dialectical logic suited to the 
development of the working class, from dominated labour 
power to a revolutionary class (1991: 150). Negri 
describes a more open description of the dialectical 
method:
‘Thus there is no linear continuity, but only a 
plurality of points of view which are endlessly 
solicited at each determinant moment of the antagonism, 
at each leap in the presentation, in the rhythm of the 
investigation, always looking for new presentations. 
[...] Each research result, in the presentation, 
attempts to characterize the content of the antagonism 
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and to see it, tendentially, in its own dynamism; 
when this dynamism takes off, we observe a veritable 
conceptual explosion.’ (1991: 13)
The problem Negri has with dialectics is bound up with 
Hegelian resolution and its implied attack of Spinoza’s 
sense of ‘immanence’, which remains to the autonomists 
a revolutionary theory.[32] Immanence in this sense, 
represents an emergent force with potential to resist 
power. However a dialectical approach can retain an 
incomplete synthesis (referred to in chapter 3, and 
argued by Žižek). Furthermore, Benjamin’s approach to 
dialectics provides an intervention, as he tries to 
‘halt the flow of the movement, to grasp each becoming 
as being’ - as opposed to the more classical Marxist 
approach where all social forms remain ‘in fluid 
movement’ (Tiedemann 1999: 943). Benjamin’s concept of 
‘dialectics at a standstill’ seems to draw together 
dialectics and immanence: 
‘For while the relation of the present to the past is a 
purely temporal, continuous one, the relation of what-
has-been to the now is dialectical: is not progression 
but image, suddenly emergent. (1999a: 462)
It is Benjamin’s idea of dialectics at a standstill that 
enables the rupture of the historical continuum and the 
possibility of transformation. Klee’s angel of history 
is a dialectical image to Benjamin, and an example of 
the way: ‘Images became dialectical for this philosophy 
because of the historical index of every single image’, 
and the ‘standstill’ thus rescues the image from the 
conservative historical continuum - indeed, ‘blasts’ it 
out of the continuum (Tiedemann 1999: 944).
Rather than regard dialectics itself at a standstill, 
recent conceptual formulations of power continue 
to evoke dialectical conjunctions. For instance 
in _Empire_, contemporary power is described as: 
‘characterised by a fluidity of form - an ebb and flow of 
formation and deformation, generation and degeneration’ 
(2000: 202). An argument can be made that the cycle 
of struggle needs to articulate itself in terms of 
generative processes, in lieu of the regenerative 
mechanisms built into capitalism itself. In another 
formulation, the term ‘corruption’ is used to refer to a 
perpetual becoming, that is the negation of generation. 
Hardt and Negri say capitalism is by definition a 
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system of corruption and the task is to investigate 
‘how corruption can be forced to cede its control to 
generation’ (2000: 392).[33] Thus, corruption might 
be thought of in terms of ‘de-generation - a reverse 
process of generation and composition, a moment of 
metamorphosis that potentially frees spaces for change’ 
(2000: 201). The dynamic of generation and corruption is 
especially evocative of dialectics, as it lends itself 
to the potential of destructive software to release 
further transformations. Hardt and Negri describe 
the structure of this, ‘like a software program that 
carries a virus along with it, so that it is continually 
modulating and corrupting the institutional forms around 
it.’ (2000: 197-8)
Software produced by The Museum of Ordure makes 
reference to ideas of corruption. For instance, 
_Dust_ (2000) is both a representation and a process 
of detritus that slowly ‘corrupts’, pixel by pixel. 
The corruption is triggered by viewing the image 
and in doing so, a pixel moves from one location to 
another. When no viewer is present (indicated by the 
sound falling below an ambient level), the pixels 
are rearranged back into their original order. The 
data is consistent, the pixels merely rearranged.
[34] Its dynamic form is consistent with the logic 
that any characterisation of power as chaotic must 
be countered with something equally complex. Alain 
Joxe responds to this issue, in _Empire of Disorder_, 
asking how resistance can be characterised to lead to 
a more pleasant chaos (2002: 107). His point is that 
traditional standpoints of resistance seem powerless 
to resist power, because now power is more complex 
and has taken the form of resistance itself. Order is 
now expressed through disorder, in other words. This 
asymmetry between order and disorder is partly as a 
result of the ‘decomposition’ of bipolar cold war 
oppositions, replaced with the disorder of the free 
market. As a result, what is required is a response that 
draws on systems and complexity theory. This is somewhat 
verified by Joxe’s statement that: ‘Disorder is only a 
new beginning because it potentially contains a variety 
of possible orders, a variety of scales of possible 
orders. Disorder always opens a new choice of degrees of 
order.’ (2002: 121)
In Negri’s terms, examples of reversal have not gone 
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far enough in transforming labour (and this is why he 
considers socialism to be a repressed alternative to 
capitalism [35]). For instance, labour time is more 
difficult to measure and is less distinct from time 
outside work, much of it now practised as ‘nonwork’, 
outside of traditional production processes - 
‘notworking’ as opposed to networking. These tendencies 
can partly be recognised in relation to the computer, 
in the way it has redefined social practices and 
relations. Labouring practices follow this networked 
pattern in which physical labour, intellectual labour 
and machine labour are ever more undifferentiated.[36] 
It is work itself that needs to be transformed and 
made more autonomous according to Negri, not by the 
reappropriation of work but by the refusal to work. This 
position of refusal derives from Tronti’s essay ‘The 
Strategy of Refusal’ of 1965 (1980), following the logic 
that capital ‘seeks to use the worker’s antagonistic 
will-to-struggle as a motor for its own development’ (in 
Virno 2004: 11). Refusal is seen as an affirmation of 
the worker’s creative capacities, outside of capitalist 
relations of production.[37] The creative power to 
use technology differently, to reappropriate it, still 
rests with those who have the expertise to operate it. 
Systems operators, programmers, computer scientists, 
technicians, software engineers, designers, computer-
literate office workers, and software artists clearly 
hold the potential to use and abuse this invention 
power. This is what Negri calls ‘”invention power” - 
the creative capacity on which capital depends for its 
incessant innovation’ (Dyer-Witheford 1999: 71). 
The strategy of refusal represents not a liberation 
_of_ work, but _from_ work. In terms of negation of 
negation, what is required is to first negate capitalist 
exploitation and then negate the conditions for work. 
The more complex issue is how a refusal to work can be 
extended to encapsulate general intellect. It is clear 
that any interpretation of Marx must be adapted to 
the times and the restructuring of power. Much of the 
content of this chapter is recalled in this statement: 
such as Deleuze and Guattari’s call for machinic agency, 
and Artaud’s description of disorder, demonstrating the 
potential for transformation. Although Negri argues 
against the dialectic, there appears to be an agreement 
that old forms and new forms of protest do need to 
be brought together - for instance, both hacking and 
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sabotage. The activity of hacking, if seen alongside 
other antagonist strategies that take things apart, 
offers another form of praxis, suitable for contexts that 
involve software. In conversation with Negri, this is 
what Deleuze anticipated: 
‘Computer piracy and viruses, for example, will 
replace strikes and what the nineteenth century called 
“sabotage” (“clogging” the machinery).’ (1990)[38]
New collective characterisations are required that 
respond to general intellect, according to Matteo 
Pasquinelli. For instance, he remains suspicious of the 
rhetoric around free software. His concern is how the 
discussion around open source and free software relates 
to action in the real world. As a result, Pasquinelli 
asks: 
‘How can we turn the sharing of knowledge, tools and 
spaces into new radical revolutionary productive 
machines, beyond the inflated Free Software? This is 
the challenge that once upon the time was called 
reappropriation of the means of production. [...] How do 
we start building these machines?’ (2005: 4)
Can we begin to imagine radical machines of disorder? 
If software is considered as something produced as the 
result of work and something that does work, the refusal 
to work might be extended to the reinvention of software 
that is dysfunctional, that refuses to function through 
an intricate knowledge of its inner workings. Software 
such as this would deny its potential, and represent not 
a transformation of work but from work, in the sense 
that Negri suggests with the paradoxical quote at the 
beginning of this chapter. The further issue that this 
chapter raises is whether software can be liberated from 
software work. This is the challenge for software art-work.
 
====================
6. *software praxis*
====================
‘A successful work of art, according to immanent 
criticism, is not one that resolves objective 
contradictions in a spurious harmony, but one that 
expresses the idea of harmony negatively by embodying 
the contradictions, pure and uncompromised, in its 
innermost structure.’ (Adorno, in Jay 1996: 179 [from 
_Prisms_, 1967: 32])
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Software both works and is worked upon. It follows 
that software art holds the potential to make 
apparent contradictions associated with the relations 
of production, described in the previous chapter. 
For instance, software can be programmed to act 
disruptively, such as by the refusal to work (non-
executable code) or by working in a negative mode 
or disorderly manner (dirty code), and outside the 
orthodoxy of passive work (analogous to proprietary 
models of clean and pure code). These possibilities 
make it clear that software is not simply a functional 
tool but expresses wider cultural processes and 
transformative possibilities. 
 
This final chapter returns to the central context of this 
thesis in arguing for a critical practice in software 
art that breaks the art historical continuum (what 
Benjamin refers to as ‘dialectics at a standstill’). 
Section 6.1 examines the deployment of software in 
an artistic context, by concentrating on the work 
involved in writing code and the work that the code then 
actualises when it is executed. It argues for practices 
that encourage the reader to become a writer, to become 
engaged in the production process. In the spirit of past 
critical practices, it suggests that software practices 
can be developed that do not merely reveal the inherent 
contradictions but the ways in which the apparatus 
itself is subject to ‘functional transformation’. The 
importance of this, as the quote by Adorno suggests, is 
that contradictions are not resolved but embodied.
This way of working rejects determinism associated 
with software, for something far more speculative and 
‘artistic’. Section 6.2 describes this performative 
dimension in more detail and relates it to the 
distinction between labour, work and action. Praxis, 
as action derived from theory, responds to these 
coordinates of what exists and the future possibility 
of its transformation. This description of praxis is 
derived from dialectical thinking, which undermines 
any undialectical opposition of theory and practice, 
and stresses the combination of creative and critical 
activity embodied in human action. These are words 
of warning for the traditional form of a PhD as the 
embodiment of privileged knowledge, and helps to 
stress the merits of practice-based PhDs (as in the 
case of this thesis when first written). Theory is made 
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meaningful and tested by practice, thus resists any 
simplistic separation of the two concepts. Furthermore, 
the phrase software praxis takes account of complex 
systems, in which disorder can be seen to generate a 
transformation of the system. In this way, this thesis 
suggests that the operations of the programmer and 
program, taken together, relate to transformative action. 
A focus on coding practices, code, and the execution of 
code represents the privileging of potential, expressing 
‘immanence’ as something that remains within and is 
ready to come into being. The final section 6.3, as the 
term ‘coda’ indicates, contains some concluding remarks. 
It takes the form of a series of qualifying statements 
that suggest the key issues at stake but without 
resolving them into a false sense of finality, in the 
spirit of the dialectical approach it proposes. Taken 
together, they embody what is reserred to as software praxis. 
-----------------------
6.1 - software art work
-----------------------
Software is a set of formal or logical instructions 
written in code. Computers execute these instructions 
but an emphasis on the program and the instructions 
demonstrates that these are written, that they are 
programmed through human intervention. In _The Art of 
Programming_ (1981), Knuth suggests the analogy between 
programming and recipes in a cookbook (1981), as a set 
of instructions that are to be followed. To look at the 
source code even of a meal reveals more information on 
the dish to be prepared, and whether this is likely 
to satisfy. The analogy is rather straightforward but 
reveals something of the vested interests involved in 
preparation, execution and consumption of the work. In 
relation to free software, Stallman has similarly argued 
the sharing of software is as old as computing, just 
as the sharing of recipes is as old as cooking (1998). 
The metaphor is also used by the Belgian artist group 
Constant in their ‘cuisine interne keuken’ in which they 
examine issues around cultural and precarious work. They 
explain ‘we mean that a work, an organisation is made 
of: the components (ingredients), the tools (utensils), 
workplace, and work and creation processes (recipes)’ 
(2003: 61).[1] 
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A discerning consumer should engage with the preparation 
and ingredients as much as with the end product - and 
investigate what is going on in the kitchen or farms, 
at the site of production.[2] With production in mind, 
Marx once remarked that you cannot tell from the mere 
taste of wheat who grew it (in Deleuze & Guattari 1990: 
24). The significance of this is that the end product 
gives little impression of the history of its process 
of manufacture, and no indication of the relations 
of production that were involved. In a similar way, 
Benjamin quotes Bertolt Brecht to demonstrate the 
deceptive representation of the site of production: 
‘A photograph of the Krupp works or the A.E.G. tells us 
next to nothing about these institutions. Actual reality 
has slipped into the functional. The reification of human 
relations - the factory, say - means that they are no 
longer explicit. So something must in fact be built up, 
something artificial, posed.’ (1992a: 255). 
The surface appearance of the computer is particularly 
unrevealing, and like the factory, expresses little 
of the complexity of its inward operations (like 
Bolognini’s installations of sealed computers mentioned 
in chapter 2). Even the interface of the operating 
system and other software that run on the machine hide 
their workings (as the previous chapter described). The 
trick of the software capitalist, then, is to hide the 
content (or labour) under a deceptive form (like von 
Kempelen s chess playing automaton mentioned in chapter 
3), rather than to reveal the contradictions of value 
and hence divisions of labour involved. This section 
of the chapter outlines these concerns in as far as 
they offer a political dimension to working with code, 
by stressing the work involved in coding. What Alan 
Sondheim calls ‘codework’ explains this as follows:
‘Every more or less traditional text is codework with 
invisible residue; every computer harbours the machinic, 
the ideology of capital in the construction of its 
components, the oppression of underdevelopment in its 
reliance on cheap labor.’ (2004)
This is something that Leonardo Solaas’s _Outsource 
me!_ (2005), makes explicit. Solaas reverses the usual 
outsourcing of programming work by seeking proposals 
for him to program, and in so doing confuses the usual 
power relations of a Western agency (even artist) 
using cheap labour and expertise from the developing 
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world (Goriunova 2005). The work reflects the current 
conditions of much software development that is 
outsourced to software houses in India or the Caribbean 
(Mackenzie 2005: 71). In _Outsource me_, the programmer 
voluntarily provides cheap labour by seeking proposals 
to make software (commissioned by _Readme 100 Software 
Art Factory_), in an ironic twist where the site of 
technical production becomes a conceptual artwork, that 
addresses the precarious labour relations of outsourcing. 
A critical appreciation of software development requires 
this simultaneous understanding of the production 
of its source code and execution, to elicit fuller 
technical and political detail. This has relevance for 
software arts practice too, in stressing all aspects 
of the work involved in making artwork to understand 
the contradictions that arise from production. It is 
quite common practice for examples of software art to 
hide the complex interactions of processes and code 
running on the computer behind the scenes, as well 
as the working processes of both programming and of 
programmers. Like most commercial software the source 
code that the programmer works with, remains ‘closed-
off’ and inaccessible to the experience of the user. 
For the most part, the software compiles the code into 
an executable version that ‘locks-down’ the source to 
protect proprietary interests, including intellectual 
and artistic capital.[3] It is worth stating the 
obvious, as David-Olivier Lartigaud does, that if a 
work is not open source, how can anything other than 
its execution be appreciated (2004)? Certainly the 
argument can be made that an aesthetic appreciation of 
code requires an appreciation of its written form _and/
or_ what it does when executed - analogous to poetry 
that takes both written and spoken forms. The essay ‘The 
Aesthetics of Generative Code’ (Cox, McLean & Ward 2001) 
drew an analogy between poetry and code, and argued 
that as appreciation of poetry may come from reading or 
experiencing a live spoken performance, code’s aesthetic 
value lies both in its written form and its execution. 
That the source code might be considered an integral 
part of the artwork, or even the artwork itself, remains 
outside the imagination or will of the software/art 
market, obsessed for the most part with property rights. 
This is where software art offers an alternative view, 
and is able to reveal contradictions over production, 
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peeling away the layers of operation and the relations 
of production involved in working with code, and in code 
working. An example is McLean’s _animal.pl_ (2003), 
software that ran continuously on a server connected to 
the Internet until a server crash ended its ‘life’ (a 
death notice was issued). The Perl script performed many 
activities, such as publicising its existence to various 
mail lists and making suggestions as to its life-like 
qualities. Although relatively autonomous, _animal.pl_ 
required a connection to the Internet to operate, and 
its actions were prescribed by the programmer. The last 
prescribed action _animal.pl_ performed was to apply the 
GNU Public License to itself, offering itself for others 
to modify and adapt in new ways.
Such an example goes against the grain of much software 
practice that displays an over-concentration on visual 
aspects, as is the case with arts practice in general, 
that has contributed to the neglect of more dynamic and 
complex processes. For the most part, artists collude 
with the ‘software culture industry’ on this issue, 
leaving other potentially creative realms relatively 
unexplored. In ‘There is No Software’, Kittler argues 
that hardware is obscured by software, and as a result 
confusion arises between the use of ‘formal and everyday 
languages’. He claims: ‘We simply do not know what our 
writing does’ (1996: 332). By this, he is referring 
to the ways that graphical interfaces dispense with 
the need for writing and hide the ‘machine’ from its 
users. For Kittler, this is implemented at the level 
of hardware itself, and software does not exist as a 
machine-independent faculty (1996: 334). 
Although the argument follows the concerns of the 
previous chapter and the way that subjectivity is 
embedded, clearly software can be hardware-independent. 
Recent practices in software art, such as Socialfiction.
org’s _.walk_ (2003) that does not require a computer, 
confirm this.[4] In this example, the decision-making 
processes normally assigned to machines is interpreted 
by the public and executed in the streets. It invites 
active participation in the execution of algorithms 
for walking, following the principles of ‘generative 
psychogeography’. The implementation of the algorithms 
is thus decidedly unreliable, allowing for unpredictable 
and chance encounters. Levels of complexity and 
conceptual ingenuity are evoked, not so much by 
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the programmer, but more so by the execution of the 
program by people - unlike the ‘closed’ operations of 
much contemporary software. The idea is endlessly re-
write-able in its collective distributed form and as a 
collaborative developmental model of practice in the 
open source tradition. Furthermore, it is an example of 
software art that does not require a computer at all - 
the simple technology of a pen and paper would suffice. 
To refer back to Kittler’s statement, what is also 
required is a person, or executant, who knows precisely 
what their writing does, and can act upon it.
The approach to programming is consistent with 
Benjamin’s description of what he called an ‘operative’ 
writer, who reflects upon his/her position within the 
production process like a technician (in _The Author as 
Producer_, 1934). He refers to this as: ‘Work itself 
puts in a word. And writing about work makes up part 
of the skill necessary to perform it.’ (1992b: 90) His 
example of this is the Russian writer Sergei Tretyakov, 
who as a journalist (or ‘hack’) demonstrates a working 
practice outside the established canon of literary 
forms. What Benjamin has in mind is the way that 
popular forms, such as the newspaper, might challenge 
established separations: of academic and popular modes, 
of descriptive and creative writing, of individual and 
collective property, and between writer and reader:    
‘For as literature gains in breadth what it loses in 
depth, so the distinction between author and public, 
which the bourgeois press maintains by artificial means, 
is beginning to disappear in the Soviet press. The 
reader is always prepared to become a writer, in the 
sense of being one who describes or prescribes. As an 
expert - not in any particular trade, perhaps, but 
anyway an expert on the subject of the job he happens to 
be in - he[sic] gains access to authorship. Work itself 
puts in a word. And writing about work makes up part of 
the skill necessary to perform it. Authority to write 
is no longer founded in a specialist training but in 
a polytechnical one, and so becomes common property.’ 
(1992b: 90)
This distinction between ‘the passive consumer of 
the readable (lisable) classic realist text and the 
active producer of meaning who accepts the challenge 
of the writable (scriptable) text’ (Belsey 1992: 125) 
refers back to the work of Barthes (in ‘The Death of 
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the Author’, 1977) - but in Benjamin the politics are 
foregrounded. In the context of software art, Cramer too 
draws upon Barthes’s _S/Z_ (1975) in making the same 
distinction between ‘readerly’ and ‘writerly’ texts, and 
applying this to operating systems (2003). Rather than 
the readerly properties of a GUI operating system that 
encourages consumption and hides the code, Cramer claims 
the command-line operating system of Unix is writerly, 
in terms of its openness and in encouraging the reader 
to become a producer of code. Arising from the open 
source movement and the social relations it engenders, 
Unix offers this potential to provide access to the 
hidden depths of code.[5] It is the ‘closest thing 
to a hardware-independent standard for writing truly 
portable software’ (Raymond 2004: 8). This contributes 
to what Cramer considers particularly significant, in 
breaking down the false distinction between the writing 
and the tool with which the writing is produced. He 
cites the 1998 essay by Thomas Scoville ‘The Elements 
of Style: UNIX as literature’ (2003: 102) to insist on 
the writerly aspects of programming (chapter 2 also 
provided many examples in this vein). Also emerging from 
Unix culture, the programming language Perl is eclectic 
in its combining and appropriating other languages, 
working against prescription: ‘It doesn’t try to tell 
the programmer how to program’ (Wall 1999). Perl holds 
multiple possibilities for transformation, and in using 
it programmers demonstrate the potential for good 
technique, in the sense that Benjamin describes in 
adapting the apparatus.  
The potential for transformation of the apparatus is 
what Brecht calls the ‘functional transformation’ of the 
‘forms and instruments of production’ (Benjamin 1992b: 
93). This approach goes beyond an engagement with the 
apparatus or being satisfied with finished works, but 
seeks to transform the apparatus, because only in this 
way might the relations of production be transformed 
too. In the case of software production the position 
holds relevance, in that it is not enough to simply 
reveal source code, make it free or to stress its 
potential aesthetic form (as was argued in the previous 
chapter), but it also needs to be made available for 
further transformation. Brecht’s solution was to develop 
a new form of writing that foregrounded contradiction. 
In _Critical Practice_, Catherine Belsey additionally 
proposes a new form of critical writing developed along 
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similar lines to examine the process of production 
of the text, and one that reveals the contradictions 
inherent in the form of its production (1992). This 
thesis follows these recommendations to argue for a 
critical practice that reveals contradictions related to 
the writing of software art. 
A distinction needs to be emphasised in that artificial 
languages differ from so-called ‘natural’ languages, 
though clearly there is nothing natural about either 
of them, as they are both artificial but in different 
ways. Importantly, a program is not spoken as such 
and it is written for two very different readers: the 
computer that executes it and other programmers who 
may like to understand it and revise it (Bolter 1984: 
127). These linguistic differences are also what Kittler 
has in mind when he points out that computer code is a 
very particular kind of language. He points to a key 
difference in that words of natural languages do not 
generally do what they say: ‘No description of a machine 
sets the machine into motion’ (1999). On the other hand, 
the artificial language of computer code generally does 
what it says - it executes and enacts its instructions 
or description. That computer code has both a legible 
state and an executable state, as Kittler puts it 
(1996), or contains both readable and writeable states 
at the level of language itself, is precisely the point 
for Cramer in that ‘the score is not aesthetically 
detached from its performance’ (2002a: 108). Once 
described in terms of performance (_.walk_, for 
example), some unpredictable elements are introduced, 
associated with human intervention and machinic agency. 
Contradictions between human and machine agency are 
central to Christophe Bruno’s _Human Browser_ (2006). 
Using wireless headphones, a human actor hears a text-
to-speech audio that comes directly from the Internet in 
real-time, and simply speaks the words. 
The important issue is how writing text or code relates 
to action - a point stressed at the end of the previous 
chapter. The dynamic relation between code, and the 
actions that arise from it, are an indication of 
historical processes taking place. Whereas conventional 
software production suggests a particular kind of logic 
where execution is determined by the code, software 
arts practice offers the potential to introduce looser 
thinking, ambiguity and contradiction. It is the 
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dialectical interplay between code and its execution 
that concerns this thesis and what this suggests 
in terms of the relation between past and future 
possibilities. Whatever strategy is decided upon is 
only ever part of an ongoing adaptive process, that 
is ‘never perfect, always in becoming, performative’, 
according to Lovink (2002: 264).[6] He describes this as 
‘messy praxis’ (2002: 226) which is a good term for the 
advocated approach of this thesis. Similarly, the term 
software praxis continues to place emphasis on creative 
human action and the contradictions that arise from this. 
---------------------
6.2 - software action
---------------------
Code is a notation of an internal structure that 
the computer is executing, expressing ideas, logic, 
and decisions that operate as an extension of the 
programmer’s intentions. Its written form is merely 
a computer-readable notation of logic, and is a 
representation of this process. Yet the written code is 
not entirely what the computer executes, as there are 
many levels of interpreting and compiling and linking 
taking place. Code is only really understandable within 
the context of its overall structure and the many 
processes that are running. In technical terms, the 
processor is obeying the instructions given to it and 
generating activity as part of a continuing performance. 
Many of the components are predetermined, but through 
the multiple interactions, combined with the dynamism 
and unpredictability of live action, the result is far 
from determined.[7] In the example _feedback.pl_ (2004) 
by McLean, a text editor is editing a piece of code that 
has the ability to modify itself when executed (see 
Cox at al 2004). These modifications happen directly 
to the code being edited in real-time, opening up the 
possibility for the code to fundamentally modify its 
own behaviour. Of course, this has major implications 
upon the act of programming and allows the programmer to 
edit code whilst it is being executed, and to respond 
to the live situation. The programmer is required to 
consider the code’s initial logic, as well as be able 
to follow the code’s logic after it has modified itself. 
The suggestion is that this is an example of software 
art that contains both theory (of its own agenda) and 
practice (of its own action). 
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In ‘On Code and Codework’, Sondheim clarifies the 
distinction made in the previous section between 
‘declarative and performative’ codes (2005). His 
example of a declarative code is something like Morse 
code, where one thing is equivalent to another in a 
way that would be useful for encryption. When it runs 
it does what it says. In contrast, an example of a 
performative code is Perl. Sondheim explains how Perl 
codes procedure and thus works on a more semantic level 
of understanding. He draws upon Umberto Eco’s semiotics, 
in which the possibility of code is extended from rules 
to ‘a set of possible _behavioral responses_’ which 
places Perl in the realm of performance, according to 
Sondheim (2005). In the area of software arts practice, 
programmers make music in keeping with the expressive 
qualities of live performance, by using interpreted 
scripting languages (such as Perl) and coding in real-
time using the command line interface, with the source 
code on public display as much as possible. For example, 
in the performances of slub (aka McLean and Ward), the 
intention is to open up what would otherwise seem to 
be determinate processes of how music is generated. 
Human intervention is foregrounded, and glitches become 
part of the creative output.[8] Any resulting sense of 
improvisation relies on a predictive understanding of 
complex processes or virtuosity, and an opening up to 
the transformative potential of code. Unlike a score 
that is followed but interpreted, a computer generally 
follows the instructions without interpretation. The 
intervention of the programmer allows for a less 
deterministic approach and an openness to other 
transformative possibilities, such as the possible and 
often unpredictable actions that result when a program 
runs, including mistakes. The program performs the music as 
much as the programmer, relaying instructions and acting 
upon them. But in the case of live coding performances, 
human agency is foregrounded. 
An even more extreme example would be JODI’s recent live 
performance _Desktop Improvisations_ (2004), a reworking 
of their earlier work _My%Desktop_ (2002). They exploit 
the limited potential of supplied and prescriptive software 
in a formal performance setting with seated audience, 
using the obnoxious alert sounds supplied with a standard 
Macintosh operating system, using key commands to create 
mayhem with repetitive mouse clicking. In a sense, it 
operates like a ‘hack’ of both live coding and live 
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music, that uses programming panache and improvisation 
as creative method. In this example by JODI, as with 
much of their work in general, a computer crash simply 
adds to the potential drama and an overall aesthetics of 
error. For instance, and as a response to the inevitable 
concessions of exhibiting at such a mainstream event 
as Documenta X, JODI simply produced a link that on 
clicking made the visitor’s machine crash. In these 
examples, the performance of the programmer and program 
challenge the way an operating system interpellates the 
user, and subjects the relations to systematic abuse. 
It is this performative aspect that lies hidden behind 
the surface of the software that this section aims to 
stress, in terms of its potentiality for action. This 
issue is evident in Arns’s ‘Read_Me, Run_Me, Execute_Me’ 
essay. The subtitle ‘Software Art and its Discontents’ 
(2004) suggests that the performative dimension lies 
repressed in relation to code (by making reference to 
Freud’s ‘Civilisation and its Discontents’). Using this 
analogy, a programming language such as Perl might offer 
therapeutic assistance in putting the programmer in 
touch with his/her, and indeed culture’s, sublimated 
desires - that which is repressed under capitalism, as 
the previous chapter indicated. That freedom of speech 
relates to relatively unrepressed free software, may 
be one of the analogies that lead Arns to discuss the 
performative dimension of software, through its relation 
to speech act theory. She is making particular reference 
to John Langshaw Austin’s _How To Do Things With Words_ 
(1962), to express: ‘that language does not only have 
a descriptive, referential or constative function, but 
also possesses a performative dimension’ (2004: 185). 
The performative aspect of speech is evidently social 
and context-bound, broadly differentiated in linguistic 
studies as the distinction between syntactic and 
semantic realms - emphasising the performance (or 
‘parole’) that is generated from the rules (‘langue’). 
Software art is concerned with both, but places 
emphasis on the performative aspect. Using Ferdinand 
de Saussure’s terms, software art is more concerned 
with ‘parole’ than ‘langue’ - more social and semantic 
concerns than structural or systemic ones. In semiotics, 
the abstract system (langue/competence) generates the 
concrete event (parole/performance). Arns sees speech as 
analogous to program code in that it says something and 
does something with consequences (2004: 186). Indeed, words 
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determine actions and events, and there is something 
fundamentally performative in this.[9] An effective 
speech demonstrates the potential to incite action.   
Also referring to Austin’s _How To Do Things With Words_, 
Virno says: ‘In the assertion “I speak,” I _do_ something 
by _saying_ these words; moreover, I declare what it is 
that I do while I do it.’ (2004: 90) Virno’s interest in 
speech emanates from how work is now increasingly bound 
to speaking and the use of communications technologies.
[10] A software program is particularly articulate in 
this sense, as it both says something and acts upon the 
instruction in an efficient way. It is this sense of 
action that software art might exploit, by challenging 
the expectations of the workplace. 
The emphasis on action in itself makes a distinction 
from the term work or labour. This distinction is what 
Hannah Arendt identifies in her essay ‘Labor, Work, 
Action’ (from a lecture of 1964). She identifies how 
labour (poiesis) and action (praxis) tend to be under-
acknowledged in relation to work (2000). Labour is where 
production and consumption are part of the same process, 
like activities needed to sustain life itself. Human 
labour is embedded in work only in as much as it is 
required to generate an income. Even in Marx’s writings, 
she maintains, labour is tied too firmly to work at the 
expense of action.[11] Arendt’s point is that in any of 
the differentiations that are attempted, action simply 
cannot be avoided. For instance, this is the case in her 
distinction between contemplation and action (what she 
refers to as ‘vita contemplativa’ and ‘vita activa’), 
from which she concludes that active life simply cannot 
be avoided (2000: 167). She explains that rather than 
think that all action ends in contemplation or that 
contemplation leads to action, it is not possible to go 
through life without acting in it, whereas contemplation 
is optional. Put differently, unlike praxis, theory alone 
cannot transform society.
Drawing upon the earlier distinction, the work involved 
in making software involves a labouring component, 
even if it is offered for free as in free software. 
Also software works in itself, although this cannot 
be considered labour unless tied to the labour of the 
programmer. This would be an interesting line of inquiry 
to explore and a complex one, but the important issue 
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here is how the work of art and software art undermine 
the established distinctions, and do not fit what Arendt 
describes as the ‘means-end’ chain (2000: 177). The work 
of art breaks out of this chain by not being ‘useful’ 
and thereby resisting commodification. Although the 
assumption might be made that software is generally 
useful, unlike the work of art, the work of software art 
is more ambiguous in this connection. In fact, much of 
software art is trying to break out of the commercial 
imperative to be useful, but also offers the potential to 
be useful in other directions, such as in the case of 
social or critical software, to use Fuller’s categories 
(from chapter 2). That it evokes contradictions in 
this respect, is part of its attraction for critical 
practice.
For Arendt, human action or praxis lies in this realm 
of uncertainty, as something that cannot be fully 
known but that is crucially bound up with the principle 
of freedom.[12] Making reference to Arendt’s essay 
forty years later, Virno confirms that the once 
unquestionable separation of labour (or poiesis), 
action (or praxis) and intellect has since dissolved.
[13] Whereas Arendt argues that politics imitates 
labour, he thinks the opposite, where labour imitates 
politics, or indeed, that poiesis has taken on the 
appearance of praxis (2004: 50-1). That labour takes 
on the form of political action, or more to the point 
has depoliticised action, explains what Virno refers to 
as the current ‘crisis of politics, the sense of scorn 
surrounding political praxis today, the disrepute into 
which action has fallen’ (2004: 51). He thinks that 
the purpose of any activity is increasingly found in 
the activity itself. Quoting Aristotle, Virno further 
explains the point: ‘For while making has an end other 
than itself, action cannot; for good reason itself is 
its end.’ (2004: 52)  
The importance of action is stressed in this statement, 
in that it breaks the ‘means-end’ chain. Virno 
chooses to explore this idea through a discussion 
of ‘virtuosity’ by looking at the special attributes 
of the performing artist. Here again, he is drawing 
upon Arendt’s observation that the performing arts 
have a strong affinity to politics. A performance is 
characterised by its lack of an end product, or at least 
a product that is indistinguishable from the performance 
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itself (2004: 52). Furthermore, it operates in real-
time and has its own sense of purpose or fulfilment, in 
parallel to the way that a computer program undermines 
the distinction between its function as a score and its 
performance (described in the previous section). 
It would appear that many of the attributes associated 
with virtuosity could be applied to programmers. For 
example, a hacker is someone who performs a ‘hack’: 
‘To qualify as a hack, the feat must be imbued with 
innovation, style and technical virtuousity.’ (Levy 
1994: 23, in Wark 2004) The programmer is required to 
apply their technical and cultural agility. Referring 
back to Benjamin, this alliance between cultural and 
technical skill is necessary to ‘transform him[/her], 
from a supplier of the production apparatus, into an 
engineer who sees his task in adapting that apparatus’ 
(1992b: 102). He is making an important distinction 
between theory and activism, and that it is simply not 
enough to have political commitment in itself. This 
emphasises Benjamin’s view that ‘technical progress is, 
for the author as producer, the basis of his political 
progress [sic].’ (1992b: 95). What Benjamin defines as 
a producer is applicable to the figure of the artist-
programmer involved in the production of software. It 
further relates to performance through the example of 
Brecht, who according to Benjamin, ‘opposes the dramatic 
laboratory to the finished work of art’ (1992b: 100). 
The Internet suggests itself as a potential ‘dramatic 
laboratory’.[14] Both politics and the performance 
require a ‘publicly organized space’, as does labour 
under post-Fordism (Virno 2004: 55). Virno also links 
this sense of vituousity to speech, as a phenomenon that 
has purpose in itself, does not produce an end product 
independent of the act of speech, and operates in a 
publicly organised space (again, the link between free 
speech and free software as an ongoing performance of 
shared score is evoked). He continues: ‘It is enough 
to say, for now, that contemporary production becomes 
“virtuosic” (and thus political) precisely because it 
includes within itself linguistic experience as such.’ 
(2004: 56)
The etymological root of the word program emphasises 
the material production of code as something before 
the act. In Greek ‘programma’ is ‘what is in advance 
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written’ - a set of instructions to be executed that are 
fixed beforehand. The artist-programmer Antoine Schmitt 
calls the program ‘prepared’ in this sense (2003). 
This is a useful intervention, as ‘programming’ can 
thereby be understood as a set of utterances describing 
a forthcoming action or a set of operations to be 
implemented in order to get a result, further evoking 
speech or performance. Art that is programmed holds a 
close connection with any action that is conceived in 
advance of its execution, and clues to this are to be 
found in the source code. The question for Virno is: 
‘what is the _score_ which the virtuosos-workers perform? 
What is the script of their linguistic-communicative _
performances_?’ (2004: 63). Added to this: what is the 
source code? Following Virno, the score and the source 
code is ‘general intellect’, as the ‘know-how on which 
social productivity relies’, as an ‘attribute of living 
labour’ (2004: 64-5). This know-how refers to the ways 
in which workers learn skills but also the rules of 
social behaviour by which labour-power is reproduced 
(and that maintain class divisions). The issue is 
whether this know-how is to be used for social good or 
not, as suggested in the previous chapter. The script, 
score and source code is by no means determined and does 
not have an end product in sight. It is in contrast: 
‘virtuosity without a script, or rather, based on the 
premise of a script that coincides with pure and simple 
_dynamis_, with pure and simple potential’ (2004: 66). 
Potential is that which is not yet present. That action 
might operate without a script, as a way out of the means-
end chain, is in marked contrast to Adorno’s comments 
regarding music as a by-product of a score. Adorno’s essay 
‘On the Fetish Character in Music and the Regression of 
Listening’ (1991: 29-61) suggests that the score is the 
work of art and that the listener reassembles the score 
internally. He explains that: 
‘... the essential function of conformist performance 
is no longer the performance of the “pure” work but the 
presentation of the vulgarized one with a gesture which 
emphatically but impotently tries to hold the vulgarization 
at a distance. [...] Vulgarization and enchantment, hostile 
sisters, dwell together in the arrangements which have 
colonized large areas of music.’ (1991: 36) 
To Adorno, the score is partly a purer form, more 
closely associated with production that affirms use 
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value, rather than the exchange value of the performance 
itself. In the former, the listener is encouraged to 
become a producer by executing the score, and in the 
latter, a consumer of the commodity form of music. In 
this sense, use-value is also reinstated over exchange-
value. Related to this, the performative aspect of 
working without a score but working with source code to 
avoid the end-product is evident in live coding, as well 
as other practices that privilege source code. 
The technical performance of the code object is 
characterised in this way by Adrian Mackenzie, in 
his essay ‘The Performativity of Code’ (2005). He is 
making reference to the Linux kernal both in terms of 
technical description of performance but also cultural 
ones, typified by Scott Lash’s description of power as 
performative (2005: 6); expressed through information 
and communications networks. The performative element 
is that which goes beyond reference and description. 
For instance, Radioqualia’s _Free Radio Linux_ (2001) 
is a performance in this sense. The source code of 
the Linux kernal (the core component of the GNU/Linux 
operating system) was webcast over the Internet, using 
a speech synthesizer to convert the 4,141,432 lines 
of code into talk radio. It was broadcast like other 
speech materials and presented as displaying aesthetic 
value (in a similar way to Linux’s prize at Ars 
Electronica mentioned earlier). To Mackenzie, Linux is 
a performative ‘speech act’ that produces an uncertain 
relation between the code object (the Linux kernal) and 
the code subject (the programmers), and thus challenges 
its property relations and corporate relations of 
production (2005: 13) - demonstrating collective social 
action. 
For Virno, this potential of utilising general intellect 
for political action is something necessary. He proposes 
two strategies of civil disobedience and ‘exit’ or 
defection in opposition to servility, both evoking 
disorder and the transformative potential of the script, 
score, coda - and indeed source code. In order to resist 
commodification, positive potential must remain without 
end product, remain in the public realm, and remain 
performative. A dialectical approach can accommodate 
this by its rejection of determinism, following an open-
ended process that reflects the structures it aims to 
transform. This is the critical task for software art 
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praxis, to remain in a continual state of becoming, 
where contradictions remain active. 
----------
6.3 - coda
----------
That multiple layers of meaning are possible in every 
part of a text, presents difficulties for someone trying 
to assemble a linear argument and offer a conclusion. 
What has been said in support of this thesis has been 
said, but in the interests of clarity it will finish 
with three qualifying statements (corresponding to the 
arguments in chapters 3, 4 and 5).[15] These are not 
intended as definitive statements but ideas for further 
development, as part of an ongoing dialectical process.
 
thesis 1: 
*Software art demonstrates emergent potential*
The argument for a dialectics of software art runs in 
parallel to the way in which source code is ready for 
action. A program, like any programme of action, is 
conceived in advance of its execution, and holds the 
potential to act even when not executed. Similarly, 
there may be a delay between what is known and what is 
acted upon, where practice leads to the development 
of theory (which in turn leads to the development of 
practice) and so on. The dialectical process generates 
what is already implicit, though not explicitly 
articulated. The critical task for software art lies in 
releasing transformative potential in this way. 
By analogy, software expresses the dynamic and emergent 
action between what exists and what is possible. A 
historical materialist approach to software describes 
a process where construction and execution remain in 
dialectical tension. The process remains incomplete to 
avoid critical stagnation, and one in which an open 
model is maintained over attempts to close it down. 
This clearly applies to open source code, as it does to 
the impulse to act in the world. The link to emergence 
confirms the conceptualisation of change, as something 
that expresses an immanent dynamic - or ‘transformative 
praxis’ - both as a condition and consequence of human 
agency, that generates new possibilities of change to the 
system. In terms of the production of software art, the 
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programmer and the program can exploit this potential.   
thesis 2: 
*Through disorder, software art generates transformative 
action*
Both dialectics and systems thinking share an interest 
in dynamic processes and interactions, emphasising that 
relatively small input can have massive consequences. 
They also confirm that systems are not closed but open to 
influence and change from external and internal factors, 
releasing the potential for transformative agency. In 
systems dialectics, negation is recast in terms of disorder, 
in such a way that new order can be seen to be generated 
through disorder, as an ongoing process of more extensive and 
penetrating inquiry. Further development is generated at 
the ‘bifurcation point’, or point of antagonism, causing 
an unforeseeable change to the existing system. 
As a consequence of machinic agency, tactics associated 
with negation and the refusal to work are extended 
to the desire for machines to break down and become 
disorderly. The refusal to work follows in a critical 
tradition that rejects the logic of the system and 
order it is part of. It is an antagonistic strategy 
that affirms the potential creativity and virtuosity 
of the programmer and program, and self-determination 
or autonomy over work. In this way, software art-work 
rejects itself as work and affirms its potential for 
transformative action. The importance of this lies in 
the recognition of the relationship between action and 
counteraction in the development of systems in general. 
Software art can be disruptive of the normative contexts 
in which it operates, and offer alternative concepts and 
actions.
thesis 3: 
*Software art embodies inherent contradictions leading 
to software praxis*
The contemporary description of power as an adaptive 
system does not reject but extends the emphasis on the 
mode of production as the site of antagonism. Whereas 
once labour represented the privileged site of struggle 
in dialectical thinking, it now takes on a more open 
character. The openness is in recognition of more and 
more complex and disorganised interactions between 
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people and machines, and hence in the relations of 
production that arise from these interactions. Any 
critique of the labour involved in making art must 
therefore recognise the ways in which labour has become 
more immaterial, collective and communicative.
Clearly any interpretation must be adapted to the 
times and so too with the dialectical method. This 
thesis contends that dialectics needs to be adapted to 
take account of the reconceptualisation of work and 
the complex ways in which human and/or machine social 
relations are expressed. One of the major objections 
to dialectics has been its inadequacy to deal with 
‘immanence’ as an emergent and radical force. On the 
contrary, dialectics continues to be a useful critical 
framework to describe systems that appear to contain 
the same logic: combining a technical description of a 
system and a suitable critical method for its analysis. 
A dialectical methodology engages with informational 
dynamics, whilst at the same time recognising that 
culture and criticism are themselves dynamic processes. 
A dialectics of software art requires a critical and a 
practical understanding of both art and software. 
A critical arts practice sounds like a contradiction in 
terms, in these post-political times. The once radical 
potential of conceptual or performance arts practice 
reveals how even an arts practice that strives to reject 
commodification is in turn recuperated. Software art can 
be seen to demonstrate radical enquiry and speculation, 
but on condition that it continues to transform itself 
as part of an ongoing dialectical process of seeking 
more critical depth. An open view of dialectics, that 
takes into account complex systems, allows for an 
ongoing chain of contradiction which is inherent but not 
yet present. It is the assertion of this thesis that the 
critical strategy of contradiction needs to be retained 
at all times, and that software art practice can offer 
new critical forms by embodying contradictions in the 
interplay between code and action. 
Contradiction is also embodied in the form this thesis 
takes, as a theoretical work which takes account 
of practice. Its writing, like code, lies at this 
intersection of code and action as software praxis. 
This thesis follows the conventions of critical writing 
but at the same time is a Perl script that can be 
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executed by typing ‘perl’ and the name of the file in the 
Unix command line. In this sense, it could only ever 
represent a work in progress, as something to be argued 
against, further adapted, and acted upon. It is both a 
thesis in itself and ready to express its dialectical 
potential by forming an antiTHESIS
use Net::FTP;
local $/;
open       SOURCE, “<$0”;
$source = <SOURCE>;
close      SOURCE;
$beginning = index($source, ‘antiTHESIS’) + 13;
$end       = index($source, ‘antiTHESIS’, $beginning + 1) - 1;
$byte1     = $beginning + rand($end - $beginning);
$byte2     = $beginning + rand($end - $beginning);
(substr($source, $byte1, 1), substr($source, $byte2, 1)) = 
(substr($source, $byte2, 1), substr($source, $byte1, 1));
open  SOURCE, “>$0”;
print SOURCE $source;
close SOURCE;
if ($source !~ /disorder can lead to a new sense of order/) {
  $ftp = Net::FTP->new(“thesis.anti-thesis.net”);
  $ftp -> login(“antithesis”, “sisehtitna”);
  $ftp -> cwd(“Sites”);
  $ftp -> put($0);
  $ftp -> quit;
}
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===============
7. *references*
===============
---------
7.1 notes
---------
CHAPTER 1:
[1] This is a reference to Kittler’s ‘There is no Software’ 
(1996) in which he apologises for his use of proprietary 
software and hardware to produce a ‘critical’ text.  
[2] ‘Perl’ is an acronym for ‘Practical Extraction and 
Report Language’, a high-level programming language, 
first developed for Unix by Larry Wall in 1987, and 
developed as an open source project. Perl programs are 
usually called ‘Perl scripts’ and are particularly 
useful for mixed-language script programming. ‘Unix’ is 
a trademark of The Open Group, but in general refers 
to any operating system that is either genetically 
descended from Bell Labs’s ancestral Unix code 
(developed by Dennis Ritchie and Ken Thompson in 1969) 
or written in close imitation of its descendants 
(Raymond 2004: xxix). A longer description of Perl 
(written with Adrian Ward, and published as part of 
_Software Studies_ edited by Matthew Fuller) is 
available online (http://www.softwarestudies.org/). 
[3] To execute the Perl script, please type the 
following into a Unix command line shell.
To run it once, type: 
perl antiTHESIS.txt     
To run repeatedly, type:
perl -e ‘while(1){do “antiTHESIS.txt”}’      
To run it 60,000 times, type:
perl -e ‘for(1..60000){do “antiTHESIS.txt”}’ 
The perl script has been written with the help of Adrian 
Ward.   
[4] When the text reaches a critical point of disorder, 
it will be published at: 
http://thesis.anti-thesis.net/~antithesis/
Any subsequent published version of the text will be 
licensed under the Libre Commons Res Communes License 
(http://www.libresociety.org/library/libre.pl/Libre_
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Commons) to express a cultural politics outside of the 
legal apparatus. It thereby rejects the recommended 
copyright statement for PhD submission. The program 
itself is distributed as free software, meaning you can 
redistribute it and/or modify it under the same terms as 
Perl itself (http://www.perl.com/perl/misc/Artistic.html).
[5] The use of the term ‘anticonstraint’ makes reference 
to the OuLiPo (Ouvroir de Littérature Potentielle) group 
that is discussed in more detail in chapter 2.  
CHAPTER 2: 
[1] However, many relevant histories of media arts exist, 
for instance: Paul (2003a), Rush (1999), Schwarz (1997), 
to name a few recent anthologies. Paul’s _Digital Art_ 
refers to software art as a category in itself (2003a: 
124-5). Stephen Wilson’s _Information Arts_ (2002) offers 
an alternative category, one that applies information 
theory to arts practice, but this also remains far too 
broad a description for the purpose of this thesis. 
[2] _Generator_ was curated by myself and Tom Trevor. 
See http://www.generative.net/generator/ for more detailed 
information on this exhibition and http://www.anti-thesis.
net/ for other documentation. Since, there have been a 
number of shows that take a historical perspective on 
software art: _Abstraction Now_ at the Künsterhaus Wien 
in 2003 and _White Noise_ at the Australian Centre for 
the Moving Image in 2005 are two examples. 
[3] The issue of autonomy in critical theory will be 
referred to in more detail later in this thesis, making 
reference to the work of Autonomia in particular. 
[4] Generative art was also practised among others by 
Eduardo McEntyre and Miguel Ángel Vidal (1928-) in 
Argentina, according to Osbourne (1988). Max Bense’s 
theory of ‘generative aesthetics’ (1971) which drew 
together Charles S. Pierce’s semiotics with Claude 
Shannon’s information theory, is another reference in 
this connection. 
[5] This is sometimes called ‘Cartesian linguistics’ to 
describe the separation of inner consciousness and the 
outside social world. Perhaps this is what Galanter means 
when he states that generative art is not ideological.
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[6] A concern with grammar has been particularly 
influential in generative music and composition, such 
as in the generative music of Brian Eno (using Sseyo’s 
_Koan_ software), and in key texts such as Lerdahl and 
Jackendoff’s _A Generative Theory of Tonal Music_ (1983) 
that combines the formal methodology and psychological 
concerns of Chomskian linguistics with Schenkerian music 
theory. 
[7] Bourdieu’s concept of ‘habitus’ has relevance in 
this connection. It might be compared to Chomsky’s 
generative grammar to emphasise the creative and 
active capacities of human agents but without the 
associated difficulties in Chomsky of the universal 
mind. Habitus accounts for the ways in which agents can 
act in specific ways without simply being bound by or 
following rules. It is more a set of ‘dispositions’ that 
generate practices and perceptions through ‘structured 
structures’, almost as if by second nature. A good 
example is language, and the ways in which certain forms 
of language bind people together in groups. Thus habitus 
is the ‘principle that regulates the act’ (Bourdieu, in 
Jenks 1993: 14). One might extend this to include the 
use of programming languages and the social formations 
they elicit. The important point is that agents, 
knowingly or not, generate practices in this way, and 
they do so within a broader set of social relations.
[8] The ‘clinamen’ refers to the swerving of atoms in 
Epicurean atomic theory. 
[9] Calvino’s title was plagarised for the subtitle of 
the essay ‘how I wrote one of my perl scripts’ (Cox, 
McLean & Ward 2001).
[10] This evokes what Manovich refers to as the ‘Flash 
generation’. However, his is a very general position 
emphasised by the loose statement that: ‘Programming 
liberates art from being secondary to commercial media’ 
(2002). This is what Wright is addressing, and more 
detail is required to make clearer the distinctions 
over proprietary issues and social relations engaged to 
uphold this view.
[11] Brown represents an older generation of artists 
associated with this field and has been involved in the 
research project _Cache_ (from 2002), aiming to ‘recover 
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computer arts history’ (http://www.bbk.ac.uk/hosted/
cache/). Gere’s forthcoming edited collection _White 
Heat, Cold Logic_, draws on this research.
[12] To clarify the terms: syntax is conventionally 
defined as the arrangement of words and phrases to create 
sentences, a set of rules for the analysis of this, and 
the structure of a statement in a computer language. 
Semantics is the branch of linguistics and logic 
concerned with meaning.
[13] Williams, in _Keywords_ (1988) stresses the term 
culture’s complex historical development and the ways 
in which it has become important in several distinct 
intellectual disciplines, and in several seemingly 
competing systems of thought. 
[14] This was further developed by Eco into a parody 
for generating movie scripts in 1972, preempting the 
commercial software _Plots Unlimited_ (1994) that 
exemplifies the standardisation of form in contemporary 
movie-making (in Cramer 2005: 81).  
[15] The ‘death’ was intended to shift emphasis onto 
the words on the page, or the nature of the surrounding 
language and discourse - and away from associated myths 
of originality and genius, what Barthes refers to as 
‘the “message” of the Author-God’ (1977: 146). The death 
of the programmer would be welcome in the sense that the 
programmer or software artist is often associated with 
myths of originality and genius. 
[16] This is further explained in response to Foucault’s 
question ‘Who is speaking?’ from ‘What is an Author?’ 
(1991): ‘Mallarmé replies... the word itself... in a 
pure ceremony of the Book in which the discourse would 
compose itself’ (in Burke 1992: 9). There is a pressing 
need to examine new demarcations, and the functions 
released by the alleged disappearance of the author. 
[17] Hayles’s book follows a format partly 
autobiographical and composed in close collaboration 
with a graphic designer. The results are mannered and 
awkward but the point is clearly made. The materiality 
of text or code is further verified by the property 
rights exerted on it - intellectual property would 
even cast (tangible) ideas as material objects in this 
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respect (and this is an important issue that will be 
returned to in chapter 5).
[18] A ‘Quine’ is named in honour of Willard Van Orman 
Quine, an influential mathematician and philosopher who 
died in 2000. See Gary P. Thompson’s ‘The Quine Page’ 
(http://www.nyx.net/%7Egthompso/quine.htm).
[19] Recent attention to Greenberg’s work has tended to 
concentrate on this formalist position and what he calls 
the ‘irreducible essence’ of pictorial art, in his 1965 
essay ‘Modernist Painting’ (1992). Drawing upon Kant’s 
idea of ‘self-definition’, he stresses the flatness of 
the picture plane as a distinguishing characteristic 
of Modernist painting - even Jackson Pollock’s work 
demonstrates a tension inherent in the constructed 
flatness of the surface, acccording to Greenberg. In many 
accounts, his work on abstract expressionism implies 
an endorsement of neo-liberal ideology and American 
individualism.
[20] Elsewhere this is sometimes called ‘code slang’ 
and more generally ‘code narrativity’. Clearly it is 
possible to imagine a ‘creole’ consisting of natural 
language and code such as Mez’s work (a creole is a new 
language - not an amalgam like ‘pidgin’ - formed where 
two existing languages come into contact. A further 
example would be Antiorp/Netochka Nezvanova’s semi-
legible creoles, in which meaning and authorship are 
held in question.
[21] ‘Laying bare the device’ is a phrase associated 
more precisely with Victor Shklovsky’s study of Laurence 
Sterne’s _Tristram Shandy_ (of 1759).
[22] In a similar way, Wark’s _The Hacker Manifesto_ 
requires that hackers take control and seek autonomy 
over what they produce, to identify their interests as a 
class in order to serve society as a whole, and strike 
alliances with other workers (2004). 
[23] This was a project by myself, Tim Brennan 
and Adrian Ward, exhibited online and as part of 
exhibitions: _Manifest: Library_ (1999) as part of HUB, 
Bishopsgate Goodsyard, London (commissioned by Cityside 
& University of East London); and as part of _A Timely 
Place, or, Getting Back to Somewhere_, London Print 
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Studio (2000). The paper ‘Manifest: Reframing False 
Consciousness’ was presented as part of _Consciousness 
Reframed_, University College Newport, Wales, & _
Phenomenology_ conference, University College, Cork, 
Eire (both 2000). The User’s guide is called _Manifest_, 
published by Working Press 1999. 
[24] It is tempting to playfully claim that ‘software 
art has no history’ - making reference to John Roberts’s 
_Art has no History!_ (1994) examining the ideological 
construction of art history. This in turn is a reference 
to Althusser’s statement that ‘Ideology has no History’ 
(1997), that referred to Marx’s _The German Ideology_ 
(1978 [1845/6]) in which he proposes that ideology has 
no history, ‘since its history is outside it, where 
the only existing history is, the history of concrete 
individuals’ (in Althusser 1997: 121). The idea that 
ideology has no history is thereby a negative thesis 
to indicate that ideology is pure illusion produced 
by those in power, but also its sense of history is a 
mere reflection of ‘real history’ - it has ‘no history 
of its own’ (1997: 122). If the same can be said of art 
history, can the same be said of software art history, 
to reveal that the power relations that it expresses are 
illusory in the same way?
[25] Use-value is something Saul Albert discusses in his 
essay ‘Useless Utilities’ (2002), opposing the romantic 
notion that defines art in terms of its lack of utility. 
In a worse case scenario Albert suggests that ‘art for 
art’s sake has been replaced by the idea of art for 
technology’s sake’ with software simply reduced to the 
role of tool (2002). 
[26] There are key examples in a history of art and 
technology that might be mentioned in this connection, 
such as the ‘sci-art’ work of Leonardo da Vinci and the 
‘experiments in art and technology’ (EAT) involving the 
engineer Billy Klüver working with John Cage and Robert 
Rauschenberg amongst others. Of particular interest is 
Klüver’s collaboration with Rauschenberg _9 Evenings: 
Theatre and Engineering_ (1960), which incorporated new 
technology developed by 10 artists, working with more 
than 30 Bell Labs engineers.
[27] This is the position taken by Habermas in 
‘Modernity - An Incomplete Project’ (1991 [1980]) 
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opposing emergent notions of post-modernity and post-
history at that time. Modernity describes a transition 
state between the old and the new. New technology stands 
as an exemplar for the wanton post-modern consumerist 
condition of newness never being allowed to settle in 
the present - a paradoxical combination of an obsession 
with nostalgia and at the same time with the idea of 
almost instantaneous obsolescence.
[28] It should be mentioned that the ‘Manifesto of the 
Futurists’ is often cast as proto-fascist. Elsewhere, 
Benjamin adds that the Futurist obsession with the 
aesthetics of politics rather than the politics of 
aesthetics can lead only to one thing: war. And this 
is precisely what happened, in an appropriate ironic 
twist, where the leading figures of futurism were killed 
by the very machines they valorised. Benjamin makes a 
dialectical opposition of the aesthetics of politics and 
the politics of aesthetics: ‘This is the situation of 
politics which Fascism is rendering aesthetic. Communism 
responds by politicizing art.’ (1999b: 235) 
[29] Pedagogy considered as an art form is exemplified 
by the issues of communication and distribution that 
conceptual art posed. Joseph Beuys coined the term 
‘social sculpture’ with this in mind: ‘To be a teacher 
is my greatest work of art. The rest is waste product, a 
demonstration[...]. Objects aren’t very important to me 
any more[...]. I am trying to reaffirm the concept of art 
and creativity in the face of Marxist doctrine[...]. For 
me the formation of the thought is already sculpture.’ 
(in Lippard 1997: xvii)
[30] In this context, ‘connectionism’ stands for ‘order-
emerging-out-of massive-connections’, an approach to 
artificial intelligence that later became known as neural 
networks (Kelly 2003: 360-1).
[31] A further link can be drawn to the Planetary 
Collegium (http://www.planetary-collegium.net/) of which 
Ascott is Director, and the research context from which 
this submission for PhD derives. 
[32] It should be said that the _Software_ show builds 
upon a range of other influences, such as _The Machine 
as Seen at the End of the Mechanical Age_ at the Museum 
of Modern Art (1968), and _Art by Telephone_ at the 
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Museum of Contemporary Art in Chicago (1969), as well as 
_Cybernetic Serendipity_ at the ICA in London (1968).
[33] This quote could easily have been taken from Wark’s 
_The Hacker Manifesto_ that also argues for a politics 
based on an engagement with property that has shifted 
from land, to industrial production, to information 
(2004). The _Radical Software_ journal’s current 
availability on the Internet as free PDF downloads 
is therefore thoroughly in keeping with the ethos of 
open content publishing initiatives (from http://www.
radicalsoftware.org). 
[34] Another key reference is Burnham’s ‘Systems 
Esthetics’ (1968b) that informs his _Beyond Modern 
Sculpture_. Gere’s essay ‘Jack Burnham and the Work 
of Art in the Age of Real Time Systems’ (as the title 
suggests) makes the following claim: ‘that Burnham is to 
art in the age of real time systems what Walter Benjamin 
was to art in the age of its mechanical reproducibility’ 
(2005: 149).
[35] It was the Fluxus artist Henry Flynt who allegedly 
coined the term ‘concept art’. Other influences include 
Alan Kaprow’s ‘happenings’, as well as concrete poetry, 
mail art, performances, body and street works. 
[36] This is a statement from 1967. For the _
Generator_ show, which used the quote in publicity, 
LeWitt presented a ‘serial variation’ (or algorithm) 
using found postcards of Chicago in which they become 
increasingly layered. 
[37] Somewhat similar in spirit, but with added irony, 
is Cornelia Sollfrank’s statement on her web site, made 
with reference to her net.art generators: ‘A smart 
artist makes the machine do the work!’ 
[38] Kluitenberg writes: ‘In this paradoxical 
environment [of the Internet], dominant discourses of 
social, political and economic power can be challenged 
at the level of the representational systems they 
employ. The classical avant-gardes provide a repository 
of ideas, tactics and strategies that are now played out 
in a radically enlarged context; no longer the context 
of art itself, but that of the network society.’ (2002)
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[39] This is perhaps a reference to Tristan Tzara’s 
statement of 1918: ‘There is a great negative work 
of destruction to be accomplished.’ (in Harrison & 
Wood 1998: 252) This further relates to the ‘negative 
dialectics’ of Adorno that will be introduced in the 
following chapter. 
[40] For instance, see the project _Gustav Metzger is My 
Dad_ (1998) that Camerawork organised on the occasion of 
its funding cut, where much of the paperwork associated 
with funding was shredded (http://www.anti-thesis.net/
projects/shredding/images.html). In parallel, a digital 
version shredded the html of web pages (http://www.anti-
thesis.net/projects/shredding/source.txt). I was co-
producer of these works.
[41] The source code of _biennale.py_ is available in 
spoken form (http://www.epidemiC.ws/love.mp3). That a 
virus might be regarded as a work of art has a history 
too. Citing Baumgärtel, Cramer describes the work of 
Artemus Barnoz, in 1988, secretly installing a systems 
extension that produced a new age peace message on every 
system startup (in Nori 2002: 76). 
[42] It reads: ‘:(){ :|:& };:}’. To explain, ‘:()’ 
defines a function named ‘:’, run a copy of itself if the 
function is called ‘{:|:&};’, execute the function ‘:’.
[43] The false declaration of love is a particularly 
cruel one in a world that lacks love. The analogy of the 
virus is not without its problems of description either. 
Fuller makes reference to the work of David Wojnarowicz 
who died of an AIDS related illness in 1992, and his 
realisation that he’d not only contracted a virus but 
also the realisation that society was diseased (2004: 
28).
[44] That new media looks ostensibly like old media is a 
similar observation to Jay Bolter and Richard Grusin’s 
idea of ‘remediation’ (1999) to describe the ways in 
which media are recycled into other media.
[45] Allegory is explained: ‘It has two important 
technical properties: the anti-symbolist ability to 
disrupt aesthetic illusions of the real, and the forcing 
together, through montage or image pile-ups, realms 
that are seemingly discrete, but actually connected.
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[...] Allegory is a technical means to retransmit 
discontinuity, fragmentation and a catastrophic 
structure of history.’ (Leslie 2000: 199).
[46] The description of _The Bank of Time_ is taken from 
the _Runme_ feature that I previously wrote in 2004 
(http://runme.org/project/+BoT/).
[47] Reflecting on his _Passagen-Werk_ (what elsewhere 
he called the ‘Dialectical Fairyland’, in Tiedemann 
1999: 932), Benjamin further explains his method: ‘That 
is, to assemble large-scale constructions out of the 
smallest and most precisely cut components. Indeed, 
to discover in the analysis of the small individual 
moment the crystal of the total event. And, therefore, 
to break with vulgar historical naturalism. To grasp 
the construction of history as such.’ (1999a: 461) More 
detail on this is included in chapter 3.  
CHAPTER 3:
 
[1] The Klee painting was bought by Benjamin in 1921.
[2] Leslie’s translation differs from the commonly 
distributed Harry Zohn translation (Benjamin 1999c: 
249). It also prefigures Marshall McLuhan’s statement 
that: ‘We look at the present through a rear-view 
mirror. We march backwards into the future.’ (1967: 74)
[3] This is a quite different sense of catastrophe 
than recent events that occupy the minds of those who 
fear terrorism. Slavoj Žižek would see fundamentalist 
terrorism in terms of the ‘passion for the real’ - in 
the case of 9/11, America simply ‘got what it fantasized 
about’ and the ‘Real’ violently entered everyday 
reality (2003). It was the unlikely figure of Karl-Heinz 
Stockhausen who pointed this out in his statement that 
9/11 was the ultimate work of art. 
[4] The passage is an intriguing one with many further 
references. For instance, the spiritual overtones are 
important for an understanding of Benjamin’s work. 
His interest in Messianism and the Kabbalah clearly 
has a bearing on his views of historical progress and 
redemption. To elaborate on this would be too much of a 
tangent in this connection, as would an exploration of 
the figure known as the ‘Turk’ that engages Orientalist 
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fantasies of the time. 
[5] This is also an unwitting reference to Duchamp’s 
_The Bride Stripped Bare by Her Bachelors, Even (The 
Large Glass)_ (1915-23). Duchamp is an especially 
suitable reference in this connection as he was a keen 
chess-player, interested in the automated aspects of the 
game itself.
[6] Bateson’s concept ‘metalogue’ (1972) suggests a 
similar reflexive logic in describing a conversation in 
which the form of discussion embodies the subject being 
discussed. This thesis operates in a similar manner by 
embodying the subject of software as software.
[7] There is nothing but this determining contradiction 
of matter in motion, explains Mao in his ‘On 
Contradiction’. It is through this that different forms 
can be identified such as: ‘positive and negative 
numbers in mathematics; action and reaction in 
mechanics; positive and negative electricity in physics; 
dissociation and combination in chemistry; forces of 
production and relations of production, classes and 
class struggle, in social science; offence and defence 
in military science; idealism and materialism, the 
metaphysical outlook and the dialectical outlook, in 
philosophy; and so on.’ (1977: 36). 
[8] ‘Apocatastasis’ does not appear in the dictionary 
- I assume it combines apocalyptic and stasis in 
describing damage due to lack of change on a dramatic 
scale.
[9] The quote continues: ‘The tradition of all dead 
generations weighs like a nightmare on the brain 
of the living. And just when they seem engaged in 
revolutionising themselves and things, in creating 
something that has never yet existed, precisely in such 
periods of revolutionary crisis they anxiously conjure 
up the spirits of the past to their service and borrow 
from them names, battle cries and costumes in order to 
present the new scene of world history in this time-
honoured disguise and this borrowed language.’ (Marx 
1980: 96) According to Marx, the more the present is in 
crisis, the more one has to borrow from the ‘spirits of 
the past’. Thus the living borrow from the dead - to 
stress the emphasis that Derrida grants it in _Spectres 
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of Marx_ (1994).
[10] Fukayama’s argument is that American Empire brings 
an end to European history. Derrida calls Fukuyama’s work 
the new ‘gospel’, to refer to its Christian overtones. Fukuyama 
is explicitly drawing upon Hegel’s _Phenomenology of 
Spirit_ (sometimes called _Phenomenology of Mind_) but 
also this is a reference to the work of Alexander Kojève 
of 1947, and his ‘postscript on post-history and post-
historical animals’ (1994: 70).
[11] Ironically the same criticism has been levelled 
at Marx for his mystification of the dialectical method 
- amongst others, by Popper, in _The Open Society 
and its Enemies_ (2003 [1945]). Popper is concerned 
to assess the contributions of Hegel and Marx on an 
understanding of history: ‘What I wish to show is that 
Marx’s “materialist interpretation of history”, valuable 
as it may be, must not be taken too seriously; that we 
must regard it as nothing more than a most valuable 
suggestion to us to consider things in their relation to 
their economic background.’ (2003: 120)  
[12] Ideology describes how ideas reproduce themselves. 
The history of the term ideology itself reveals a 
further connection to software in describing a genetic 
theory of ideas - and Žižek’s term for ideology 
‘generative matrix’ perhaps derives from this. 
[13] Lefebvre, referring to Hegel’s ‘end of history’, 
accuses Lukács of conceiving of the ‘end of philosophy’ 
through his theory of class consciousness (1968: 36-
7). Lurking in the background here is a more complex 
philosophical argument over the opposition of idealism 
and materialism, making reference to Marx’s ‘The German 
Ideology’ of 1845/6 and ‘Manuscripts of 1844’. Early 
Marx rejects both idealist and materialist philosophy 
for revolutionary praxis.   
[14] Terry Eagleton explains that in effect, Lukács has 
adopted Hegel’s ‘absolute idea’ for the proletariat 
and that through the dialectical method, truth can 
eventually be found in the whole through overcoming 
‘reification’. To explain reification briefly: it remains a 
useful concept under consumer capitalism, more in fact 
a precondition, as traditionally the ‘transformation of 
social relations into things’ but also the ‘effacement of 
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the traces of production’ (Jameson 1991: 314), leaving 
people to happily consume free of guilt. 
[15] Althusser is stressing the importance of the 
‘ideological State apparatuses’ (including the 
family, schools, church, legal apparatus, political 
system, trade unions, communications media, arts and 
culture, etc.) that operates more covertly than the 
overt violence of the ‘repressive State apparatuses’ 
(including the government, army, police, courts, 
prisons, etc.) (1997: 110). This is not a new phenomena. 
In pre-industrial times, the ideological state apparatus 
worked through religion predominantly, controlling other 
apparatuses like education, communications and culture. 
He thinks this central position has now been taken by 
the education apparatus in capitalist social formations 
(1997: 116), and the contemporary conception of the 
importance of the ‘knowledge economy’ would appear to 
continue his emphasis.
[16] One can easily apply this to the academicisation 
of critical theory, the publishing industry that has 
built up around it, and the abstraction of theory from 
everyday praxis: ‘The introverted thought architect 
dwells behind the moon that is taken over by extroverted 
technicians [as] no theory escapes the marketplace’ 
(Adorno 2000: 3, 4).  
[17] The integrative power and levelling tendencies of 
mass culture is what Adorno and Horkheimer’s essay ‘The 
Culture Industry’ addresses directly (1997 [1944]). 
[18] The Frankfurt Institut for Social Research developed 
Marxist social theory, influenced by Freud and Max Weber 
in particular. It is often charactised as ‘critical 
theory’ and is associated with Adorno, Horkheimer, Benjamin, 
Marcuse, Habermas, Arendt, amongst others. The work of 
Susan Buck-Morss (such as _The Dialectics of Seeing_), 
also quoted in this thesis, draws from this tradition. 
Jay’s _The Dialectical Imagination: A History of the 
Frankfurt School and the Institute of Social Research 
1923-1950_ (1996 [1973]) contains an extensive history. 
[19] The idea of awakening contained a particular 
theological and mystical significance for Benjamin. The 
dialectic of waking and sleeping is further described 
in Guy Debord’s _The Society of the Spectacle_ (1998 
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[1967]) in which the impulse is also to awaken from the 
bad dream of capitalism, to shake the sleeping political 
consciousness out of its slumber.  
[20] ‘The Spectre is Still Roaming Around!’ as Žižek 
puts it elsewhere (1998). Indeed, the first noun in _The 
Communist Manifesto_ is ‘spectre’ and it immediately 
returns (like the repressed): ‘A spectre is haunting 
Europe - the spectre of communism’ [‘Ein Gespenst 
geht um in Europa - das Gespenst des Kommunismus’]. 
Žižek used the phrase ‘The Spectre is Still Roaming 
Around!’ for the title of his introduction to the 150th 
anniversary of _The Communist Manifesto_ published as 
a separate volume (1998). Elsewhere, in _The Ticklish 
Subject_, Žižek parodies _The Communist Manifesto_, 
and playfully begins: ‘A spectre is haunting western 
academia, the spectre of the Cartesian subject. All 
academic powers have entered into a holy alliance to 
exorcise this spectre [...] (1999b: 1). 
[21] This book supports this view, not least in its 
use of the programming language Perl, in which ‘AND 
has higher precedence than OR does’, according to its 
creator Wall (1999). See the entry to _Software Studies_ 
on Perl (Cox & Ward 2007).  
[22] Popper is also a well-known critic of Marxism. In 
_The Open Society and its Enemies_ (2003 [1945]), he 
accuses Marx of overstressing economism in what he calls 
‘economic historicism’ (2003: 110). 
[23] Bhaskar’s critique also casts Darwinian evolution 
as teleological and hence closed. It is important not to 
conflate this critique with the reactionary creationism 
of fundamentalist Christians, whose sophistication 
stopped with the first chapter of _Genesis_ according to 
Bateson (2000: 434). Equally misleading and apolitical 
is the alternative view that: ‘species go extinct 
not because of bad genes but because of bad luck’ 
(David Raup in _Extinction_, quoted in Goodwin 1997: 
116). Furthermore, it makes an unacceptable political 
metaphor, of the inevitability and naturalness of 
free trade, open competition and market forces, where 
the rich get richer and so on. Engels summarises this 
problem as follows: ‘Darwin did not know what a bitter 
satire he wrote on mankind, and especially on his 
countrymen, when he showed that free competition, the 
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struggle for existence, which the economists celebrate 
as the highest historical achievement, is the normal 
state of the animal kingdom.’ (1980: 351)
[24] Prigogine and Stengers cite Ludwig Boltzman 
who investigated the correlation of probability and 
irreversibility: ‘Only when a system behaves in a random 
way may the difference between past and future, and 
therefore irreversibility, enter into its description.’ 
(1985: 16)  
CHAPTER 4:
[1] Following the economic crisis in the 1970s, Castells 
describes the conditions for the change in the evolution 
of capitalism ‘to overcome its own contradictions’, and 
to escape delimiting restrictions imposed by state-
controlled industrial forces (1996: 51). Thus, reform 
sought to deepen the capitalist logic of profit-seeking 
and enhance productivity by globalising production, 
circulation and markets, whilst establishing state 
support for these policies, often to the detriment of 
social and public interests (Castells 1996: 19).
[2] Jameson relates these economic stages directly to 
cultural production as follows: realism (worldview of 
realist art), modernism (abstraction of high modernist 
art) and postmodernism (pastiche) (1991).
[3] There are further links here that acknowledge 
relatively distinct periodisations that relate to 
machines and capitalist restructuring: this sense of 
pervasiveness enabled by networked computers corresponds 
to what Gilles Deleuze calls a ‘society of control’ 
modelled on the ‘third wave’ of computerised machines 
(in his ‘Postscript on Control Societies’, from _
Negotiations_, in Galloway 2004: 3). 
[4] Incidentally, although humans have named ants in 
pejorative terms, the ‘queen’ is not an authority or 
camp figure, merely an egg-laying ant and does not direct 
or exploit the workers as such. 
[5] Although DNA’s double helix, as the basic structure 
of life was identified in 1953 (by Francis Crick and 
James Watson), it was only by the 1970s that genetic 
engineering became widely practised with the cloning 
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of the first human gene in 1977 (Castells 1996: 48) and 
subsequently the idea of engineering life has become big 
business (with resultant battles over property rights 
and who should own the copyright on gene research). The 
ethical issue came to public attention in 1988 when 
scientist entrepreneurs at Harvard University challenged 
the moral and ethical agenda of God and Nature by 
patenting a genetically engineered mouse. By now, the 
human genome has been extensively mapped and despite the 
best efforts of those who would consider life to be in 
the public domain, scientist-entrepreneurs have gained 
legal and economic control. Thus, humans themselves 
are becoming increasingly privatised in a perversion 
of nature. Some artists are working in this area but 
tend to employ crude analogies or simply illustrate the 
issues. Eduardo Kac’s ‘transgenic’ rabbit _Alba_ is one 
provocative exception that engages with the discourse 
and ethics of genetics (http://www.ekac.org/gfpbunny.
html).
[6] Biology, like technology, is clearly caught up in 
complex cultural narratives of power, knowledge and 
subjectivity. This is reminiscent of the ways in which 
Foucault theorised the body and technology as bound 
together in the construction of power. The human genome 
project is an obvious example of the ways in which 
knowledge and power serve the interests of institutions 
over individuals (Kember 2000: 157). Foucault maintains 
that there is no unitary human subject, except that 
which is produced through discursive processes and 
forms of rationality that produce the subject as the 
object of knowledge - in the complex relationship of 
knowledge-power. Throughout the nineteenth century, 
the body was continually made subject to medical and 
psychological examinations to render ruling capitalist 
and imperial ideology as ‘true’ knowledge. This is the 
normalising power of the ‘carceral network’ that did 
not exercise power directly on the body but on the body 
as the object of knowledge. For instance, research in 
this area promises: ‘a DNA-level quality control over 
the reproduction of labor power, control aimed not at 
the cure of disease but at the disgrading of potentially 
unproductive, oversensitive, or expensive units’ (Dyer-
Witheford 1999: 106). To the artist/activist collective 
Critical Art Ensemble, this is ostensibly an eugenics 
programme. 
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[7] In the industrial period, according to Adam Smith, 
the worker ‘generally becomes as stupid and ignorant 
as it is possible for a human creature to become [and] 
in every improved and civilised society, this is the 
state into which the labouring poor, that is, the great 
body of the people, must necessarily fall’ (quoted in 
Marx 1990: 483). This is perhaps more a question of 
disaffection as the worker is no more stupid than the 
system they labour for: ‘In fact, of course, this 
“productive” worker cares as much about this crappy 
shit he has to make as does the capitalist himself who 
employs him, and who also couldn’t give a damn for the 
junk’ (Marx 1981: 273). To be fair, Smith’s argument 
is intended to suggest that education is necessary for 
these very reasons, although he does not extend this 
to an understanding of how the education system itself 
‘reproduces’ capitalist interests - something Althusser 
and Bourdieu describe in more detail (see chapter 3).  
[8] Despite this tendency to imagine the worker-less factory, 
the process of production evidently still rests on living 
labour but it is organised in network forms. Marx puts 
it like this: ‘A machine which is not active in the labour 
process is useless[...]’. (1990: 289). Even a so-called 
autonomous system cannot produce value in itself.
[9] Klein says much the same in her observations on the 
way that labour is subordinated by the machine: ‘IBM 
claims that its technology spans the globe, and so it does, 
but often its international presence takes the form of 
cheap Third World labour producing the microchips and 
power sources that drive our machines. On the outskirts 
of Manilla, for instance, I met a seventeen-year-old 
girl who assembles CD-Rom drives for IBM. I told her 
I was impressed that someone so young could do such 
high-tech work. “We make computers,” she told me, 
“but we don’t know how to operate computers”.’ (2001: 
xvii) In the chapter ‘The Discarded Factory’, Klein 
describes appalling exploitation that is the reality of 
globalisation, paying particular attention to violence 
and corruption within free trade zones.
[10] By referring to both system and hierarchy, Hardt 
and Negri aim to make a hybrid of Niklas Luhmann’s systems 
theory (in which society is described in terms of autopoesis 
rather than made by humans as such) and John Rawls’s theory 
of justice. By ‘governance without government’, they are 
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referring to the title of a book by James Rosenau and 
Ernst-Otto Czempiel (1992). Elsewhere, this myth of a democratic, 
nonhierarchical, noncentred network structure is what 
Deleuze and Guattari describe as the ‘rhizome’ (1987: 3-25).
[11] This description of a distributed management system 
lies behind the _Kurator.org_ project as a distributed 
curatorial system for open source code - using protocols 
for different ends than centralised/decentralised and 
proprietary interests. Kurator.org asks: ‘If the 
assumption is made that traditional curating follows a 
centralised network model, then what is the position of 
the curator within a distributed network model?’ (Krysa 
& Sedek 2005) The suggestion of the project is that the 
artist-programmer characterisation is extended to that 
of the curator-programmer, and software art to software 
curation.
[12] This can be traced earlier to Leibniz in the 
seventeenth century, who thought that clockwork automata 
could express perfection when constructed by God, but 
not when constructed by mere humans. According to 
Cartesian logic at this time, mind and matter are seen 
to be autonomous entities but little attention is given 
to the dynamic interrelation of the two. This is why the 
work of Leibniz is particularly influential to Wiener 
(2000: 41). 
[13] For a thorough technical history, see Paul E. 
Ceruzzi’s _A History of Modern Computing_ (2003 
[1998]). The book covers the development of the 
electronic digital computer in the 1940s to the spread 
of networking after 1985, and in the second edition 
through to the development of open source software after 
1995. In any given history, there are vested interests 
in which history is preferred. For instance, in _The 
Language of New Media_, Manovich cites Konrad Zuse 
to situate the beginnings of ‘new media’ in keeping 
with his central analogy to the history of cinema 
(2001: 25). In contrast, Geoffrey Batchen, a historian 
of photography, disputes this version of events and 
proceeds to describe photography in binary terms: 
the presence and absence of light, and on/off tonal 
patterning representing numerical repetitions of units 
to make up a whole image (Batchen, in Kimbell 2004: 29). 
Indeed, he claims it is ‘a fledgling form of information 
culture’ made more explicit by Fox Talbot’s 1839 
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proposal to replace the use of sunlight by the spark 
of electricity: ‘a making visible of electricity’ (in 
Kimbell 2004: 31). Batchen refers to a Fox Talbot image 
_Lace_ (of 1845) to make the link to a longer history of 
lace-making and computation. 
[14] In describing the factory as a ‘self-regulating 
system in embryonic form’, Marx, using bio-technological 
metaphors claimed: ‘An organised system of machines 
to which motion is communicated by the transmitting 
mechanism from an automatic centre is the most developed 
form of production by machinery. Here we have, in place 
of the isolated machine, a mechanical monster whose body 
fills whole factories, and whose demonic power, at first 
hidden by the slow and measured motions of its gigantic 
members, finally bursts forth in the fast and feverish 
whirl of its countless working organs.’ (1990: 503) Is 
the achievement of technology simply to fulfill this 
nightmarish vision of automation?
[15] Workers as ‘second-order robots’ refers to a 
history of the term ‘robot’ itself. It was allegedly 
first used by Karel Capek in his play ‘Rossum’s Universal 
Robots’, in Prague in 1921, drawing upon the Czech term 
‘robota’ which literally means ‘forced work or labour’ 
from the Latin ‘robor’ meaning power or force (Floridi 
1999: 207). The play typically describes a scenario 
in which a factory that builds artificial agents is 
eventually taken over by them and the whole of humanity 
destroyed.  
[16] This is also a reference to Benoit Mandelbrot’s _
The Fractal Geometry of Nature_, 1883, and his question: 
‘How long is the coast of Britain?’. The answer is 
infinitely long or that it depends on the length of your 
ruler. Mandelbrot surmises that as the length of the 
measurement becomes smaller, the coastline gets longer 
- to the point where it is being measured at an atomic 
scale, when it becomes infinite. 
[17] An infinite loop is a sequence of instructions in a 
computer program which loop endlessly.
[18] Boolean logic has many applications in electronics, 
computer hardware and software. In _Zeros + Ones_ (1997), 
Sadie Plant relates this logic to sexual politics. She 
explains with irony how ones and zeros, male and female, 
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penis and vagina, all make ‘lovely couples’ (1997: 35). 
In this sense, ‘It takes two to make a binary’ and 
set up the heterosexual paradigm. Taking the analogy 
to sex further, artificial life can be understood as a 
heterosexist discourse, with its emphasis on the desire 
for reproduction as one of the definitions of life (Kember 2003).
[19] The idea that a machine might demonstrate 
intelligence is derived from Alan Turing’s paper 
‘Computing Machinery and Intelligence’ of 1950, hence 
the so-called ‘Turing Test’ to measure whether a machine 
might pass for a human. Hofstadter’s ‘A Coffee House 
Conversation on the Turing Test’ (1985 [1981]) is 
sceptical about the claims of artificial intelligence, 
setting the richness of human imagination and emotions 
against the mechanicist promises of artificial 
intelligence in the form of a conversation. 
[20] In Heim’s view, class conflict is a thing of the 
past, which says something about the commodification of 
dialectics by academics and publishers alike, keen to 
appear radical to satisfy the market but not upset it.
[21] Gotthard Günther, in ‘Grundzüge einer neuen Theorie 
des Denkens in Hegel’s Logik’ [‘Main Features of a New 
Thinking in Hegel’s Logic’], situates classical binary 
logic as part of a more general and comprehensive 
multivalued or many systems logic (Paul 2000). What 
further captures the imagination is that Günther 
planned to build a ‘transputer’, a machine based 
on ‘polycontextural logic’ (how he perceived human 
consciousness). There is some contemporary interest 
in this logic in as far as it relates to networked 
technology, in that it arguably reflects Günther’s 
polycontextural logic.
 
[22] Owens is partly concerned to distance herself from 
what she sees as the mistaken (postmodern) view of 
complexity as proof of uncertainty, virtuality and 
scientific myth-making (1996). She is particularly 
thinking of Kuhn’s _The Structure of Scientific 
Revolutions_ (1970), and Paul Feyerabend’s _Against 
Method_ (1975). Owens suggests that scientific method has 
always embraced a strategic sense of uncertainty, not 
just the arts and humanities (as indicated in chapter 3 when 
discussing reflexivity and recursion). Similarly Brian 
Goodwin (in his _How the Leopard Changed Its Spots_, 
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1994) too easily equates this sense of uncertainty to 
a critique of modernity (1997: 114). He is assuming 
modernism to affirm determinism, whereas critical modernity 
has always embraced uncertainty and its own critique, 
and should therefore not necessarily be seen as deterministic 
but able to embrace its contradictions (as described in 
section 3.2, with reference to Berman in particular). 
[23] The strange attractor demonstrates ‘infinite 
regress’, an inexhaustible sequence of folding and 
stretching a line. When a change takes place in a 
predicted chain of events, the strange attractor causes 
the initial system and the disturbed system to move 
apart exponentially fast (paraphrased from Gleick 1998: 
150-1).
[24] Lukács in _History and Class Consciousness_ would 
de-emphasise the application of dialectics to nature, in 
favour of the social and conceptual realms only (1976). 
Whereas Jay describes Marcuse’s position as: ‘Natural 
being was different from historical being; mathematical, 
nondialectical physics was valid in its own sphere: 
“Nature,” Marcuse wrote, “has a history, but is not 
history”’ (1996: 73). Antonio Gramsci also shifts the 
dialectic away from the contradiction inherent in nature 
and emphasises the contradiction between reality and 
the will of the subject, in calling for a ‘pessimism 
of the intellect, [but] optimism of the will’. This is 
usually attributed to Gramsci but is a variation of 
Romain Rolland’s phrase ‘pessimism of the intelligence, 
optimism of the will’ (footnote, in Hoare & Nowell-Smith 
1971: 174).  
[25] More detail on this issue of incomplete synthesis 
was introduced in chapter 3. Otherwise, false totalities 
emerge. For example, Stalinism is accounted for its lack 
of open-endedness, as it wrongly assumed the dialectical 
process to have ended, and closed it down to drastic 
effect. 
[26] An English translation and hypertext version of 
Queneau’s ‘A Story as You Like It’ [‘Un conte à votre 
façon’] is available online (http://www.thing.de/
projekte/7:9%23/queneau_1.html).
[27] Prigogine and Stengers state: ‘A society defined 
entirely in terms of a functional model would correspond 
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to the Aristotelian idea of natural hierarchy and order. 
Each official would perform the duties for which he 
[sic] has been appointed. These duties would translate 
at each level the different aspects of the organization 
of the society as a whole. The king gives orders to 
the architect, the architect to the contractor, the 
contractor to the worker. On the contrary, termites and 
other social insects seem to approach the “statistical” 
model. As we have seen, there seems to be no mastermind 
behind the construction of the termites’ nest, when 
interactions among individuals produce certain types of 
collective behaviour in some circumstances, but none of 
these interactions refer to any global task, being all 
purely local.’ (1985: 205)
[28] For instance, and according to Owens, a theory like 
deconstruction is ‘trapped in the very dualism it seeks 
to circumvent’ (1996: 91). Other examples were mentioned 
earlier in this connection (see note 22). 
[29] Alternatively, there could be a forceful logic 
in making a historical link to Anarchist principles 
in describing a ‘political system’ that emphasises 
disorder and chaos. This is what Bey does in _T.A.Z.: 
The Temporary Autonomous Zone, Ontological Anarchy, 
Poetic Terrorism_ (2003 [1985]), describing anarchy as 
chaos, and chaos as the principle of continual creation, 
of ‘all-potentiality’ (2003: 70). He is making reference 
to what Prigogine calls ‘creative evolution’ to account 
for the creative potential of ‘perturbations, crashes, 
and breakdowns in the Net’ (2003: 111). By drawing 
upon Taoist thinking, Bey resists what he sees as the 
negativity associated with chaos theory, or its link to 
new ageism or science that sees it as a negative force 
of destruction or for enforcing order. 
[30] There are a number of examples of the ways in which 
in practice, Marxism has sought to separate dialectics 
from materialism: otherwise remaining in impoverished 
form under Stalinism, or by focusing almost exclusively 
on contradiction through Maoism (Owens cites Mao’s _On 
Contradiction_). According to Mao, there is nothing 
but contradiction of matter in motion, following in 
the tradition of Engels in this respect (see note 9 to 
chapter 3). 
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CHAPTER 5:
[1] Like Žižek, Guattari sees the reorganisation of 
better social relations as no more difficult to imagine 
than other scientific or aesthetic endeavours - no more 
difficult to ‘solve than questions of quantum physics or 
the manipulation of genes’ (1995: 46). 
[2] Guattari refers to an ‘intradisciplinary’ approach, 
as the capacity to traverse different fields, in contrast 
to an interdisciplinary approach that would tend to 
make the mistake of making a synthesis of heterogenous 
positions.  
[3] To state the obvious, the antithetical title of 
their _Anti-Oedipus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia_ 
(1990 [1972]) explicitly negates the oedipal drama; the 
subtitle indicates the ‘intradisciplinary’ principle 
(described in the previous note) of drawing together 
capitalism and schizophrenia. 
[4] To Marcuse, so-called ‘perversions’ such as 
homosexuality operate as a potential challenge to the 
exploitative organisation of labour, as expressed in 
procreative social reproduction (Geoghegan 1981: 53-4). 
Deleuze and Guattari also cite Wilhelm Reich in this 
connection to understand the mechanics of fascism. Their 
emphasis on desire explains in a more sympathetic way 
Reich’s astonishment that the masses do not steal and 
strike on a regular basis, and tolerate being humiliated 
and enslaved. Deleuze and Guattari would have us re-
read Marx, but also Adolf Hitler, to understand how 
the desiring-machine operates (in Guattari 1995: 248). 
Similarly, in the work of the Frankfurt School, Oedipal 
resistance to the father lent itself to the study of 
authority (and by extension the relationship of the 
individual to society) in as much as they were trying to 
understand the psycho-social conditions in which workers 
rejected their historical role within Marxism to accept 
Nazism. 
[5] Freud would advise that if you repress the existence 
of something, even repression itself, it will return 
anyway at unexpected moments, often as trauma. This 
Freudian model of latency is what Jameson calls the 
‘returns of the repressed of historicity’ (1991: xvi). 
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[6] The surrealist Francis Picabia describes the machine 
as ‘the daughter born without a mother’ (in Guattari 
1995: 125).
[7] Indicating his intellectual preferences, Leclaire 
would like to reintroduce some dualisms such as the 
real and the symbolic (Lacan), or the base and the 
superstructure (Marx). 
[8] Negri also co-wrote _Communists Like Us_ with 
Deleuze (1990). As part of the Italian group ‘autonomia’ 
founded in the 1970s, Negri and others tried to open 
up new possibilities for the theory and practice of 
class struggle. Many of the ideas associated with 
autonomia were developed through the journal _Futur 
Antérior_ [future perfect], and the contributions of 
Hardt, Lazzarato, Negri, Virno, mentioned later in this 
chapter.
[9] It represents ‘simultaneous separation and 
coherence’, according to Jim Fleming in the ‘Editor’s 
Preface’ (1991: vii) in words that echo the process 
of connections and rupture described in the work of 
Deleuze and Guattari (in Guattari 1995: 126-7). To add 
more detail and theoretical connections, Negri’s _Marx 
after Marx_ results from a series of lectures at the 
Université Paris in 1978 at the invitation of Althusser.
[10] ‘Subsumption’ indicates the ways that one thing 
is absorbed into another. In this context, class 
exploitation is subsumed into broader social forms and 
life in general.
[11] The ‘multitude’ (taken from Benedict de Spinoza’s 
phrase ‘democracy of the multitude’), expresses the 
‘coexistence of the positive and the negative on the 
terrain of immanence’ according to Hardt and Negri 
in _Empire_ (2000: 374). Their _Multitude: War and 
Democracy in the Age of Empire_ adds more detail on 
the possibility for a revolutionary democracy, as does 
Virno’s _A Grammar of the Multitude_ (2004), drawing 
particularly on the contrasting views of Thomas Hobbes 
and Spinoza to develop an understanding that is derived 
from Marx’s idea of general or mass intellect.
[12] Hardt and Negri say: ‘The proletariat is not what 
it used to be, but that does not mean it has vanished’ 
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(2000: 53). A broader definition of proletarians would 
include the ‘marginalised proletariat’ of students, the 
unemployed and unpaid house workers. Even technologies 
that have changed the nature of work might also be 
described as somewhat ‘proletarianised’ according 
to John Armitage (2002). Some commentators, in what 
Armitage calls the ‘neoliberal discourse of technology’ 
(2002), would go further and suggest that not only is 
human labour no longer at the centre of production but 
technology is instead. For more on this, see Jeremy 
Rifkin’s _The End of Work_ (1995) - although this is not 
a view this thesis supports.
[13] This understanding builds upon the work of Habermas 
in his _Theory of Communicative Action_ (1984), that 
updates the concept of historical materialism to take 
account of communicative action. 
[14] The free distribution of source code is free only 
in the sense that it can be further adapted and changed 
(under certain conditions of course). This is what 
Stallman refers to as ‘copyleft’ protected by the GNU 
public license agreement for future free provision and 
distribution under the same conditions. See http://www.
opensource.org/ and then http://www.fsf.org/ for more 
detail on the distinction between this and open source.
[15] The distribution of new knowledge associated with 
a PhD thesis is similarly revealing. This explains 
the purpose of the manner in which this thesis is 
distributed. It is first copyrighted in the standard 
way, but at a point in its future development the 
text will be published on the web and licensed under 
the Libre Commons Res Communes License. See chapter 1 
(introduction) for further explanation of this. 
[16] See the web site (http://twenteenthcentury.com/uo/
index.php), and for its Faculty of Unix, running since 
2002 (http://darq.org.uk/FacultyUnix).
[17] For more on the Libre Commons License, see the web 
site (http://www.libresociety.org/library/libre.pl/
Libre_Commons/). In a recent posting to the _nettime_ 
mail list, Cramer is scathing of this approach: ‘This 
is a romantic apolitical position because such a space 
“outside of all legal jurisdictions” does not exist. 
Wake up and get a life.’ Berry counters this with the 
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following: ‘Incidentally, you may be interested to know 
that law requires a state to enforce it, and, to the 
best of my knowledge, we do not *yet* have a global 
state, and consequently the spaces between nation states 
(such as the high seas) are not subject to law as such 
(rather international treaties which attempt to govern 
these ungovernable spaces).’ (2005)
[18] It was le Comte de Lautréamont, who in 1870 
claimed: ‘Plagiarism is necessary. Progress implies 
it. It embraces an author’s phrase, makes use of his 
expressions, erases a false idea, and replaces it with 
the right idea.’ This was later plagiarised by Guy 
Debord as follows: ‘Plagiarism is necessary. Progress 
demands it. Staying close to the author’s phrasing, 
plagiarism exploits his expressions, erases false ideas, 
replaces them with correct ideas.’ (from ‘Negation 
and Consumption’, in _The Society of the Spectacle_, 
1998: 145). Stewart Home further claims that this was 
wrongly attributed and Lautréamont plagarised the 
quote: ‘Old discoveries belong to those who put them 
to use’. Home has reworked it too as: ‘Progress is 
necessary. Plagiarism demands it’ (these quotes are left 
unreferenced in the spirit of their contents). 
[19] Chainworkers.org’s slogan is ‘Chain and 
brainworkers unite’ (http://www.chainworkers.org/) 
referred to by Lazzarato (2003).  
[20] This also accounts for further misconceptions such 
as Lunenfeld’s term ‘dialectical immaterialism’ (2002), 
to contribute to critical discussions about ‘technology 
untethered to the constraints of production’. As 
much as the phrase is evocative of the approach 
this thesis takes, Lunenfeld’s statement is a severe 
misunderstanding of the ways in which production has 
expanded to the whole of society, with cultural work 
thoroughly integrated in the social factory.   
[21] However, Barbrook’s position should not be 
dismissed out of hand, as it is also one that responds 
critically to what he calls ‘the Californian ideology’ 
that typifies the combination of technological 
determinism and free market principles. The example is 
_Wired_ magazine, that reproduces an ideology based upon 
‘Darwinian thinking and techno-mysticism’ according to 
Stallabrass (2003: 149).
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[22] For example, Mauss refers to ‘potlatch’, a 
ceremonial feast at which possessions are give away or 
destroyed to display wealth or enhance status (1970: 5).
[23] The first Apple Macintosh and its ‘desktop’ 
graphical user interface was introduced in 1984. 
Bowles is referring to the Apple II. Apple remains 
the machine of choice in most ‘creative’ contexts. In 
the most recent reprint of his essay, Bowles adds some 
more recent reflection but in general finds its general 
argument holds (2005). 
[24] In a similar way, Latour describes a situation 
where the seemingly impossible task of opening Pandora’s 
black box is made possible by experiencing technology 
at work, not ready-made - but ‘in action’ and ‘before 
the box closes and goes black’ (1999: 21). ‘Black box’ 
is a phrase from cybernetics, applied when a piece of 
machinery or a set of commands are too complex to be 
easily understood. This applies almost by default to 
software where the complex processes and actions are 
obscured. 
[25] The online description reads: ‘Suicide Letter 
Wizard for Microsoft Word helps you to create a suicide 
letter according to your preferences. Use professional 
design. Choose from a variety of styles. Make your 
letter look great.’ (http://www.dxlab.org/slw/). 
[26] OpenOffice.org is a multiplatform and multilingual 
office suite and an open-source project. Compatible with 
all other major office suites, the product is free to 
download, use, and distribute (http://www.openoffice.
org/).
[27] This would be in keeping with the position of de 
Certeau, who asserted that users oppose established 
rules in the most ordinary of circumstances (1984). 
Through what he calls ‘antidiscipline’, consumers 
negotiate discipline and power exerted on them. By 
employing what he calls ‘tactical’ forms and ‘makeshift 
creativity’, consumers ‘make use of techniques for re-
employment in which we can recognize the procedures of 
everyday practices. A politics of such ploys should be 
developed’ (1984: xxiv). 
[28] The term ‘tactical media’ is variously defined, 
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but emerges from a group of media activists in Rome in 
1996. Lovink’s involvement in tactical media emerges 
from the _Next 5 Minutes_ festival (which began in 1993) 
and other collaborative writings; for instance ‘The ABC 
of Tactical Media’ (1997) with David Garcia, and ‘New 
Rules for the New Actonomy’ (2001) with Schneider. For 
Critical Art Ensemble, the concept is a way of avoiding 
the ‘dense arcane style of the Frankfurt Institut’ 
(2002: 27), and a way of asserting difference from avant-
garde practices for ‘electronic civil disobedience’ 
(2002: 13). 
[29] For example, this ‘distributed-denial-of-
service’ was used by the Zapatistas against the Mexican 
government and against the WTO at the time of Seattle in 
1999 (Medosch 2003: 17). 
[30] Or, as Eben Moglen puts it: ‘A spectre is haunting 
multinational capitalism - the spectre of free 
information.’ (2003: 216) Moglen is a lawyer who has 
contributed to the development of the General Public 
License (GPL) with Stallman. His full parody continues: 
‘All the powers of “globalism” have entered into an 
unholy alliance to exorcize this spectre: Microsoft 
and Disney, the World Trade Organization, the United 
States Congress and the European Commission. Where are 
the advocates of freedom in the new digital society 
who have not been decried as pirates, anarchists, 
communists? Have we not seen that many of those hurling 
the epithets were merely thieves in power, whose talk 
of “intellectual property” was nothing more than an 
attempt to retain unjustifiable privileges in a society 
irrevocably changing? But it is acknowledged by all 
the Powers of Globalism that the movement for freedom 
is itself a Power, and it is high time that we should 
publish our views in the face of the whole world, 
to meet this nursery tale of the Spectre of Free 
Information with a Manifesto of our own.’ (2003: 216) 
Also making explicit reference to the _The Communist 
Manifesto_, Wark claims that what now haunts the world 
is the spectre of ‘hacking’. However, he claims his 
manifesto is neither an orthodox Marxist tract nor post-
Marxist repudiation, but a ‘crypto-Marxist reimagining 
of the materialist method for practising theory within 
history’ (2004: 024). 
[31] The phrase ‘precarious labour’ has become increasingly 
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popular in the activist community to describe the 
material reality of intermittent and irregular work that 
‘teeters’ on the edge of moral acceptability and the 
ability to generate a living wage, although it should be 
noted that it is not labour in itself that is precarious 
but the ‘technical and cultural conditions in which 
info-labour’ finds itself (Beradi 2005). 
[32] Negri’s position on Spinoza is developed in his 
essay ‘The Savage Anomaly’ of 1980.
[33] For more on this, see Reiner Schürmann, _Des 
hégémonies brisées_, Mouvezin: T.E.R., 1996 (in Hardt 
& Negri 2000: 389). The term ‘corruption’ is borrowed 
from Aristotle’s _De generatione et corruptione_ (1982), 
again cited in _Empire_.
[34] The dialectical operation between states of order 
and disorder also underpins Signwave’s _Anagrammar_ 
(2001), an unruly version of Microsoft Powerpoint 
or Apple Keynote (produced to accompany the essay 
‘The Aesthetics of Generative Code’ for conference 
presentation, Cox, McLean & Ward 2001). Whilst 
presenting text slides on screen, it ‘listens’ to the 
current sound input source, and when a sound occurs, 
starts to jumble up the letters of the current slide. 
When the sound falls below an ambient level, the letters 
are rearranged back into their original order. Both 
examples demonstrate a dialectical play between two 
interconnected states of order and disorder, between 
generation and corruption, suggesting the potential 
for transformation. In the context of this thesis, the 
examples offer a dialectical approach that responds to an 
understanding of complexity theory (as argued at the end 
of chapter 4).
  
[35] Negri’s negative view of socialism is perhaps 
informed by the various failed examples of ‘real 
existing socialism’ observed at the time of writing 
in 1985. With Hardt, he charts the tragic irony in 
that nationalist socialism comes to resemble national 
socialism, because the same machine of national 
sovereignty lies behind the logic of both. As a result, 
they maintain ‘we are not anarchists but communists 
who have seen how much repression and destruction of 
humanity have been wrought by liberal and socialist 
big governments. We have seen how this is being re-
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created in imperial government, just when the circuits 
of productive cooperation have made labour as a whole 
capable of constituting itself as a government’ (2000: 350).
[36] Pasquinelli identifies action related to labour, 
politics and art, as integrated into each other, making 
everyone ‘workers-artists-activists’ (2005: 2). 
[37] The Situationist International also made much 
of this strategy of refusal in the May ‘68 uprisings 
in announcing ‘Don’t Work!’ and ‘Never Work!’ (Ford 
2005: 119 & 123). The Situationist refusal to work is 
paralleled by the Neoist ‘artstrike’ calling on cultural 
workers to stop making or discussing their work from 
1990 to 1993 - although this is simply plagiarising 
Metzger’s 1974 proposal for an Art Strike, according to 
Home (1993). In the context of performance art, refusing 
to work can be a provocative action, such as the example 
of Roy Varra who simply stood in Tianneman Square, and 
although doing nothing, was arrested. 
 
[38] Deleuze explains that a sabot was a worker’s wooden 
clog. In the context of programming, ‘deprogramming’ 
is one example of calling to attention the structures 
and standard formats of software. This strategy makes 
reference to the Situationist ‘détournement’ of 
technology.
CHAPTER 6:
[1] Lévi Strauss’s _The Raw and the Cooked_ (1970) 
provides a further reference in which the ‘raw’ 
associated with nature is opposed to the ‘cooked’ 
associated with culture. His approach is structuralist 
anthropology drawing upon semiotics, where the raw 
‘signifier’ enters into the realm of the ‘signified’ when 
cooked. The analogy between recipes and source code is 
further explored in the barszcz source code repository 
that includes Jaromil’s string based cooking (http://
www.barszcz.net/). 
[2] To Adorno and Horkheimer, the analogy to the 
production of food also reveals that: ‘the culture 
industry perpetually cheats its consumers of what 
it perpetually promises[...] that the diner must be 
satisfied with the menu’ (1997: 139). What is on offer is 
bad for the digestion.
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[3] The artist-programmer Mark Napier says much the 
same: ‘In the software industry the code is very valuable 
since it contains the knowledge, recipe or blueprint of 
how the software product is made. The binary “executable” 
is distributed to the world, but the source code is 
carefully guarded. As an artist I’m happy to share most 
of my source code with other artists.[...] Whoever owns 
the source code in effect “owns” the artwork.’ (2000)
[4] Socialfiction.org’s _.walk_ won the first prize in 
the software art category at transmediale in 2004 (see 
Cox, Reas & Rich 2003). A simple stroll algorithm 
follows: ‘// Classic.walk; Repeat { 1st street left; 2nd 
street right; 2nd street left }’. This is both clearly 
understandable even to the non-specialist and wildly 
unpredictable in its outcomes.
[5] Unix is open in the broadest sense in that its 
API (application programming interface) works across 
different computer platforms. Most servers rely on Unix, 
and it underpins the Internet protocol of TCP/IP.  
[6] Elsewhere Lovink charts this crisis of the 
intellectual, tracing Gramsci’s idea of the ‘organic 
intellectual interfacing with ordinary people to 
the contemporary distrust of the concept of the 
intelligentsia in the post-political era. In the 
knowledge economy, the intellectual has become a 
faceless professional, and sadly lacks a public role in 
society. Accordingly, the suggestion is that the link 
between the intellectual and the public might be forged 
in virtual space - the ‘virtual intellectual’ (2002: 
30). This might be wishful thinking, but expresses 
the potential for a new kind of collective engagement 
with ideas in keeping with a re-engagement with the 
Internet as public sphere (located in the sphere of the 
negative as Lovink puts it). Rejecting the ‘free-market 
way of thinking’ the virtual intellectual is more of 
a ‘free-floating’ knowledge worker (a less aloof term) 
who engages with other workers and is ‘always under 
construction’ (2002: 38-9). This also emphasises Virno’s 
point referred to in the previous chapter in relation 
to general intellect - and the importance of the public 
sphere in generating positive potential. 
[7] This description is adapted from the previous 
collaborative paper ‘Coding Praxis’ (Cox, et al 2004).
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[8] For instance, the work of toplap (http://www.toplap.
org/) who perform music using live coding and display 
their desktop screens in the spirit of transparency of 
process (Collins et al 2003). This is not intentionally 
a politicised practice at all (and consequently suffers 
from the problem of virtuosity as an individualised 
display of skill), but holds the potential to be a 
critical practice in the sense this section describes.
[9] Or, actions and events determine words. This is 
the irony of Bruno’s _Human Browser_ (2006) mentioned 
previously in this thesis.
[10] Although it should be noted that Virno argues the 
opposite to Arns, in claiming that it is not the parole 
but the langue which is mobilised (2004: 91).
[11] The distinction between work and labour is hard to 
fathom, as both words broadly refer to the same thing. 
Arendt quotes John Locke: ‘the labor of our body and 
the work of our hands’ (2000: 170). She adds that most 
European languages make similar distinctions: ‘arbeiten’ 
and ‘werken’ in German; ‘laborare’ and ‘fabricari’ in 
Latin; ‘ponein’ and ‘ergazesthai’ in Greek. It seems 
that the human body is given over to labour, the 
reproductive process, the biological and the link to the 
human organism (even the pains of birth are associated 
of course). Thus labouring is tied more closely to 
the cycles of life itself, as it ‘corresponds to the 
condition of life itself’ and lasting happiness and 
contentment lies in ‘painful exhaustion and pleasurable 
regeneration’ (Arendt 2000: 172).
[12] This position is developed in Virno’s ‘Virtuosity 
and Revolution: The Political Theory of Exodus’ (1996: 
188). 
[13] Praxis is clearly an important issue in Marxist 
philosophy. Lefebvre explains that human creation can 
be explained as praxis in which humans transform nature 
through ‘the unity of the sensuous and the intellectual, 
of nature and culture’ (1968: 39).  
[14] The issue of the Internet as an extension of 
the public sphere makes reference to Habermas’s _The 
Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere_ (1985) 
and texts such as Mark Poster’s ‘Cyberdemocracy: 
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Internet and the Public Sphere’ (1997).  
[15] This approach to a conclusion is inspired by 
Virno’s _A Grammar of the Multitude_ (2004).
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